Auto sync: 2025-10-20 12:44:27 (5 files changed)

M  .sessions/Journal.vim

M  Writing/ERLM/main.tex

M  Writing/ERLM/state-of-the-art/v5.tex

A  Writing/Journal/JRNL-20251015-204549.md

A  Writing/Journal/JRNL-20251017-193513.md

.sessions/Journal.vim

@@ -17,10 +17,52 @@ badd +1 ~/Documents/Dane\'s\ Vault/Journal/2025_07_30.md
 badd +10 JRNL-20250904-135850.md
 badd +96 JRNL-20251003-174601.md
 badd +14 journal_config.txt
+badd +95 JRNL-20251012-210736.md
 argglobal
 %argdel
-edit journal_config.txt
+edit JRNL-20251012-210736.md
+let s:save_splitbelow = &splitbelow
+let s:save_splitright = &splitright
+set splitbelow splitright
+wincmd _ | wincmd |
+vsplit
+1wincmd h
+wincmd w
+let &splitbelow = s:save_splitbelow
+let &splitright = s:save_splitright
+wincmd t
+let s:save_winminheight = &winminheight
+let s:save_winminwidth = &winminwidth
+set winminheight=0
+set winheight=1
+set winminwidth=0
+set winwidth=1
+exe 'vert 1resize ' . ((&columns * 93 + 93) / 186)
+exe 'vert 2resize ' . ((&columns * 92 + 93) / 186)
 argglobal
+balt journal_config.txt
+setlocal foldmethod=manual
+setlocal foldexpr=0
+setlocal foldmarker={{{,}}}
+setlocal foldignore=#
+setlocal foldlevel=0
+setlocal foldminlines=1
+setlocal foldnestmax=20
+setlocal foldenable
+silent! normal! zE
+let &fdl = &fdl
+let s:l = 95 - ((21 * winheight(0) + 32) / 64)
+if s:l < 1 | let s:l = 1 | endif
+keepjumps exe s:l
+normal! zt
+keepjumps 95
+normal! 0
+wincmd w
+argglobal
+if bufexists(fnamemodify("journal_config.txt", ":p")) | buffer journal_config.txt | else | edit journal_config.txt | endif
+if &buftype ==# 'terminal'
+  silent file journal_config.txt
+endif
 balt JRNL-20251003-174601.md
 setlocal foldmethod=manual
 setlocal foldexpr=0
@@ -37,7 +79,10 @@ if s:l < 1 | let s:l = 1 | endif
 keepjumps exe s:l
 normal! zt
 keepjumps 14
-normal! 0
+normal! 019|
+wincmd w
+exe 'vert 1resize ' . ((&columns * 93 + 93) / 186)
+exe 'vert 2resize ' . ((&columns * 92 + 93) / 186)
 tabnext 1
 if exists('s:wipebuf') && len(win_findbuf(s:wipebuf)) == 0 && getbufvar(s:wipebuf, '&buftype') isnot# 'terminal'
   silent exe 'bwipe ' . s:wipebuf
@@ -45,6 +90,8 @@ endif
 unlet! s:wipebuf
 set winheight=1 winwidth=20
 let &shortmess = s:shortmess_save
+let &winminheight = s:save_winminheight
+let &winminwidth = s:save_winminwidth
 let s:sx = expand("<sfile>:p:r")."x.vim"
 if filereadable(s:sx)
   exe "source " . fnameescape(s:sx)

Writing/ERLM/main.tex

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 \maketitle
 \input{goals-and-outcomes/v6}
-\input{state-of-the-art/v4}
+\input{state-of-the-art/v5}
 \input{research-approach/v3}
 \input{broader-impacts/v1}
 \input{metrics-of-success/v1}

