238 lines
9.3 KiB
Markdown
238 lines
9.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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authors:
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- "Alberti, Anthony L."
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- "Agarwal, Vivek"
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- "Gutowska, Izabela"
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- "Palmer, Camille J."
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- "de Oliveira, Cassiano R. E."
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citekey: "albertiAutomationLevelsNuclear2023"
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alias: "albertiAutomationLevelsNuclear2023"
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publish_date:
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2023-03-01 journal: "Progress in Nuclear Energy"
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volume: 157
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pages: 104559
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last_import: 2025-07-30
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---
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# Automation levels for nuclear reactor operations: A revised perspective
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## Indexing Information Published: 2023-03
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**DOI**
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[10.1016/j.pnucene.2022.104559](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pnucene.2022.104559)
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#Small-modular-reactor, #Microreactor, #Advanced-sensors,
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#Artificial-intelligence, #Automation-levels, #Digital-twin,
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#Fission-battery, #Reduced-order-model
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#InFirstPaks
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>[!Abstract] This work serves to propose updated levels of
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>automation for nuclear reactor operations, as a result of
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>considering long-term economic and commercial ambitions of
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>the advanced reactor developer community. As in other
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>fields such as road-going vehicles and aviation, reactor
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>technologies can benefit from modern automation through the
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>resulting reduction in operations and maintenance costs,
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>while still maintaining the current industry standards
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>regarding safety, resilience, reliability, overall
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>performance, and the capacity for root-cause analysis. The
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>current guidelines on automation levels, as published by
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>the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Section 9 of
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>NUREG-0700, reflect outdated design principles that
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>implicitly limit the potential of automation innovation for
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>reactor operations, particularly in regard to advanced
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>reactors intended to operate in remote locations or be used
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>for off-grid applications. Motivated by the operational
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>paradigms anticipated for future reactor designs, we
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>propose a six-level approach that aligns with contemporary
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>automation concepts as well as automation level definitions
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>from other non-nuclear safety–critical industries. These
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>levels build upon the current guidelines in order to enable
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>next-generation nuclear reactor technologies to become
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>increasingly economically competitive and commercially
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>viable relative to competing power generation sources.
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>Using a hypothetical heat removal reactor transient, we
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>provide examples of how the human–machine interactions
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>change at each level of automation, ranging from
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>traditional operator control (Level 0) to operator-free
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>unattended operations (Level 5)—the latter being one of the
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>key attributes proposed at the Fission Battery Initiative
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>led by Idaho National Laboratory. Finally, we critically
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>examine the identified challenges, knowledge gaps, and
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>enabling technologies to achieve advanced levels of
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>automation.>[!seealso] Related Papers
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>
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## Annotations ### Notes ![[Zettelkasten/Literature
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Notes/Notes on Papers/Automation levels for nuclear reactor
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operations- A revised perspective-notes.md]]
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### Highlights From Zotero
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>[!highlight] Highlight we propose a six-level approach that
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>aligns with contemporary automation concepts as well as
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>automation level definitions from other nonnuclear
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>safety-critical industries. 2025-07-24 9:42 am
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>
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>[!done] Important For typical reactors in the current
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>fleet, 70% of their non-fuel O&M costs relate to labor
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>[12]. 2025-07-24 9:44 am
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>
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>[!tip] Brilliant The various levels of automation, as per
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>Section 9 of NUREG-0700, ultimately rely on a
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>human-in-the-loop to monitor plant performance and
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>intervene when necessary. Under these guidelines,
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>automation technology aims to provide operator support,
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>rather than replace operator duties in regard to sustained
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>day-to-day operational and tactical control. 2025-07-24
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>9:51 am
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>
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>[!tip] Brilliant Recognizing that operations plans
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>contradicting these guidelines can receive NRC approval
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>through sufficient reasoning, we posit that this
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>requirement implicitly limits the ambitions and desired
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>operational paradigms of the advanced reactor developer
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>community, and creates a potentially detrimental disconnect
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>with the regulator. This is particularly applicable in the
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>case of fully autonomous human-out-of-the-loop-based
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>operations (a key facet of the “unattended” attribute
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>adopted in the FB Initiative [21]). 2025-07-24 9:51 am
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>
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>[!done] Important In terms of classifying tasks for
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>automation in nuclear power plant operations, O’Hara and
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>Higgins break down the tasks for which reactor operators
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>are responsible into two general types: primary and
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>secondary [23]. Primary tasks, which are the main focus of
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>this work, directly impact the overall functionality and
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>safety of the plant. Secondary tasks encompass all other
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>intermediate tasks, such as navigating, arranging, and
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>interrogating information at workstations and control
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>panels [24, 23]. 2025-07-24 11:22 am
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>
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>[!tip] Brilliant Monitoring and detection covers activities
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>related to obtaining information about a system or
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>subsystem. This can simply mean tracking parameters on a
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>control panel or sending personnel to visually verify that
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>a component is functioning properly. Situation assessment
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>refers to evaluating obtained data and determining the
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>state of a system or subsystem. This typically involves
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>understanding whether the given plant or system is
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>operating properly. If any anomaly is found, the underlying
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>causes are investigated. Response planning refers to
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>determining proper courses of action, based on the
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>situation assessment. Response implementation encompasses
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>performing the actions identified in the response plan.
