R "Zettelkasten/Hub Notes/NNFM Ontology.canvas" -> "NNFM Ontology.canvas" R "Zettelkasten/Hub Notes/Permanent Notes/Programming/Assembly/Assembly Canvas.canvas" -> "Programming/Assembly/Assembly Canvas.canvas" R "Zettelkasten/Hub Notes/Permanent Notes/Programming/Assembly/Untitled.md" -> Programming/Assembly/Untitled.md R "Zettelkasten/Hub Notes/Permanent Notes/Programming/Formal Methods/LEAN/Learning Plan.md" -> "Programming/Formal Methods/LEAN/Learning Plan.md" R "Zettelkasten/Hub Notes/Permanent Notes/Programming/Formal Methods/LEAN/Tutorial World.md" -> "Programming/Formal Methods/LEAN/Tutorial World.md" R "Zettelkasten/Hub Notes/Permanent Notes/Programming/Formal Methods/TLA/TLA Canvas.canvas" -> "Programming/Formal Methods/TLA/TLA Canvas.canvas" R "Zettelkasten/Hub Notes/Permanent Notes/Programming/Formal Methods/TLA/TLA+ Learning Plan.md" -> "Programming/Formal Methods/TLA/TLA+ Learning Plan.md" R "Zettelkasten/Hub Notes/Permanent Notes/Programming/Formal Methods/TLA/What is TLA?.md" -> "Programming/Formal Methods/TLA/What is TLA?.md"
374 lines
15 KiB
Markdown
374 lines
15 KiB
Markdown
# Thesis Ideas 2025-07-30
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Following our group meeting from Monday, July 28th, Dan
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suggested I write down 6 ideas, and from them we shall
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figure out a possible topic idea that I can really start
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working on.
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___________________________________________________________
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## **Integrating Shielding into Nuclear Power Control**
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### Goal:
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The goal of this research is to use temporal logic shielding
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to do online safety assurance of a machine learning (ML)
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based controller for a reactor control system (RCS). While
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ML-based controllers can outperform traditional rule-based
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or PID control systems, their lack of provable safety
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guarantees has prevented their deployment in nuclear control
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applications. This work proposes to integrate shielding into
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a ML-based RCS to provide a strong safety guarntee.
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Shielding uses temporal logic specifications to define an
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area in the state space that is safe. If the ML controller's
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predicted actions leave this space or violate a
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specification, the shield intervenes and engage a
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safety-oriented fallback controller. This way, safety
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guarantees are still provided by the fallback controller,
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but the ML controller is free to operate within the verified
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safe region..
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### Outcomes:
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For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
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following:
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1. Translate regulatory and system level requirements into a
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temporal logic specification to synthesize a controller
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'shield'. This shield monitors the ML controller and
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intervenes whenever a requirement is predicted to be
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violated.
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2. Design a verified fallback controller against the same
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verification requirements that can either return the
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reactor to the safe state space or safely shut down the
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reactor.
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3. Evaluate performance of the ML controller with attached
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shield, while assessing shield intervention frequency for
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different operating scenarios (power up, shut down, regular
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load following).
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### Impact:
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Machine learning controllers can outperform PID and
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rule-based controllers by adapting to nonlinear dynamics,
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optimizing over multi-objective cost functions, and changing
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plant conditions. But, these ML controllers are often
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*unexplainable*, meaning that their global behavior is not
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easily understood. This prevents ML based controllers from
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being used in high-assurance usecases such as nuclear power.
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Shielding can address this issue, by providing a formal
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runtime assurance, alleviating the burden of explainability
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away from the machine learning algorithm. This work would
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further bring regulatory requiremnts into the formal design
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of control systems and high
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### Relevant Papers
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[[safe-reinforcement-learning-via-shielding]]
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[[evaluating-robustness-of-neural-networks-with-mixed-integer-programming]]
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___________________________________________________________
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## **Formally Verified Neural Network Control of Control Rod System**
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### Goals:
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The goal of this resarch is to use formal methods to verify
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safety properties of neural network controller for a reactor
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control system. Neural network based controllers are able to
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efficiently control nonlinear systems with complex
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objectives, but by their nature are are opaque systems whose
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behavior is not easily analyzed. That being said, once a
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neural network is trained, it is an entirely deterministic
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system. Recent techniques using satisfiability modulo theory
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(SMT) or mixed integer linear programming (MILP) encodings
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of neural networks have been used to verify neural network
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controller behavior adheres to constraints for fixed input
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spaces. This work will adapt these methods to be used with
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nuclear-specific safety constraints and enable provably safe
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neural network control for the nuclear industry.