Writing/ERLM/state-of-the-art/v5.tex

@@ -1,18 +1,100 @@
 \section{State of the Art and Limits of Current Practice}
 
+The principal aim of this research is to create autonomous reactor control
+systems that are tractably safe. But, to understand what exactly is being
+automated, it is important to understand how nuclear reactors are operated
+today. First, the reactor operator themselves is discussed. Then, operating
+procedures that we aim to leverage later are examined. Next, limitations of
+human-based operation are investigated, while finally we discuss current formal
+methods based approaches to building reactor control systems.
+
 \subsection{Current Reactor Procedures and Operation}
-%How are operating procedures made and why do they exist
 
-%what are different kinds of operating procedures
+Current generation nuclear power plants employ 3,600+ active NRC-licensed
+reactor operators in the United States. These operators are divided into Reactor
+Operators (ROs) who manipulate reactor controls and Senior Reactor Operators
+(SROs) who direct plant operations and serve as shift
+supervisors~\cite{10CFR55}. Staffing typically requires 2+ ROs with at least one
+SRO for current generation units. To become a reactor operator, an individual
+might spend up to six years to pass required training~\cite{princeton}.
 
-%NUREG 0899
+The role of human operators is paradoxically both critical and
+problematic. Operators hold legal authority under 10 CFR Part 55 to make
+critical decisions including departing from normal regulations during
+emergencies. The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident demonstrated how
+``combination of personnel error, design deficiencies, and component
+failures'' led to partial meltdown when operators ``misread confusing
+and contradictory readings and shut off the emergency water
+system''~\cite{Kemeny1979}. The President's Commission on TMI identified
+a fundamental ambiguity: placing ``responsibility and accountability for
+safe power plant operations...on the licensee in all circumstances''
+without formal verification that operators can fulfill this
+responsibility under all conditions~\cite{Kemeny1979}. This tension
+between operational flexibility and safety assurance remains unresolved
+in current practice.
 
+<<<<<<< HEAD
 %how are procedures tested
+=======
+Nuclear plant procedures exist in a hierarchy: normal operating procedures for
+routine operations, abnormal operating procedures for off-normal conditions,
+Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) for design-basis accidents, Severe
+Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) for beyond-design-basis events, and
+Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) for catastrophic damage
+scenarios. These procedures must comply with 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6)(ii) and are
+developed using guidance from NUREG-0899~\cite{NUREG-0899}, but their
+development process relies fundamentally on expert judgment and simulator
+validation rather than formal verification. Procedures undergo technical
+evaluation, simulator validation testing, and biennial review as part of
+operator requalification under 10 CFR 55.59~\cite{10CFR55}. Despite these
+rigorous development processes, procedures fundamentally lack formal
+verification of key safety properties. There is no mathematical proof that
+procedures cover all possible plant states, that required actions can be
+completed within available timeframes under all scenarios, or that transitions
+between procedure sets maintain safety invariants. 
 
-%Automation already is used for emergency systems
+\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{Procedures lack formal verification of correctness
+and completeness.} Current procedure development relies on expert judgment and
+simulator validation. No mathematical proof exists that procedures cover all
+possible plant states, that required actions can be completed within available
+timeframes, or that transitions between procedure sets maintain safety
+invariants. Paper-based procedures cannot ensure correct application, and even
+computer-based procedure systems lack the formal guarantees that automated
+reasoning could provide.
+
+Nuclear plants operate with multiple control modes: automatic control where the
+reactor control system maintains target parameters through continuous rod
+adjustment, manual control where operators directly manipulate control rods, and
+various intermediate modes. In typical pressurized water reactor operation, the
+reactor control system automatically maintains a floating average temperature,
+compensating for changes in power demand with reactivity feedback loops alone.
+Safety systems instead operate with implemented automation. Reactor
+Protection Systems trip automatically on safety signals with millisecond
+response times, and engineered safety features actuate automatically on accident
+signals without operator action required.
+>>>>>>> 568549999a24c6a86f19411cbdf12b642057ade9
+
+The current division between automated and human-controlled functions
+reveals the fundamental challenge of hybrid control. Highly
+automated systems handle reactor protection like automatic trips on safety
+parameters, emergency core cooling actuation, containment isolation,
+and basic process control. Human operators, however, retain control of
+strategic decision-making such as power level changes, startup/shutdown
+sequences, mode transitions, and procedure implementation. %%%NEED MORE
+
+\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{Current practice treats continuous plant
+dynamics and discrete control logic separately.} No application of
+hybrid control theory exists that could provide mathematical guarantees
+across mode transitions, verify timing properties formally, or optimize
+the automation-human interaction trade-off with provable safety bounds.
 
