346 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
346 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
# Thesis Ideas 2025-07-30
|
|
|
|
Following our group meeting from Monday, July 28th, Dan
|
|
suggested I write down 6 ideas, and from them we shall
|
|
figure out a possible topic idea that I can really start
|
|
working on.
|
|
|
|
___________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
## **Integrating Shielding into Nuclear Power Control**
|
|
|
|
### Goal:
|
|
|
|
The goal of this research is to use temporal logic shielding
|
|
to do online safety assurance of a machine learning (ML)
|
|
based controller for a reactor control system (RCS). While
|
|
ML-based controllers can outperform traditional rule-based
|
|
or PID control systems, their lack of provable safety
|
|
guarantees has prevented their deployment in nuclear control
|
|
applications. This work proposes to integrate shielding into
|
|
a ML-based RCS to provide a strong safety guarntee.
|
|
Shielding uses temporal logic specifications to define an
|
|
area in the state space that is safe. If the ML controller's
|
|
predicted actions leave this space or violate a
|
|
specification, the shield intervenes and engage a
|
|
safety-oriented fallback controller. This way, safety
|
|
guarantees are still provided by the fallback controller,
|
|
but the ML controller is free to operate within the verified
|
|
safe region..
|
|
|
|
### Outcomes:
|
|
|
|
For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
|
|
following:
|
|
|
|
1. Translate regulatory and system level requirements into a
|
|
temporal logic specification to synthesize a controller
|
|
'shield'. This shield monitors the ML controller and
|
|
intervenes whenever a requirement is predicted to be
|
|
violated.
|
|
|
|
2. Design a verified fallback controller against the same
|
|
verification requirements that can either return the
|
|
reactor to the safe state space or safely shut down the
|
|
reactor.
|
|
|
|
3. Evaluate performance of the ML controller with attached
|
|
shield, while assessing shield intervention frequency for
|
|
different operating scenarios (power up, shut down, regular
|
|
load following).
|
|
|
|
### Impact:
|
|
|
|
Machine learning controllers can outperform PID and
|
|
rule-based controllers by adapting to nonlinear dynamics,
|
|
optimizing over multi-objective cost functions, and changing
|
|
plant conditions. But, these ML controllers are often
|
|
*unexplainable*, meaning that their global behavior is not
|
|
easily understood. This prevents ML based controllers from
|
|
being used in high-assurance usecases such as nuclear power.
|
|
Shielding can address this issue, by providing a formal
|
|
runtime assurance, alleviating the burden of explainability
|
|
away from the machine learning algorithm. This work would
|
|
further bring regulatory requiremnts into the formal design
|
|
of control systems and high
|
|
|
|
### Relevant Papers
|
|
|
|
[[safe-reinforcement-learning-via-shielding]]
|
|
[[evaluating-robustness-of-neural-networks-with-mixed-integer-programming]]
|
|
|
|
___________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
## **Formally Verified Neural Network Control of Control Rod System**
|
|
|
|
### Goals:
|
|
|
|
The goal of this resarch is to use formal methods to verify
|
|
safety properties of neural network controller for a reactor
|
|
control system. Neural network based controllers are able to
|
|
efficiently control nonlinear systems with complex
|
|
objectives, but by their nature are are opaque systems whose
|
|
behavior is not easily analyzed. That being said, once a
|
|
neural network is trained, it is an entirely deterministic
|
|
system. Recent techniques using satisfiability modulo theory
|
|
(SMT) or mixed integer linear programming (MILP) encodings
|
|
of neural networks have been used to verify neural network
|
|
controller behavior adheres to constraints for fixed input
|
|
spaces. This work will adapt these methods to be used with
|
|
nuclear-specific safety constraints and enable provably safe
|
|
neural network control for the nuclear industry.
|
|
|
|
### Outcomes:
|
|
|
|
For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
|
|
following:
|
|
|
|
1. Build a neural network controller for real time control
|
|
of a control rod system.
|
|
|
|
2. Encode shutdown margin safety requirements into a SMT or
|
|
MILP framework.
|
|
|
|
3. Formally verify that the neural network based controller
|
|
will not violate any shutdown margin restrictions while
|
|
still meeting operational goals.
|
|
|
|
### Impact:
|
|
|
|
SMT and MILP methods of verifying neural networks have been
|
|
previously applied to classification problems, but have not
|
|
been utilized to check neural network controllers for
|
|
adherence to cyber-physical system requirements. Critical
|
|
infrastructure control such as nuclear power is an ideal
|
|
candidate for these methods to be utilized, however, because
|
|
the systems being controlled have a bounded and
|
|
well-characterized state space compared to other neural
|
|
network controller usecases (autonomous flight, autonomous
|
|
driving, image classification, etc.). This work, if
|
|
successful, will help ease tensions about neural network
|
|
controllers' safety for critical infrastructure, and allow a
|
|
new class of provably safe control architectures to be used
|
|
in high assurance systems.