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### Outcomes:
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For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
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following:
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1. Build a neural network controller for real time control
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of a control rod system.
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2. Encode shutdown margin safety requirements into a SMT or
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MILP framework.
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3. Formally verify that the neural network based controller
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will not violate any shutdown margin restrictions while
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still meeting operational goals.
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### Impact:
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SMT and MILP methods of verifying neural networks have been
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previously applied to classification problems, but have not
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been utilized to check neural network controllers for
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adherence to cyber-physical system requirements. Critical
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infrastructure control such as nuclear power is an ideal
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candidate for these methods to be utilized, however, because
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the systems being controlled have a bounded and
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well-characterized state space compared to other neural
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network controller usecases (autonomous flight, autonomous
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driving, image classification, etc.). This work, if
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successful, will help ease tensions about neural network
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controllers' safety for critical infrastructure, and allow a
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new class of provably safe control architectures to be used
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in high assurance systems.
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### Related Papers:
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[[reluplex-an-efficient-smt-solver-for-verifying-deep-neural-networks]]
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[[evaluating-robustness-of-neural-networks-with-mixed-integer-programming]]
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[[formal-verification-of-neural-network-controlled-autonomous-systems]]
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___________________________________________________________
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## **Temporal Logic Specifications for Autonomous Controller Synthesis**
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### Goals:
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The goal of this research is to develop a framework for
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generating autonomous supervisory controllers for reactor
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control systems directly from high-level temporal logic
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specifications. In high-assurance systems such as nuclear
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power, building control logic that is verified to adhere to
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regulatory requirements is an arduous error-prone task. To
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mitigate this problem this work will use formal
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specification languages, such as TLA+ and FRET, to encode
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safety and operational requirements. Once encoded, these
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requirements will be automatically be synthesized into a
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realizable automata.
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### Outcomes:
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For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
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following:
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1. Captured high level safety and operating reactor control
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requirements in a temporal logic language
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2. Synthesize a supervisory controller from the temporal
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logic specification using a tool like Strix
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3. Verify the supervisory controller generated adheres to
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safety specifications using exhaustive model checking.
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4. Generate proof artifacts of controller adherence to
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formal requirements
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### Impact:
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Safety-critical systems require controllers that have a high
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assurance that they adhere to safety and operational
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requirements. Building these controllers, however, is not an
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easy task. To build a high assurance controller today
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requires a great deal of labor as the controller and
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requirements must be iteratively checked against one another
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until an acceptable controller is found. This work seeks to
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eliminate this labor cost, and instead offload the
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controller synthesis to an automated computational solution.
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While the nuclear industry is the motivating industry for
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this work, applications in other high assurance systems are
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possible. This work closes a gap between regulatory
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adherence and controller synthesis that is easily
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translatable to industries such as aerospace, autonomous
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manufacturing and other critical infrastructure.
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### Related Papers:
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[[enhancing-cyber-physical-system-dependability-via-synthesis-challenges-and-future-directions]]
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___________________________________________________________
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## **Formally Verified Runtime Monitoring and Fallback**
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### Goals:
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The goal of this research is to create a methodology for
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automatically generating runtime monitoring and fallback
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switching components from formal specifications in FRET for
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a reactor control system. Runtime monitoring with automatic
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switchover is a proven approach to ensuring safety in
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critical control systems: a primary controller operates
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under normal conditions, while a fallback safety controller
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is engaged if safety limits are approached or violated.
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These fallback mechanisms lend themselves naturally to
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linear temporal logic (LTL) specifications that can be
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elicited from high-level safety and operational requirements
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using automated tools. If the creation of these runtime
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monitors and switchovers can be automated from formal
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requirements, the engineering effort to implement robust
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fallback logic will be greatly reduced, while maintaining
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provable adherence to safety constraints.
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### Outcomes:
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1. Implement reactor control safety and operational
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requirements as requirements in FRET, and extract
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temporal logic definitions of allowable system behaviors.
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2. Synthesize the switching component from LTL specification
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using an automated tool such as Strix.
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2. Develop a new endpoint for the Advanced Reactor Cyber
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Analysis and Development Environment (ARCADE) that
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utilizes a shielding mechanism to switch between control
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trains.
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3. Create an example learning-based controller to
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demonstrate the application of the machine generated
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shield.
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4. Provide proof artifacts that automatically generated
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shield components will not allow an arbitrary controller
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to reach an unsafe state.