 \subsection{Human Factors in Nuclear Accidents}
+The persistent role of human error in nuclear safety incidents, despite
+decades of improvements in training and procedures, provides perhaps the
+most compelling motivation for formal automated control with
+mathematical safety guarantees.
 
+<<<<<<< HEAD
 %Whos in the control room
 
 %how are reactor operators trained
@@ -39,3 +121,270 @@
 %details of how it worked, and limitations therein
 
 %Digital system ONLY
+=======
+Multiple independent analyses converge on a striking statistic: \textbf{70--80\%
+of all nuclear power plant events are attributed to human error} versus
+approximately 20\% to equipment failures~\cite{DOE-HDBK-1028-2009,WNA2020}. More
+significantly, the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that ``human
+error was the root cause of all severe accidents at nuclear power plants''---a
+categorical statement spanning Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima
+Daiichi~\cite{IAEA-severe-accidents}. A detailed analysis of 190 events at
+Chinese nuclear power plants from 2007--2020~\cite{Wang2025} found that 53\% of
+events involved active errors while 92\% were associated with latent errors
+(organizational and systemic weaknesses that create conditions for failure). The
+persistence of this 70--80\% human error contribution despite four decades of
+continuous improvements in operator training, control room design, procedures,
+and human factors engineering. This suggests fundamental cognitive limitations
+rather than remediable deficiencies.
+
+The Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident on March 28, 1979 remains the definitive
+case study in human factors failures in nuclear operations. The accident began
+at 4:00 AM with a routine feedwater pump trip, escalating when a
+pressure-operated relief valve (PORV) stuck open---draining reactor
+coolant---but control room instrumentation showed only whether the valve had
+been commanded to close, not whether it actually closed. When Emergency Core
+Cooling System pumps automatically activated as designed, operators made the
+fateful decision to shut them down based on their incorrect assessment of plant
+conditions. The result was a massive loss of coolant accident and the core
+quickly began to overheat. During the emergency, operators faced more than 100
+simultaneous alarms, overwhelming their cognitive capacity~\cite{Kemeny1979}.
+The core suffered partial meltdown with \textbf{44\% of the fuel melting} before
+the situation was stabilized.
+
+Quantitative risk analysis revealed the magnitude of failure in existing
+safety assessment methods: the actual core damage probability was
+approximately 5\% per year while Probabilistic Risk Assessment
+had predicted 0.01\% per year---a \textbf{500-fold underestimation}.
+This dramatic failure demonstrated that human reliability could not be
+adequately assessed through expert judgment and historical data alone.
+%%%SOURCE??? Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods developed over four decades
+quantify human error probabilities and performance shaping factors. The
+SPAR-H method represents current best practice,
+providing nominal Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) of \textbf{0.01 (1\%)
+for diagnosis tasks} and \textbf{0.001 (0.1\%) for action tasks} under
+optimal conditions~\cite{NUREG-CR-6883}.
+
+However, these nominal error rates degrade dramatically under realistic
+accident conditions: inadequate available time increases HEP by
+\textbf{10-fold}, extreme stress by \textbf{5-fold}, high complexity by
+\textbf{5-fold}, missing procedures by \textbf{50-fold}, and poor
+ergonomics by \textbf{50-fold}. Under combined adverse conditions
+typical of severe accidents, human error probabilities can approach
+\textbf{0.1 to 1.0 (10\% to 100\%)}---essentially guaranteed failure for
+complex diagnosis tasks~\cite{NUREG-2114}.
+
+Rasmussen's influential 1983 taxonomy~\cite{Rasmussen1983} divides human errors
+into skill-based (highly practiced responses, HEP $10^{-3}$ to $10^{-4}$),
