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Speaker Notes: Formally Verified Autonomous Hybrid Control
Presentation for Engineering PhDs Audience: General engineering background, not necessarily control/nuclear/formal methods experts
Slide 1: Title & Roadmap
Central Thesis: Formally verified autonomous hybrid control is both necessary and achievable for next-generation nuclear power.
Roadmap Overview:
- The Problem: Economic challenge + fundamental human reliability limits
- The Technical Challenge: Hybrid systems and why current methods fall short
- The Solution: Three-thrust approach with formal guarantees + hardware-in-the-loop
- The Impact: Beyond nuclear applications
Slide 2: Economic Challenge
Small modular reactors face an unsustainable staffing cost problem
The Economic Reality:
- Current requirement: 2+ Reactor Operators + 1+ Senior Reactor Operator per unit
- Training timeline: up to 6 years to become licensed reactor operator
- Small modular reactors have same staffing overhead but lower power output
- Result: Higher per-megawatt O&M costs threaten economic viability
The Market Opportunity:
- Datacenter demand projected: 1,050 TWh annually by 2030
- Nuclear O&M costs: 23-30% of levelized cost ($88.24/MWh)
- Annual O&M for datacenter demand alone: $21-28 billion
Key message: Automation is not optional---it's economically essential
Slide 3: Safety Imperative
Human operators are the root cause of 70-80% of nuclear incidents
The Human Error Problem:
- 70-80% of events attributed to human error (multiple independent analyses)
- IAEA categorical statement: "Human error was the root cause of ALL severe accidents"
- Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Fukushima
Three Mile Island (1979):
- 100+ simultaneous alarms overwhelmed operators
- Operators shut down emergency cooling based on incorrect assessment
- Result: 44% of fuel melted
- Risk assessment was off by 500-fold (5% actual vs 0.01% predicted)
Fundamental Cognitive Limitations:
- Working memory: 7±2 items (Miller, 1956)
- Human Error Probability degrades under stress:
- Optimal conditions: 0.001-0.01 (0.1-1%)
- Accident conditions: 0.1-1.0 (10-100%) = essentially guaranteed failure
- Four decades of training improvements haven't changed the 70-80% ratio
Slide 4: The Paradox
Nuclear control faces a fundamental tension
The Paradox: Human operators are both essential for flexibility and the primary source of failure
Why We Need Humans:
- Strategic decision-making
- Procedure interpretation
- Handling novel situations
- Adaptive judgment
- Legal authority (10 CFR 55)
Why Humans Fail:
- Working memory: 7±2 items
- Response time: seconds vs milliseconds
- Cognitive biases (confirmation, anchoring)
- Stress degrades performance 10-50x
- Error rates: 0.001 → 1.0 under accident conditions
Current Division of Labor:
- Automated: Emergency protection (trip systems, ECCS) = terminal operations
- Manual: Strategic operations (startup, mode transitions, power changes) = routine operations
- Problem: This is backwards! We automate terminal ops but manually handle routine ops.
Goal: Combine the reliability of automation with the sophistication of human decision-making
Slide 5: Hybrid Systems
Hybrid systems combine continuous dynamics with discrete mode switching
Nuclear plants are inherently hybrid systems
Continuous Dynamics:
- Reactor temperature, neutron flux, pressure, flow rates, heat transfer
- Governed by differential equations: ẋ(t) = f(x(t), q(t), u(t))
Discrete Decisions:
- Mode transitions, control strategy changes, safety system actuation, procedure steps
- Governed by logic: q(k+1) = ν(x(k), q(k), u(k))
Example: Reactor Startup
- Cold Shutdown → Heatup → Approach Criticality → Low Power
- Each mode has continuous dynamics; transitions are discrete strategic decisions
- This is exactly what human operators do today
Slide 6: Current Gaps
Existing methods can handle either continuous or discrete, but not both
Formal Methods (HARDENS):
- Can verify discrete logic (requirements → verified binaries)
- Achieved in 9 months, low cost
- BUT: Cannot handle continuous dynamics
Control Theory:
- Can verify continuous stability (Lyapunov, LQR, robust control)
- BUT: Cannot verify discrete transitions or mode switching
THE GAP: Hybrid system verification with formal guarantees spanning both continuous and discrete
HARDENS Achievement:
- Complete RTS verification (discrete only)
- TRL 3-4, no experimental validation
- Requirements → formal specs → verified implementation
- But: No continuous dynamics, no closed-loop verification
We need to bridge this gap.
Slide 7: Approach Overview
Unifying discrete synthesis and continuous verification enables end-to-end guarantees
Three-Thrust Integrated Approach:
Thrust 1 (Procedures → Temporal Logic):
- Use NASA FRET to translate written procedures to formal specifications
- Example: "If high temp, insert rods until reset" becomes G(T_high → X(rods ∧ ...))
