Obsidian/Zettelkasten/Permanent Notes/Literature Notes/LIT-20251023125758-nureg899.md
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LIT-20251023125758 NUREG899 literature 2025-10-23T16:57:58Z 2025-10-23T17:18:34Z

NUREG899

Emergency operating procedures should be function-oriented. That means that operators 'do not have to immediately diagnose an event... to maintain the plant in a safe configuration." Critical functions are cited as:

  1. Containment integrity
  2. Reactivity Control
  3. Heat Removal
  4. Reactor coolant inventory control

Functions are maintained by 'tasks'. Tasks are specific actions that are taken to maintain or achieve a function.

This doc says EOPs are verified and validated by:

  1. Excercising EOPs on simulators
  2. Control room walk-throughs
  3. Desk top reviews
  4. Seminars
  5. Computer modeling and analysis

EOPs should minimize the use of cross referencing because it increases decision times and increases the chance of human error. It's 'disruptive'.

Operator Aids are things like flowcharts or graphs that can help an operator learn things more quickly and clearly than text alone can provide. They should be easily learned and retained, while being precise and not cluttered. Interpretability is paramount.

EOPs have segments:

  1. Cover page
  2. Table of contents if applicable
  3. Scope
  4. A set of entry conditions
  5. Automatic actions that happen by automated systems
  6. What the operator should do immediately
  7. Things the operator should do afterwards based on reference to written procedures
  8. Relevant supporting material.

Control rooms should have a sufficient number of EOP handbooks such that everyone can use one, they're easy to get to, and also be located such that they don't interfere with workstations or cover up controls. If there's multiple control rooms that share a common area, each control room should have it's own set of EOPs. They should not be sharing copies, essentially.

Appendix B talks about logical statements. They're written strangely like program control flow, underlined, and capitalized:

IF RPS scram has not initiated, THEN initiate SLC and isolate RWCU