+rule-based (following procedures, HEP $10^{-2}$ to $10^{-1}$), and
+knowledge-based (novel problem solving, HEP $10^{-1}$ to 1). Severe accidents
+inherently require knowledge-based responses where human reliability is lowest.
+Miller's classic 1956 finding~\cite{Miller1956} that working memory capacity is
+limited to 7$\pm$2 chunks explains why Three Mile Island's 100+
+%WHAT IS A CHUNK?
+simultaneous alarms exceeded operators' processing capacity.
+
+\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{Human factors impose fundamental reliability
+limits that cannot be overcome through training alone.} Response time
+limitations constrain human effectiveness---reactor protection systems
+must respond in milliseconds, 100--1000 times faster than human
+operators. Cognitive biases systematically distort judgment:
+confirmation bias, overconfidence, and anchoring bias are inherent
+features of human cognition, not individual failings~\cite{Reason1990}.
+The persistent 70--80\% human error contribution despite four decades of
+improvements demonstrates that these limitations are fundamental
+rather than remediable.
+
+\subsection{HARDENS and Formal Methods}
+
+The High Assurance Rigorous Digital Engineering for Nuclear Safety
+(HARDENS) project, completed by Galois, Inc. for the U.S. Nuclear
+Regulatory Commission in 2022, represents the most advanced application
+of formal methods to nuclear reactor control systems to
+date---and simultaneously reveals the critical gaps that remain.
+
+\subsubsection{Rigorous Digital Engineering Demonstrated Feasibility}
+
+HARDENS aimed to address the nuclear industry's fundamental dilemma:
+existing U.S. nuclear control rooms rely on analog technologies from the
+1950s--60s, making construction costs exceed \$500 million and timelines
+stretch to decades. The NRC contracted Galois to demonstrate that
+Model-Based Systems Engineering and formal methods could design, verify,
+and implement a complex protection system meeting regulatory criteria at
+a fraction of typical cost.
+
+The project delivered far beyond its scope, creating what Galois
+describes as ``the world's most advanced, high-assurance protection
+system demonstrator.'' Completed in \textbf{nine months at a tiny
+fraction of typical control system costs}~\cite{Kiniry2022}, the project
+produced a complete Reactor Trip System (RTS) implementation with full
+traceability from NRC Request for Proposals and IEEE standards through
+formal architecture specifications to formally verified binaries and
+hardware running on FPGA demonstrator boards.
+
+Principal Investigator Joseph Kiniry led the team in applying Galois's
+Rigorous Digital Engineering methodology combining model-based
+engineering, digital twins with measurable fidelity, and applied formal
+methods. The approach integrates multiple abstraction levels---from
+semi-formal natural language requirements through formal specifications
+to verified implementations---all maintained as integrated artifacts
+rather than separate documentation prone to divergence.
+
+\subsubsection{Comprehensive Formal Methods Toolkit Provided Verification}
+
+HARDENS employed an impressive array of formal methods tools and
+techniques across the verification hierarchy. High-level specifications
+used Lando, SysMLv2, and FRET (NASA JPL's Formal Requirements
+Elicitation Tool) to capture stakeholder requirements, domain
+engineering, certification requirements, and safety requirements.
+Requirements were formally analyzed for \textbf{consistency,
+completeness, and realizability} using SAT and SMT solvers---verification
+that current procedure development methods lack.
+
+Executable formal models employed Cryptol to create an executable
+behavioral model of the entire RTS including all subsystems, components,
+and formal digital twin models of sensors, actuators, and compute
+infrastructure. Automatic code synthesis generated formally verifiable C
+implementations and System Verilog hardware implementations directly
+from Cryptol models---eliminating the traditional gap between
+specification and implementation where errors commonly arise.
+