|
|
|
|
### Related Papers:
|
|
|
|
[[reluplex-an-efficient-smt-solver-for-verifying-deep-neural-networks]]
|
|
[[evaluating-robustness-of-neural-networks-with-mixed-integer-programming]]
|
|
[[formal-verification-of-neural-network-controlled-autonomous-systems]]
|
|
___________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
## **Temporal Logic Specifications for Autonomous Controller Synthesis**
|
|
|
|
### Goals:
|
|
|
|
The goal of this research is to develop a framework for
|
|
generating autonomous supervisory controllers for reactor
|
|
control systems directly from high-level temporal logic
|
|
specifications. In high-assurance systems such as nuclear
|
|
power, building control logic that is verified to adhere to
|
|
regulatory requirements is an arduous error-prone task. To
|
|
mitigate this problem this work will use formal
|
|
specification languages, such as TLA+ and FRET, to encode
|
|
safety and operational requirements. Once encoded, these
|
|
requirements will be automatically be synthesized into a
|
|
realizable automata.
|
|
|
|
### Outcomes:
|
|
|
|
For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
|
|
following:
|
|
|
|
1. Captured high level safety and operating reactor control
|
|
requirements in a temporal logic language
|
|
|
|
2. Synthesize a supervisory controller from the temporal
|
|
logic specification using a tool like Strix
|
|
|
|
3. Verify the supervisory controller generated adheres to
|
|
safety specifications using exhaustive model checking.
|
|
|
|
4. Generate proof artifacts of controller adherence to
|
|
formal requirements
|
|
|
|
### Impact:
|
|
|
|
Safety-critical systems require controllers that have a high
|
|
assurance that they adhere to safety and operational
|
|
requirements. Building these controllers, however, is not an
|
|
easy task. To build a high assurance controller today
|
|
requires a great deal of labor as the controller and
|
|
requirements must be iteratively checked against one another
|
|
until an acceptable controller is found. This work seeks to
|
|
eliminate this labor cost, and instead offload the
|
|
controller synthesis to an automated computational solution.
|
|
|
|
While the nuclear industry is the motivating industry for
|
|
this work, applications in other high assurance systems are
|
|
possible. This work closes a gap between regulatory
|
|
adherence and controller synthesis that is easily
|
|
translatable to industries such as aerospace, autonomous
|
|
manufacturing and other critical infrastructure.
|
|
|
|
|
|
### Related Papers:
|
|
___________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
## **Formally Verified Runtime Monitoring and Fallback**
|
|
|
|
### Goals:
|
|
|
|
If this research is successful, we will be able to generate
|
|
autonomous controller shields that provably adhere to specifications
|
|
written with temporal logic.
|
|
|
|
### Outcomes:
|
|
|
|
- Create an intermediary shield that mediates signals between an
|
|
optimal control system and the physical plant (MODBUS)?
|
|
|
|
- Translate specifications in a language like TLA+ into an
|
|
executable program
|
|
|
|
- Provide proof artifacts that automatically generated
|
|
shield components will not allow an arbitrary controller to
|
|
reach an unsafe state.
|
|
|
|
### Impact:
|
|
|
|
Shielding is one of the preeminent ways to do safe machine
|
|
learning controllers. Instead of putting the proof burden on
|
|
the machine learning component, shielding creates a safe
|
|
boundary in the state space where a safety controller will
|
|
step in if the machine learning controller endangers the
|
|
system. This technology solves a critical problem with high
|
|
assurance systems: high assurance systems have critical
|
|
safety requirements that make scrutiny on autonomous systems
|
|
safety intense. Shielding can provide a safety barrier for
|
|
the controller, allowing the architecture of the control
|
|
laws to be amenable to more efficient machine learning based
|
|
methods. Finally, utilizing an automatic translation from a
|
|
temporal logic formulation of a speculation will allow the
|
|
engineers of these systems to quickly and clearly implement
|
|
a shield, without all of the cumbersome derivation.
