304 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
304 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
---
|
|
|
|
authors:
|
|
|
|
- "Wood, Richard T."
|
|
|
|
- "Upadhyaya, Belle R."
|
|
|
|
- "Floyd, Dan C."
|
|
|
|
|
|
citekey: "woodAutonomousControlFramework2017"
|
|
|
|
alias: "woodAutonomousControlFramework2017"
|
|
|
|
publish_date: 2017-08-01
|
|
|
|
journal: "Nuclear Engineering and Technology"
|
|
volume: 49
|
|
issue: 5
|
|
pages: 896-904
|
|
last_import: 2025-07-30
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
# An autonomous control framework for advanced reactors
|
|
|
|
## Indexing Information
|
|
|
|
Published: 2017-08
|
|
|
|
**DOI**
|
|
[10.1016/j.net.2017.07.001](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.net.2017.07.001)
|
|
#Autonomous-Control, #Instrumentation-and-Control-System,
|
|
#Small-Modular-Reactor
|
|
|
|
|
|
#InSecondPass
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
>[!Abstract] Several Generation IV nuclear reactor concepts
|
|
>have goals for optimizing investment recovery through
|
|
>phased introduction of multiple units on a common site with
|
|
>shared facilities and/or reconfigurable energy conversion
|
|
>systems. Additionally, small modular reactors are suitable
|
|
>for remote deployment to support highly localized
|
|
>microgrids in isolated, underdeveloped regions. The
|
|
>long-term economic viability of these advanced reactor
|
|
>plants depends on significant reductions in plant
|
|
>operations and maintenance costs. To accomplish these
|
|
>goals, intelligent control and diagnostic capabilities are
|
|
>needed to provide nearly autonomous operations with
|
|
>anticipatory maintenance. A nearly autonomous control
|
|
>system should enable automatic operation of a nuclear power
|
|
>plant while adapting to equipment faults and other upsets.
|
|
>It needs to have many intelligent capabilities, such as
|
|
>diagnosis, simulation, analysis, planning,
|
|
>reconfigurability, self-validation, and decision. These
|
|
>capabilities have been the subject of research for many
|
|
>years, but an autonomous control system for nuclear power
|
|
>generation remains as-yet an unrealized goal. This article
|
|
>describes a functional framework for intelligent,
|
|
>autonomous control that can facilitate the integration of
|
|
>control, diagnostic, and decision-making capabilities to
|
|
>satisfy the operational and performance goals of power
|
|
>plants based on multimodular advanced reactors.>[!seealso]
|
|
>Related Papers
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
## Annotations
|
|
|
|
### Notes
|
|
|
|
[[An-autonomous-control-framework-for-advanced-reactors-notes]]
|
|
|
|
### Highlights From Zotero
|
|
>[!tip] Brilliant
|
|
>
|
|
> The long-term economic viability of these advanced reactor
|
|
> plants depends on significant reductions in plant
|
|
> operations and maintenance costs. To accomplish these
|
|
> goals, intelligent control and diagnostic capabilities are
|
|
> needed to provide nearly autonomous operations with
|
|
> anticipatory maintenance. 2025-07-06 12:44 pm
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
>[!done] Important
|
|
>
|
|
> An SMR is generally characterized by: (1) an electrical
|
|
> generating capacity of less than 300 MWe (megawatt
|
|
> electric), (2) a primary system that is entirely or
|
|
> substantially fabricated within a factory, and (3) a
|
|
> primary system that can be transported by truck or rail to
|
|
> the plant site. 2025-07-06 12:47 pm
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
>[!tip] Brilliant
|
|
>
|
|
> he current US nuclear industry average for O&M staff is
|
|
> roughly one person per every 2 megawatts of generated
|
|
> power. 2025-07-06 12:48 pm
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
>[!done] Important
|
|
>
|
|
> Current automated control technologies for nuclear power
|
|
> plants are reasonably mature, and highly automated
|
|
> control for an SMR is clearly feasible under optimum
|
|
> circumstances. Autonomous control is primarily intended to
|
|
> account for the nonoptimum circumstances when degradation,
|
|
> failure, and other off-normal events challenge the
|
|
> performance of the reactor, and the capability for
|
|
> immediate human intervention is constrained. There are
|
|
> clear gaps in the development and demonstration of
|
|
> autonomous control capabilities for the specific domain of
|
|
> nuclear power operations. 2025-07-06 1:04 pm
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
|
|
>[!done] Important
|
|
>
|
|
> Autonomy extends the scope of primary control functions.