+Formal verification tools included SAW (Software Analysis Workbench) for
+proving equivalence between models and implementations, Frama-C for C
+code verification, and Yosys for hardware verification. HARDENS verified
+both automatically synthesized and hand-written implementations against
+their models and against each other, providing redundant assurance
+paths.
+
+This multi-layered verification approach represents a quantum leap
+beyond current nuclear I\&C verification practices, which rely primarily
+on testing and simulation. HARDENS demonstrated that \textbf{complete
+formal verification from requirements to implementation is technically
+feasible} for safety-critical nuclear control systems.
+
+\subsubsection{Critical Limitation: Discrete Control Logic Only}
+
+Despite its impressive accomplishments, HARDENS has a fundamental
+limitation directly relevant to hybrid control synthesis: \textbf{the
+project addressed only discrete digital control logic without modeling
+or verifying continuous reactor dynamics}. The Reactor Trip System
+specification and formal verification covered discrete state transitions
+(trip/no-trip decisions), digital sensor input processing through
+discrete logic, and discrete actuation outputs (reactor trip commands).
+The system correctly implements the digital control logic for reactor
+protection with mathematical guarantees.
+
+However, the project did not address continuous dynamics of nuclear
+reactor physics including neutron kinetics, thermal-hydraulics, xenon
+oscillations, fuel temperature feedback, coolant flow dynamics, and heat
+transfer---all governed by continuous differential equations. Real
+reactor safety depends on the interaction between continuous processes
+(temperature, pressure, neutron flux evolving according to differential
+equations) and discrete control decisions (trip/no-trip, valve
+open/close, pump on/off). HARDENS verified the discrete controller in
+isolation but not the closed-loop hybrid system behavior.
+
+\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{HARDENS addressed discrete control logic
+without continuous dynamics or hybrid system verification.} Hybrid
+automata, differential dynamic logic, or similar hybrid systems
+formalisms would be required to specify and verify properties like ``the
+controller maintains core temperature below safety limits under all
+possible disturbances''---a property that inherently spans continuous and
+discrete dynamics. Verifying discrete control logic alone provides no
+guarantee that the closed-loop system exhibits desired continuous
+behavior such as stability, convergence to setpoints, or maintained
+safety margins.
+
+\subsubsection{Experimental Validation Gap Limits Technology Readiness}
+
+The second critical limitation is \textbf{absence of experimental
+validation} in actual nuclear facilities or realistic operational
+environments. HARDENS produced a demonstrator system at Technology
+Readiness Level 3--4 (analytical proof of concept with laboratory
+breadboard validation) rather than a deployment-ready system validated
+through extended operational testing. The NRC Final Report explicitly
+notes~\cite{Kiniry2022}: ``All material is considered in development and
+not a finalized product'' and ``The demonstration of its technical
+soundness was to be at a level consistent with satisfaction of the
+current regulatory criteria, although with no explicit demonstration of
+how regulatory requirements are met.''
+
+The project did not include deployment in actual nuclear facilities,
+testing with real reactor systems under operational conditions,
+side-by-side validation with operational analog RTS systems, systematic
+failure mode testing (radiation effects, electromagnetic interference,
+temperature extremes), actual NRC licensing review, or human factors
+validation with licensed nuclear operators in realistic control room
+scenarios.
+
+\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{HARDENS achieved TRL 3--4 without experimental
+validation.} While formal verification provides mathematical correctness