|
|
|
|
### Related Papers:
|
|
|
|
[[on-using-real-time-reachability-for-the-safety-assurance-of-machine-learning-controllers]]
|
|
[[enhancing-cyber-physical-system-dependability-via-synthesis-challenges-and-future-directions]]
|
|
[[safe-reinforcement-learning-via-shielding]]
|
|
|
|
___________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
## **Data-Driven Fault Detection Using High-Assurance Digital Twins**
|
|
(8)
|
|
|
|
### Goals:
|
|
|
|
The goal of this research is to use machine learning to
|
|
identify system faults of a reactor control system during
|
|
runtime. A digital twin will be compared to measurements
|
|
from a real plant to identify issues such as coolant losses,
|
|
sensor and actuator failures, or component degredation so
|
|
that safety strategic decisions about the plant can be made
|
|
autonomously.
|
|
|
|
### Outcomes:
|
|
|
|
For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
|
|
following:
|
|
|
|
- Create a simulation suite for the Small Modular Advanced
|
|
High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR) to simulate fault
|
|
conditions of sensors, actuators, and component degradation.
|
|
|
|
- Develop a physics informed neural network (PINN) approach
|
|
to evaluate physics discrepancies in measured signals and
|
|
to estimate physically relevant parameters to determine
|
|
real system divergence from the nominal plant.
|
|
|
|
- Realize a proof of concept autonomous controller than can
|
|
react to fault conditions by switching to different
|
|
control modes rather than only responding with reactor
|
|
shutdown.
|
|
|
|
### Impact:
|
|
|
|
The nuclear energy industry's largest expense is operations
|
|
and maintenance (O&M). These costs include typical reactor repair
|
|
and refueling, the labor involved to complete such
|
|
maintenance, and finally the labor involved in operating the
|
|
reactor itself. Currently the largest of these O&M expenses
|
|
is the labor and part cost used in maintenance, while large
|
|
nuclear reactor facilities require a modest reactor operator
|
|
budget per megawatt of energy produced. The advent of small
|
|
modular reactors (SMRs) and microreactors (MRs) will change
|
|
these economics significantly.
|
|
|
|
As SMRs and MRs become more common, the cost of repair and
|
|
maintenance should reduce dramatically as nuclear power
|
|
components will become modular, replaceable parts instead of
|
|
the bespoke reactor designs currently operating. Operator
|
|
wages, however, can be expected to increase without
|
|
introducing greater controller autonomy. SMRs and MRs are
|
|
much smaller output designs per reactor core, and if they
|
|
are required to employ the same size reactor operator team
|
|
as a conventional large reactor, will suffer from much
|
|
larger operator expense per megawatt. Greater controller
|
|
autonomy can solve this problem by unloading some reactor
|
|
control responsibilities from the operator, and therein
|
|
reduce labor consumption.
|
|
|
|
<# TO DO #>
|
|
Finally reactor safety can be improved by greater autonomy
|
|
yada yada find some reasons to back this up.
|
|
|
|
### Related Papers:
|
|
___________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
## **Verified Adaptive Control**
|
|
|
|
### Goals:
|
|
|
|
The goal of this research is to create an adaptive controller
|
|
that can adjust to system dynamics changes over time to maintain
|
|
an optimal control, while using formal methods to provide strong
|
|
safety guarantees about the malleable control law.
|
|
|
|
### Outcomes:
|
|
|
|
For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
|
|
following:
|
|
|
|
- Create a simulation suite for the Small Modular Advanced High
|
|
Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR) to simulate component degradation
|
|
such as heat exchanger blockages and fuel concentration burn-up.*
|
|
|
|
- Create an adaptive control rod controller to maximize load following
|
|
precision for a simulated power grid demand.
|
|
|
|
- Use contract based verification at runtime to ensure that
|
|
learned parameters for the adaptive controller remain within
|
|
safety specification limits
|
|
|
|
*Is this actually even a problem for SmAHTR? Figuring the fuel is
|
|
suspended in the salt I'd assume chemistry is pretty strictly
|
|
controlled. I'm sure I can find other examples.
|
|
|
|
### Impact:
|
|
|
|
Certain reactor control systems are already automatic systems,
|
|
such as constant temperature or pressure controls for operating
|
|
at steady state. These simple controllers are able to follow load
|
|
changes from the power grid on their own, but over will lose
|
|
efficiency as the underlying plant mechanics become less
|
|
efficient, or maintenance is performed and components are
|
|
refreshed. For nuclear power contexts, fine control is ideal to
|
|
maximize profits and to minimize energy wasteage. This is not an
|
|
easy problem to solve, however, as the dynamics of the underlying
|
|
plant are constantly changing. Adaptive control can help address
|
|
this issue, but learnable controllers must come with guarantees
|
|
of safety in order to be attractive to the nuclear industry.
|
|
|
|
### Related Papers:
|
|
|