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### Impact:
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This approach addresses a persistent challenge in
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high-assurance systems: stringent safety requirements often
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force engineers to trade innovation and adaptability for
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proven but rigid safety mechanisms. The proposed method
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maintains safety guarantees while allowing more flexible or
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advanced primary control strategies. Moreover, automating
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the translation from formal safety requirements into
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executable monitoring and switchover logic creates a
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repeatable, transparent, and verifiable process. This
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reduces engineering effort, improves traceability to
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regulatory requirements, and may enable faster deployment of
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safety-critical control architectures in nuclear power and
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other critical infrastructure systems.
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### Related Papers:
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[[on-using-real-time-reachability-for-the-safety-assurance-of-machine-learning-controllers]]
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[[enhancing-cyber-physical-system-dependability-via-synthesis-challenges-and-future-directions]]
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[[safe-reinforcement-learning-via-shielding]]
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___________________________________________________________
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## **Data-Driven Fault Detection Using High-Assurance Digital Twins**
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### Goals:
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The goal of this research is to develop a high-assurance,
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digital twin–based fault detection and mitigation framework
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for a reactor control system. A physics-based digital twin
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will be run in parallel with plant measurements to detect
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anomalies such as coolant losses, sensor and actuator
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faults, and abnormal component degradation. Discrepancies
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between the digital twin and plant data will be analyzed
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using residual0based and physics-informed machine learning
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models to diagnose the underlying fault and trigger
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appropriate graded autonomous control actions ranging from
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control adjustments to safe shutdown.
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### Outcomes:
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For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
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following:
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1. Create a simulation suite for the Small Modular Advanced
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High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR) to simulate high-impact
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fault types such as secondary loop coolant losses, heat
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exchanger fouling, and sensor drifting.
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2. Implement a residual-based physics-informed neural
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network (PINN) to estimate key plant parameters, detect
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discrepancies between predicted and measured signals, and
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identify probable fault condition and severity.
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3. Integrate the fault detection developed with a
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proof-of-concept autonomous supervisory controller
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capable of implementing graded responses to fault conditions
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aligned with NRC safety protocols.
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### Impact:
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The nuclear energy industry's largest expense is operations
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and maintenance (O&M). These costs include typical reactor
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repair and refueling, the labor involved to complete such
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maintenance, and finally the labor involved in operating the
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reactor itself. Large reactors are able to spread these O&M
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costs over large power outputs, but small modular reactors
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(SMR) and microreactors (MR) do not have the same capacity
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to dissipate O&M costs. Instead, SMRs and MRs must innovate
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in O&M to be economically competitve. As SMRs and MRs become
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more common, the cost of repair and maintenance will reduce
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dramatically as nuclear power components become modular,
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replaceable parts instead of the bespoke reactor designs
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currently operating in large reactors. Operator wages,
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however, can be expected to increase without introducing
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greater controller autonomy. SMRs and MRs have much smaller
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power output per reactor core, and if they are required to
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employ the same size reactor operator team as a conventional
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large reactor, will suffer from much larger operator expense
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per megawatt. Greater controller autonomy can solve this
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problem by unloading some reactor control responsibilities
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from the operator, and therein reduce labor cost.
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(I think something can be said about safety here too (time
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to respond, human factors removed, etc.), but I'm chewing on
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how to word that.)
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### Related Papers:
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___________________________________________________________
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## **Verified Adaptive Control**
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### Goals:
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The goal of this research is to create an adaptive
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controller for a reactor control system that can adjust to
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system dynamics changes from component degredation or
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post-maintenance effects to maintain an optimal control,
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while using formal methods to provide strong safety
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guarantees that all adaptations remain within verified
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safety limits.
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### Outcomes:
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For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
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following:
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1. Create a simulation suite for the Small Modular Advanced
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High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR) to simulate component
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degradation such as heat exchanger fouling or chemistry
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changes following maintenance.
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2. Create a parameter adaptive control rod controller to maximize
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load following precision for a simulated power grid
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demand.
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3. Use contract based verification at runtime to ensure that
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learned parameters for the adaptive controller remain
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within safety specification limits.
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### Impact:
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Many reactor control systems already automate steady-state
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operation and basic load-following, but their performance
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degrades over time as plant equipment wears or is replaced.
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Without retuning, controllers may become less efficient,
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leading to suboptimal thermal efficiency, reduced grid
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responsiveness, and unnecessary operational margins that can
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lead to unnecessary shutdowns. Adaptive control can address
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these challenges by continuously tuning control parameters
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to match the evolving plant dynamics. However, without
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provable safety guarantees, such adaptation is unlikely to
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be accepted in high-assurance domains without proof of
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controller safety. By embedding formal, contract-based
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verification into the adaptation process, this work will
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enable the use of responsive and efficient control
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strategies that maintain regulatory compliance while
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improving plant performance and availability.
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### Related Papers:
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