+guarantees for the implemented discrete logic, the gap between formal
+verification and actual system deployment involves myriad practical
+considerations: integration with legacy systems, long-term reliability
+under harsh environments, human-system interaction in realistic
+operational contexts, and regulatory acceptance of formal methods as
+primary assurance evidence.
+
+\subsection{Research Imperative: Formal Hybrid Control Synthesis}
+
+Three converging lines of evidence establish an urgent research
+imperative for formal hybrid control synthesis applied to nuclear
+reactor systems.
+
+\textbf{Current reactor control practices} reveal fundamental gaps in
+verification. Procedures lack mathematical proofs of completeness or
+timing adequacy. Mode transitions preserve safety properties only
+informally. Operator decision-making relies on training rather than
+verified algorithms. The divide between continuous plant dynamics and
+discrete control logic has never been bridged with formal methods.
+Despite extensive regulatory frameworks developed over six decades,
+\textbf{no mathematical guarantees exist} that current control approaches
+maintain safety under all possible scenarios.
+
+\textbf{Human factors in nuclear accidents} demonstrate that human error
+contributes to 70--80\% of nuclear incidents despite four decades of
+systematic improvements. The IAEA's categorical statement that ``human
+error was the root cause of all severe accidents'' reveals fundamental
+cognitive limitations: working memory capacity of 7$\pm$2 chunks,
+response times of seconds to minutes versus milliseconds required,
+cognitive biases immune to training, stress-induced performance
+degradation. Human Reliability Analysis methods document error
+probabilities of 0.001--0.01 under optimal conditions degrading to
+0.1--1.0 under realistic accident conditions. These limitations
+\textbf{cannot be overcome through human factors improvements alone}.
+
+\textbf{The HARDENS project} proved that formal verification is
+technically feasible and economically viable for nuclear control
+systems, achieving complete verification from requirements to
+implementation in nine months at a fraction of typical costs. However,
+HARDENS addressed only discrete control logic without considering
+continuous reactor dynamics or hybrid system verification, and the
+demonstrator achieved only TRL 3--4 without experimental validation in
+realistic nuclear environments. These limitations directly define the
+research frontier: \textbf{formal synthesis of hybrid controllers that
+provide mathematical safety guarantees across both continuous plant
+dynamics and discrete control logic}.
+
+The research opportunity is clear. Nuclear reactors are quintessential
+hybrid cyber-physical systems where continuous neutron kinetics,
+thermal-hydraulics, and heat transfer interact with discrete control
+mode decisions, trip logic, and valve states. Current practice treats
+these domains separately---reactor physics analyzed with simulation,
+control logic verified through testing, human operators expected to
+integrate everything through procedures. \textbf{Hybrid control
+synthesis offers the possibility of unified formal treatment} where
+controllers are automatically generated from high-level safety
+specifications with mathematical proofs that guarantee safe operation
+across all modes, all plant states, and all credible disturbances.
+
+Recent advances in hybrid systems theory---including reachability
+analysis, barrier certificates, counterexample-guided inductive
+synthesis, and satisfiability modulo theories for hybrid systems---provide
+the theoretical foundation. Computational advances enable verification of
+systems with continuous state spaces that were intractable a decade ago.
+The confluence of mature formal methods, powerful verification tools
+demonstrated by HARDENS, urgent safety imperatives documented by
+persistent human error statistics, and fundamental gaps in current
+hybrid dynamics treatment creates a compelling and timely research
+opportunity.
+>>>>>>> 568549999a24c6a86f19411cbdf12b642057ade9