- Realizability checking catches errors in procedures before implementation
Thrust 2 (Temporal Logic → Discrete Automaton):
- Reactive synthesis generates correct-by-construction state machine
- Discrete controller is mathematically guaranteed to follow specifications
Thrust 3 (Continuous Controllers):
- Use reachability analysis and barrier certificates
- Compositional verification: local proofs, global guarantees
Innovation: Each piece uses state-of-the-art tools; innovation is in the integration
Slide 8: Thrust 1 - Procedures to Logic
NASA's FRET tool translates procedures into unambiguous logic
The Challenge: Natural language is ambiguous; machines need precise specifications
Example Translation:
- Natural: "If a high temperature alarm triggers, control rods must immediately insert and remain inserted until operator reset."
- Logic: G(HighTemp → X(RodsInserted ∧ (¬RodsWithdrawn U OpReset)))
FRETish Structure: 6 components eliminate ambiguity
- [Scope] [Condition] [Component] SHALL [Timing] [Response]
Realizability Checking: Catches errors before implementation
- Detects conflicting requirements
- Identifies undefined behaviors (gaps left to human judgment)
- These are "bugs in the procedures"---better to find them early!
Output: Unambiguous temporal logic ready for synthesis
Slide 9: Thrust 2 - Reactive Synthesis
Reactive synthesis generates provably correct discrete controllers
What is Reactive Synthesis?
- Input: Temporal logic formula (what should happen)
- Output: Finite state machine (how to make it happen)
- Guarantee: If a solution exists, it is correct by construction
Example: Simplified Reactor Automaton
- Nodes = discrete modes (what control strategy to use)
- Edges = transition conditions (when to switch)
- No switching errors possible---the automaton is mathematically guaranteed to satisfy specifications
This is the "Operator's Decision-Making" Automated
Tool: Strix (SYNTCOMP competition winner)
Output: Discrete controller with formal correctness guarantee
Slide 10: Thrust 3 - Continuous Verification
Continuous controllers verified using three complementary techniques
Three Types of Continuous Modes:
- Stabilizing: Stay in current mode (e.g., full-power operation)
- Transitory: Drive toward next mode (e.g., startup heatup)
- Expulsory: Force to safe mode (e.g., SCRAM)
Three Verification Techniques:
-
Reachability Analysis:
- Compute reachable state sets
- Verify boundary conditions met
- Recent advances: Neural Hamilton-Jacobi for high dimensions
-
Assume-Guarantee:
- Local verification, global guarantees
- Each mode verified independently
-
Barrier Certificates:
- Prove safe set forward invariance
- Guarantee transitions occur correctly
Key Innovation: Design continuous controllers after synthesizing automaton
- Automaton defines transition boundaries
- Design each mode to satisfy its local transitions
- Compositional verification avoids intractable global analysis
Output: Verified continuous modes + discrete automaton = Complete hybrid controller
Slide 11: Key Insight
Automaton-first design makes verification tractable
Traditional Approach (Intractable):
- Design everything at once
- Verify entire trajectory through all modes
- Computationally intractable for complex systems
Our Approach (Tractable):
- Synthesize Discrete Automaton (tells us what boundaries to verify)
- Define Transition Boundaries (from automaton structure)
- Design Continuous Modes Locally (each controller designed for its specific job)
- Verify Each Mode Independently (local verification is tractable)
- Compose via Assume-Guarantee (interface contracts guarantee composition)
Key Message: Decomposition is the key to tractable verification
Slide 12: Demonstration
SmAHTR autonomous startup provides a rigorous test case
Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR):
- Liquid-salt cooled reactor design
- Well-documented startup procedures
- Representative of next-generation SMR designs
Startup Sequence: Cold → Controlled Heating → Approach Criticality → Low-Power Physics → Full Power
Each mode has different control objective:
- Temp control → Ramp rate → Reactivity → Neutron flux → Load following
Implementation Platform:
- Simulation: High-fidelity Simulink model (thermal-hydraulics + neutron kinetics)
- Hardware: Emerson Ovation control system (industry standard)
- Integration: ARCADE platform (hardware-in-the-loop)
- Validation: Real-time performance on actual control equipment
Why This Matters:
- Multiple coordinated subsystems
- Strict timing/temperature constraints
- Complex nonlinear dynamics
- This is not a toy problem---it's representative of deployment challenges
Slide 13: Expected Outcomes
Success measured by progression to TRL 5
Technology Readiness Level Progression:
- Current: TRL 2-3 (basic concepts, HARDENS precedent)
- Target: TRL 5 (validated prototype in relevant environment)