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>2025-07-24 11:29 am
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>
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> *This is all really important, and outlines the chain of
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> actions that a nuclear plant operator would take.*
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>[!highlight] Highlight Strategic operations consider the
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>questions of whether, when, and where. 2025-07-28 11:38 am
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>
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>[!highlight] Highlight Operational and tactical operations
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>pertain to the context of vehicle motion. These impact
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>longitudinal (acceleration/deceleration) and lateral
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>(steering) actions, object detection, maneuver planning,
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>and response execution. The number/combination of automated
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>driving tasks—as well as which operational design domain
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>they fall underlargely determine the automation level of a
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>particular driving task. 2025-07-28 11:38 am
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>
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>[!highlight] Highlight The minimal risk condition is a
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>predetermined state in which either a user or automated
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>system recognizes a potentially hazardous situation and
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>subsequently circumnavigates it to minimize risk. Fallback
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>is the response to encountering a potentially hazardous
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>situation 2025-07-28 11:43 am
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>
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>[!tip] Brilliant Level 3: The system recognizes a crash
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>scene and requests that the driver resume control and
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>provide fallback (e.g., engage hazard lights and enter the
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>unobstructed shoulder lane). Level 4/5: Even if the driver
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>is unresponsive to the fallback request, the automated
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>system is able to achieve the minimal risk condition or
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>circumnavigate the hazard. 2025-07-28 11:44 am
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>
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>[!done] Important The automation tipping point occurs at
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>Level 4, with the automated flight system becoming able to
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>sufficiently control operational and tactical tasks, such
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>that a human pilot is no longer required. Rather, the ECA
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>suggests the implementation of a mission commander, who is
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>in command but not in control. 2025-07-28 11:48 am
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>
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> *Higher levels of optimization actually reduce the
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> training demand of operators. We see this all over the
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> place with things like ChatGPT. They remove the grunt work
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> so the human can think **strategically**.*
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>[!tip] Brilliant At Level 5, the commander simply provides
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>strategic commands to the system—without controlling the
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>aircraft at any point. 2025-07-28 11:48 am
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>
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>[!done] Important Additionally, we assume strategic
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>operations to not be automated at any level. These are
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>reserved for human command, either onsite via an operator
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>or reactor supervisor, or offsite via a reactor supervisor.
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>Only operational and tactical tasks are considered for
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>automation. 2025-07-28 11:53 am
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>
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>[!highlight] Highlight Following the definition presented
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>by the SAE, automatic active safety systems (e.g., the ADS
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>in the ESBWR) are not classified as automated. Rather,
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>these systems provide safety measures to ensure the
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>ultimate safety of the plant, and thus should be included
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>at every automation level. 2025-07-28 12:59 pm
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>
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### Follow-Ups
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>[!example] In the present paradigm, much of this automation
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>comes in the form of operator support. Examples include
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>computerized operator support systems that assess various
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>alarms and provide fault diagnoses to operators [26, 27,
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>28, 29], computer-based procedure systems that provide
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>necessary data and procedures to assist operators by
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>identifying tasks in real-time to foster safety goal
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>achievement [30, 31, 32], and the automatic activation of
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>primary safety systems (e.g., emergency core cooling
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>systems) during severe accidents.
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>- [ ] #Follow-Up
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>[!example] [23] J.M. OHara and J.C. Higgins. Human-system
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>Interfaces to Automatic Systems: Review Guidance and
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>Technical Basis. Technical Report BNL–91017-2010, 1013461,
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>2010. URL https://doi.org/10.2172/1013461. [24] John M.
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>O’Hara, William S. Brown, Paul M. Lewis, and J.J.
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>Persensky. The Effects of Interface Management Tasks on
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>Crew Performance and Safety in Complex, Computer-Based
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>Systems: Overview and Main Findings (NUREG/CR-6690), 2002.
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>URL https://www.nrc.gov/
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>reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr6690/vol1/index.html.
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>- [ ] #Follow-Up
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