|
|
> Such capabilities can consist of automated control during
|
|
> all operating modes, process performance optimization
|
|
> (e.g., self-tuning), continuous monitoring, and diagnosis
|
|
> of performance indicators as well as trends for
|
|
> operational and safety-related parameters, diagnosis of
|
|
> component health, flexible control to address both
|
|
> anticipated and unanticipated events and to provide
|
|
> protection of life-limited components (such as batteries
|
|
> and actuators), adaptation to changing or degrading
|
|
> conditions, and validation and maintenance of control
|
|
> system performance. Key characteristics of autonomy
|
|
> include intelligence, robustness, optimization,
|
|
> flexibility, and adaptability. Intelligence facilitates
|
|
> minimal or no reliance on human intervention and can
|
|
> accommodate an integrated, whole system approach to
|
|
> control. It implies embedded decision-making and
|
|
> management/planning authority. Intelligence in control
|
|
> provides for anticipatory action based on system knowledge
|
|
> and event prediction. 2025-07-06 6:03 pm
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
>[!highlight] Highlight
|
|
>
|
|
> As a minimum requirement of autonomy, the SMR plant
|
|
> control system must be able to switch between normal
|
|
> operational modes automatically (i.e., automatic control).
|
|
> Additionally, reactor protective action must be available
|
|
> if the desired operational conditions cannot be achieved.
|
|
> 2025-07-06 6:07 pm
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
>[!done] Important
|
|
>
|
|
> Unlike conventional reactor operational concepts, in which
|
|
> the primary defense against potentially adverse conditions
|
|
> resulting from off-normal events is to scram the reactor,
|
|
> the objective of autonomous control is to limit the
|
|
> progression of off-normal events and minimize the need for
|
|
> shutdown. This is especially true in situations where the
|
|
> nuclear power plant is the stabilizing generation source
|
|
> on a small electric grid. 2025-07-06 6:10 pm
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
>[!tip] Brilliant
|
|
>
|
|
> To illustrate the autonomous functionality that can be
|
|
> provided for the SMR plant control system, two fault
|
|
> management scenarios are considered in which detection and
|
|
> response are described. The first scenario relates to
|
|
> fault adaptation in the case of sensor failure. The
|
|
> indicators from surveillance and diagnostic functions that
|
|
> the plant control system can employ include divergence of
|
|
> redundant measurements, conflict between predicted (based
|
|
> on analytical or relational estimation) and measured
|
|
> values, and detection and isolation of a confirmed fault.
|
|
> The prospective response can include substitution of a
|
|
> redundant measurement or utilization of a diverse
|
|
> measurement. An example of the latter would be using
|
|
> neutron flux instead of temperature (i.e., core thermal
|
|
> power) as a power measurement. Switching to an alternate
|
|
> control algorithm may prove necessary for faulted or
|
|
> suspect measurements. The second scenario relates to fault
|
|
> avoidance in the case of a degrading actuator. The
|
|
> indicators of an incipient failure can be prediction of
|
|
> actuator failure based on prognostic modeling (e.g., fault
|
|
> forecasting) or detection of sluggish response to
|
|
> commands. The prospective response can be to switch to an
|
|
> alternate control strategy to avoid incipient failure by
|
|
> reducing stress on the suspect component. An example would
|
|
> be utilizing manipulation of core heat removal (e.g.,
|
|
> coolant density change) instead of direct reactivity
|
|
> insertion (e.g., control element movement) to control
|
|
> reactor power. 2025-07-06 6:15 pm
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
>[!done] Important
|
|
>
|
|
> Although having a highly reliable plant control system is
|
|
> important, that fact is of limited value if the control
|
|
> system cannot accommodate plant degradation without
|
|
> immediate human intervention or scram. In such a case, the
|
|
> result is a highly reliable control system that becomes
|
|
> ineffective because the plant has changed. 2025-07-06 6:16
|
|
> pm
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
>[!highlight] Highlight
|
|
>
|
|
> A three-level hierarchy is typical for robotic
|
|
> applications [8,30,31]. The three layers in top-to-bottom
|
|
> hierarchical order are the planner layer, the executive
|
|
> layer, and the functional layer. The general concept of
|
|
> the hierarchy is that commands are issued by higher levels
|
|
> to lower levels, and response data flows from lower levels
|
|
> to higher levels in the multi-tiered framework.
