9.2 KiB
| authors | citekey | alias | publish_date | journal | volume | pages | last_import | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
albertiAutomationLevelsNuclear2023 | albertiAutomationLevelsNuclear2023 | 2023-03-01 | Progress in Nuclear Energy | 157 | 104559 | 2025-07-30 |
Automation levels for nuclear reactor operations: A revised perspective
Indexing Information
Published: 2023-03
DOI 10.1016/j.pnucene.2022.104559 #Small-modular-reactor, #Microreactor, #Advanced-sensors, #Artificial-intelligence, #Automation-levels, #Digital-twin, #Fission-battery, #Reduced-order-model
#InFirstPass
[!Abstract] This work serves to propose updated levels of automation for nuclear reactor operations, as a result of considering long-term economic and commercial ambitions of the advanced reactor developer community. As in other fields such as road-going vehicles and aviation, reactor technologies can benefit from modern automation through the resulting reduction in operations and maintenance costs, while still maintaining the current industry standards regarding safety, resilience, reliability, overall performance, and the capacity for root-cause analysis. The current guidelines on automation levels, as published by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Section 9 of NUREG-0700, reflect outdated design principles that implicitly limit the potential of automation innovation for reactor operations, particularly in regard to advanced reactors intended to operate in remote locations or be used for off-grid applications. Motivated by the operational paradigms anticipated for future reactor designs, we propose a six-level approach that aligns with contemporary automation concepts as well as automation level definitions from other non-nuclear safety–critical industries. These levels build upon the current guidelines in order to enable next-generation nuclear reactor technologies to become increasingly economically competitive and commercially viable relative to competing power generation sources. Using a hypothetical heat removal reactor transient, we provide examples of how the human–machine interactions change at each level of automation, ranging from traditional operator control (Level 0) to operator-free unattended operations (Level 5)—the latter being one of the key attributes proposed at the Fission Battery Initiative led by Idaho National Laboratory. Finally, we critically examine the identified challenges, knowledge gaps, and enabling technologies to achieve advanced levels of automation.>[!seealso] Related Papers
Annotations
Notes
Highlights From Zotero
[!highlight] Highlight we propose a six-level approach that aligns with contemporary automation concepts as well as automation level definitions from other nonnuclear safety-critical industries. 2025-07-24 9:42 am
[!done] Important For typical reactors in the current fleet, 70% of their non-fuel O&M costs relate to labor [12]. 2025-07-24 9:44 am
[!tip] Brilliant The various levels of automation, as per Section 9 of NUREG-0700, ultimately rely on a human-in-the-loop to monitor plant performance and intervene when necessary. Under these guidelines, automation technology aims to provide operator support, rather than replace operator duties in regard to sustained day-to-day operational and tactical control. 2025-07-24 9:51 am
[!tip] Brilliant Recognizing that operations plans contradicting these guidelines can receive NRC approval through sufficient reasoning, we posit that this requirement implicitly limits the ambitions and desired operational paradigms of the advanced reactor developer community, and creates a potentially detrimental disconnect with the regulator. This is particularly applicable in the case of fully autonomous human-out-of-the-loop-based operations (a key facet of the “unattended” attribute adopted in the FB Initiative [21]). 2025-07-24 9:51 am
[!done] Important In terms of classifying tasks for automation in nuclear power plant operations, O’Hara and Higgins break down the tasks for which reactor operators are responsible into two general types: primary and secondary [23]. Primary tasks, which are the main focus of this work, directly impact the overall functionality and safety of the plant. Secondary tasks encompass all other intermediate tasks, such as navigating, arranging, and interrogating information at workstations and control panels [24, 23]. 2025-07-24 11:22 am
[!tip] Brilliant Monitoring and detection covers activities related to obtaining information about a system or subsystem. This can simply mean tracking parameters on a control panel or sending personnel to visually verify that a component is functioning properly. Situation assessment refers to evaluating obtained data and determining the state of a system or subsystem. This typically involves understanding whether the given plant or system is operating properly. If any anomaly is found, the underlying causes are investigated. Response planning refers to determining proper courses of action, based on the situation assessment. Response implementation encompasses performing the actions identified in the response plan. 2025-07-24 11:29 am
This is all really important, and outlines the chain of actions that a nuclear plant operator would take.
[!highlight] Highlight Strategic operations consider the questions of whether, when, and where. 2025-07-28 11:38 am
[!highlight] Highlight Operational and tactical operations pertain to the context of vehicle motion. These impact longitudinal (acceleration/deceleration) and lateral (steering) actions, object detection, maneuver planning, and response execution. The number/combination of automated driving tasks—as well as which operational design domain they fall underlargely determine the automation level of a particular driving task. 2025-07-28 11:38 am
[!highlight] Highlight The minimal risk condition is a predetermined state in which either a user or automated system recognizes a potentially hazardous situation and subsequently circumnavigates it to minimize risk. Fallback is the response to encountering a potentially hazardous situation 2025-07-28 11:43 am
[!tip] Brilliant Level 3: The system recognizes a crash scene and requests that the driver resume control and provide fallback (e.g., engage hazard lights and enter the unobstructed shoulder lane). Level 4/5: Even if the driver is unresponsive to the fallback request, the automated system is able to achieve the minimal risk condition or circumnavigate the hazard. 2025-07-28 11:44 am
[!done] Important The automation tipping point occurs at Level 4, with the automated flight system becoming able to sufficiently control operational and tactical tasks, such that a human pilot is no longer required. Rather, the ECA suggests the implementation of a mission commander, who is in command but not in control. 2025-07-28 11:48 am
Higher levels of optimization actually reduce the training demand of operators. We see this all over the place with things like ChatGPT. They remove the grunt work so the human can think strategically.
[!tip] Brilliant At Level 5, the commander simply provides strategic commands to the system—without controlling the aircraft at any point. 2025-07-28 11:48 am
[!done] Important Additionally, we assume strategic operations to not be automated at any level. These are reserved for human command, either onsite via an operator or reactor supervisor, or offsite via a reactor supervisor. Only operational and tactical tasks are considered for automation. 2025-07-28 11:53 am
[!highlight] Highlight Following the definition presented by the SAE, automatic active safety systems (e.g., the ADS in the ESBWR) are not classified as automated. Rather, these systems provide safety measures to ensure the ultimate safety of the plant, and thus should be included at every automation level. 2025-07-28 12:59 pm
Follow-Ups
[!example] In the present paradigm, much of this automation comes in the form of operator support. Examples include computerized operator support systems that assess various alarms and provide fault diagnoses to operators [26, 27, 28, 29], computer-based procedure systems that provide necessary data and procedures to assist operators by identifying tasks in real-time to foster safety goal achievement [30, 31, 32], and the automatic activation of primary safety systems (e.g., emergency core cooling systems) during severe accidents.
- #Follow-Up
[!example] [23] J.M. OHara and J.C. Higgins. Human-system Interfaces to Automatic Systems: Review Guidance and Technical Basis. Technical Report BNL–91017-2010, 1013461, 2010. URL https://doi.org/10.2172/1013461. [24] John M. O’Hara, William S. Brown, Paul M. Lewis, and J.J. Persensky. The Effects of Interface Management Tasks on Crew Performance and Safety in Complex, Computer-Based Systems: Overview and Main Findings (NUREG/CR-6690), 2002. URL https://www.nrc.gov/ reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr6690/vol1/index.html.
- #Follow-Up