- Gap: Experimental validation with continuous dynamics
Three Concrete Deliverables:
1. Procedure Translation Methodology
- Engineers generate verified controllers from regulatory procedures
- No formal methods expertise required
2. Continuous Verification Framework
- Standard control design + iterative verification
- Mathematical proof of safe mode transitions
3. SmAHTR Hardware-in-the-Loop Demonstration
- Autonomous startup on industrial control hardware
- Real-time performance validation
- Clear path to deployment
Key Message: TRL 5 proves both theoretical validity and practical implementability
Slide 14: Broader Impact
This methodology generalizes to any safety-critical hybrid system
Common Pattern Across Domains:
- Written procedures exist
- Continuous dynamics + discrete decisions
- Safety is paramount
- Autonomy has economic benefits
Application Domains:
- Chemical Process: Batch processes, safety interlocks
- Aerospace: Flight phases, emergency procedures
- Autonomous Transport: Driving modes, emergency maneuvers
- Medical Devices: Therapy modes, patient monitoring
- Power Grid: Generation modes, fault response
Economic Multiplier:
- Nuclear O&M (datacenter demand): $21-28B annually
- Broader safety-critical infrastructure: Much larger
Regulatory Pathway:
- Proving concept in nuclear (highest safety bar)
- Establishes precedent: mathematical proof as regulatory evidence
- Easier adoption in other industries
Key Message: Nuclear is the proving ground; impact extends far beyond
Slide 15: Innovation Summary
The innovation is systematic integration to bridge a fundamental gap
What's NOT New (but state-of-the-art):
- Temporal logic
- Reactive synthesis
- Reachability analysis
- Barrier certificates
- Hardware-in-the-loop
These are mature techniques from computer science and control theory.
What IS New:
- Integration: Unifying discrete and continuous verification
- Methodology: Systematic tool-supported workflow
- Decomposition: Automaton-first design enables tractable verification
- Practical: Targets existing industrial hardware
Comparison to HARDENS:
| Feature | HARDENS (2022) | This Work |
|---|---|---|
| Discrete verification | ✓ | ✓ |
| Continuous verification | ✗ | ✓ |
| Hybrid system verification | ✗ | ✓ |
| Experimental validation | TRL 3-4 | TRL 5 |
| Hardware-in-the-loop | ✗ | ✓ |
Key Enabling Insight: Automaton-first design makes continuous verification tractable by decomposing the problem into local verifications with compositional guarantees
Slide 16: Conclusion
Formally verified autonomous hybrid control: necessary, achievable, timely
Three Converging Imperatives:
1. Economic: SMRs need autonomy to be viable
- $21-28B annual O&M for datacenter demand alone
- Per-megawatt staffing costs threaten SMR economics
2. Safety: Human error causes 70-80% of incidents
- Training can't overcome fundamental cognitive limits
- Error probability: 0.001 → 1.0 under accident conditions
3. Technical: Tools now exist to verify hybrid systems
- HARDENS proved discrete verification is feasible
- Control theory provides continuous verification tools
- We can now bridge the gap
This Research Closes the Gap: HARDENS (Discrete) + Continuous Verification = Complete Hybrid System
Vision: Control engineers generate high-assurance autonomous controllers from procedures.
- No formal methods PhD required
- Mathematical proof included
- Deployable on existing industrial hardware
Slide 17: Questions
Contact Information:
- Dane A. Sabo: dane.sabo@pitt.edu
- Dr. Dan G. Cole: dgcole@pitt.edu
- University of Pittsburgh, Cyber Energy Center
Key Talking Points to Remember
Opening (Slides 1-4)
- Hook with economics: $21-28B annual market
- Pivot to safety: 70-80% human error is a fundamental problem
- The paradox: We need human sophistication but can't tolerate human unreliability
Technical Middle (Slides 5-11)
- Hybrid systems are how nuclear plants actually operate
- Current tools only handle half the problem
- Our innovation: integration of existing tools with automaton-first decomposition
- Emphasize "correct by construction" throughout
Demonstration & Impact (Slides 12-16)
- SmAHTR is real, not toy problem
- TRL 5 means practical feasibility, not just theory
- Nuclear is proving ground, but impact is much broader
- Now is the right time: economics + safety + technical maturity converge
Anticipate Questions
- "Why not just train operators better?" → 40 years of improvements haven't changed 70-80% ratio; cognitive limits are fundamental
- "How does this compare to ML/AI approaches?" → We provide mathematical proofs, not statistical confidence
- "What about edge cases?" → That's the point! Realizability checking finds specification gaps; formal verification proves all cases
- "Timeline?" → HARDENS did discrete in 9 months; we're building on that foundation
- "Why nuclear first?" → Highest safety bar + best documented procedures + huge economic driver