Writing/Journal/JRNL-20251015-204549.md

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+---
+id: JRNL-20251015-204549
+title: Wednesday, October 15, 2025 - 08:45 PM
+type: journal
+created: 2025-10-16T00:45:49Z
+modified: 2025-10-16T00:45:49Z
+tags: [journal]
+---
+
+# Wednesday, October 15, 2025 - 08:45 PM
+
+Today is a new journal day, and I have some updates! The
+principal topic of this entry is going to be about Matilda,
+and a little bit about Sam. Nothing new is really happening
+at work recently, other than I've gone to the gym the past
+couple of days and that's been fun! I'm quite proud of that.
+
+So here's the deal about Matilda: I need to chill the fuck
+out. I'm having conversations back and forth about breaking
+up with this chick when *I don't really know her*. I have
+known her for *one* month, and we have been dating for
+*four* days. How can I possibly really know her?
+
+We went on another two dates. The first one was a bike ride
+on Tuesday afternoon, where we rode about 8 miles and
+stopped for burgers and beers in the middle. I felt like
+things were kind of awkward. We talked about random stuff,
+and things were kind of goofy. I think it was somewhat
+mutual, but I dunno I feel like maybe I was in a weird
+headspace. We chatted about my car some, and I did get a
+little bit of a weird reaction when I was like "yeah
+completion is probably 5-10 years away". I think that
+stunned her a little bit. We wrapped up and things were
+okay! A different kind of date than we're used to but it was
+a nice ride nonetheless. I think it kinda just goes to show
+maybe it's something we don't really share well as a couple.
+I like to go fast and I don't think she can keep up :eyes:.
+
+After that date though, I've been in some more turmoil about
+what I should do about the relationship. Should I break up
+with her? Are there dealbreakers I can't handle? Why did I
+move so fast? Why do I escalate based on emotions? And
+generally I've been getting a pit in my stomach sometimes
+when she says something like "you make me feel special". I
+thought this was a gut instinct telling me that I don't want
+her to feel that way or that I'm not ready for that
+commitment but this most recent date has significantly
+changed my perspective.
+
+Today I was planning on seeing her to break up with her. I
+had some sandpaper I was going to give her for these glasses
+she's making out of wine bottles, and then go on a walk with
+her. I had planned it out, I had rehearsed it with Claude
+(shoutout Claude btw), and felt pretty prepared for what was
+going to go down. But when I saw her, and we started
+walking, my gut feeling was very different. She was holding
+my hand, and we were just chatting and bs'ing about our days
+when I realized that I really don't know her, I really don't
+know that this couldn't work, and it's really not so serious
+as it feels in my head some times. 
+
+I took a step back on my thoughts of her falling for me and
+really dug into why I feel that way. I think I'm getting
+ahead of myself saying that, because we're still learning
+about each other and I think she's totally taking things
+more slowly and casually than I am. No one is seeing wedding
+bells right now, instead it's really more like we're getting
+to know one another with some exclusivity attached. It isn't
+so high stakes. Why did I get so anxious about this? Why did
+I catastrophize things with problems that don't really exist
+yet?
+
+I keep getting tied up on the idea that I need a partner
+with whom I can tinker with. Why? I have friends that I do
+that with, and honestly, like working alone a lot of the
+time. Do I need that in a partner? Maybe, but also maybe
+not? Why don't I use this relationship to really actually
+find that out? Also, she might actually be interested in
+some of that stuff? Who knows? The answer is, not me.
+
+Here's what I do know: when we went on that walk, when we
+sat down and talked about our days, when we talked about
+random stuff (like data privacy laws, government debt, and
+voluntary euthanasia????? Sidebar, that was crazy) I felt
+*so* relaxed. It was easy to just chill with her and enjoy
+the sunset. 
+
+So I've been on this thing where the emotions attached to
+her have been sinusoidal. I've gotta be honest, I think
+that's my fault, and does not help my clarity in making a
+decision in what I actually need in a partner. But, Matilda
+is *not* a partner yet. We're right at the beginning of a
+relationship, where *both* of us are figuring out if this is
+right or not. And that does *not* happen in 4 days. The
+things that I've been catastrophizing about are stressing me
+out for no reason, and are not real problems yet. It is my
+goal for this next week, to just calm down, and try to
+journal and relax before making decisions. Ideally, don't
+make *any* decisions this next week. What I feel like I
+really need is some stability. No escalations, but also I
+don't need to break up with her for no good reason either. I
+can try and figure my shit out at the same time, knowing
+that things aren't super serious right now. I don't need to
+put some much pressure on myself.
+
+Matilda is really nice to me, makes me feel calm when I'm
+with her, and really stimulates me intellectually just
+chatting about random stuff. Why I get so anxious when I'm
+not around her is my problem to figure out, and not a reason
+to drive decisions. For now, I'm going to keep getting to
+know her and try to relax a little. No one is getting
+married or having kids next month. To quote what
+best-buddy-in-chief Sam said "You know, you're allowed to be
+happy." He's right, and I don't need to create new problems.
+
+Then, there is recent details about Samuel! Sam is
+struggling some. We went golfing on Monday morning, which
+was a blast. I need to make it a priority to show up earlier
+than tee times though, as I got there basically 4 minutes
+before tee off. Anyways, Sam feels listless. He doesn't love
+his company, and Blake has been stressing him out some with
+her not really advancing her accounting certifications right
+now. I understand. I told him he should set some concrete
+goals. If he wants to leave his company, he should set a
+target date and write it down (sort of like I'm doing here).
+Maybe he should set some goals on his hobbies. The point
+was, make it measurable! I think that will help him a lot.
+
+Poker is probably falling through this Friday, with people
+being busy. Maybe I'll try to hangout with Sam anyways. 
+
+Matilda has her aunt coming into town this weekend, so the
+next time we're going to see each other is Sunday. No more
+escalating for now, no more "should I blow it all up????"
+for a bit, instead, let me just enjoy getting to know this
+new person without putting the Atlas-like pressure on it.
+That can be enough.
+