|
|
> Intelligence increases with increasing level within the
|
|
> hierarchy. Each of the three interacting tiers has a
|
|
> principal role. Basically, the functional layer provides
|
|
> direct control, the executive layer provides sequencing of
|
|
> action, and the planner layer provides deliberative
|
|
> planning. 2025-07-06 6:19 pm
|
|
>
|
|
> *Kinda mimmics the Purdue model? Application layer, scada
|
|
> layer, then what would be enterprise layer?*
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
>[!tip] Brilliant
|
|
>
|
|
> Key characteristics that are feasible through autonomous
|
|
> control include Intelligence to confirm system
|
|
> performance and detect degraded or failed conditions
|
|
> Optimization to minimize stress on SMR components and
|
|
> efficiently react to operational events without
|
|
> compromising system integrity Robustness to accommodate
|
|
> uncertainties and changing conditions Flexibility and
|
|
> adaptability to accommodate failures through
|
|
> reconfiguration among available control system elements or
|
|
> adjustment of control system strategies, algorithms, or
|
|
> parameters 2025-07-06 12:51 pm
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
>[!done] Important
|
|
>
|
|
> Given anticipated operational imperatives to utilize
|
|
> technology with demonstrated (or at least high
|
|
> probability) readiness, it is not practical to strive for
|
|
> the high-end extreme of autonomy in first-generation SMRs.
|
|
> Instead, modest advancement beyond fully automatic control
|
|
> to allow extended fault tolerance for anticipated events
|
|
> or degraded conditions and some predefined
|
|
> reconfigurability is the most realistic goal for an
|
|
> initial application of SMR plant autonomous control.
|
|
> 2025-07-06 1:00 pm
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
>[!tip] Brilliant
|
|
>
|
|
> The primary technical gap relates to decision capabilities
|
|
> (e.g., strategic, interpretive, adaptive, predictive).
|
|
> Technology development and demonstration activities are
|
|
> needed to provide the desired technical readiness for
|
|
> implementation of an SMR autonomous control system. In
|
|
> particular, the capabilities to monitor, trend, detect,
|
|
> diagnose, decide, and self-adjust must be established
|
|
> within an integrated functional architecture to enable
|
|
> control system autonomy. 2025-07-06 1:00 pm
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
|
|
### Follow-Ups
|
|
|
|
>[!example] One of the most fully digital plants currently
|
|
>in operation in the United States is the Oconee Nuclear
|
|
>Station [14]. The three units at Oconee have digital
|
|
>reactor protection systems and a digital integrated control
|
|
>system (ICS). The digital ICS coordinates the main control
|
|
>actions of multiple control loops through an integrated
|
|
>master controller that establishes feedforward control
|
|
>demands based on desired overall core thermal power. The
|
|
>ICS also has provisions for supplementary support actions
|
|
>among control loops to facilitate optimized performance.
|
|
>- [ ] #Follow-Up
|
|
|
|
>[!example] There is an architectural approach for nearly
|
|
>autonomous control systems that has been developed through
|
|
>simulated nuclear power applications (see Fig. 2). As part
|
|
>of research into advanced multimodular nuclear reactor
|
|
>concepts, such as the ALMR, the International Reactor
|
|
>Innovative and Secure (IRIS), and representative advanced
|
|
>SMR concepts, a supervisory control system architecture was
|
|
>devised [24e26]. This approach provides a framework for
|
|
>autonomous control while supporting a high-level interface
|
|
>with operations staff, who can act as plant supervisors.
|
|
>The final authority for decisions and goal setting remains
|
|
>with the human, but the control system assumes expanded
|
|
>responsibilities for normal control action, abnormal event
|
|
>response, and system fault tolerance.
|
|
>- [ ] #Follow-Up
|
|
|