Writing/Journal/JRNL-20251017-193513.md

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+---
+id: JRNL-20251017-193513
+title: Friday, October 17, 2025 - 07:35 PM
+type: journal
+created: 2025-10-17T23:35:13Z
+modified: 2025-10-17T23:35:13Z
+tags: [journal]
+---
+
+# Friday, October 17, 2025 - 07:35 PM
+
+Yeah, so y'know how I said I was going to enjoy getting to
+know her, and that that would be enough? Yeah, that didn't
+work out. I broke up with Matilda yesterday.
+
+Yesterday I went to my grandparents to do some laundry. In
+the morning I felt okay about how things were left with
+Matilda, but as the day progressed, bits and pieces of that
+anxiety about the relationship and issues I had kept
+creeping in. It's really hard because Matilda is such a nice
+and good person, but ultimately, there were things about my
+values that didn't line up. We were keeping a
+Sunday-sleepover up in the air, and this was also kind of a
+determining factor for me. I really think that if she would
+have stayed over on Sunday that we would have had sex. Or at
+least, I would have had to refuse and make things very
+awkward.
+
+Matilda told me early on that she didn't want to have sex
+unless she was in a committed relationship. I said that's
+completely fair! I totally get it. Then, about two weeks
+ago, she gave me a heads up that she was getting back on
+birth control. It was a weird heads up to get, but we talked
+about it, agreed we were going in that direction, and it was
+okay. But, recently, there had been some flirtatious action
+where we were basically soft sexting that really indicated
+to me we would have sex soon. And with me on the fence about
+the whole thing, escalating to sex is the exact opposite of
+what I wanted to do. I told myself last entry that I would
+not escalate, and that I would calm down. Well, I tried to
+calm down, but I've arranged things that I will definitely
+not be escalating.
+
+I told my grandparents about the situation. How she's such a
+nice person, but I can't shake this gut feeling that
+something is wrong. They try to be helpful, and are
+generally supportive, but they met in high school and have
+been together since. Neither of them have really 'dated'. So
+to that end, I was kind of on my own.
+
+Then, I'm sitting in the basement while the dryer is running
+and I got to a point where I thought to myself "I cannot
+keep waffling on this, this anxiety is killing me and I need
+to just end it." I texted her asking her how her evening was
+going, and she responded that it was going well. She also
+sent me a picture of the Christmas tree Downtown and said
+'Great news!', and then asked if I'd want to go ice skating
+with her or maybe go on a double date with Sam and Blake ice
+skating. I never texted back.
+
+I sat in a chair instead, and thought for a long time about
+what I was going to do. I thought for a long time if
+sticking it out was worth it, but I thought about
+conversations with Claude and thought about 'If I don't do
+this now, how am I going to feel in a week or two weeks?'.
+The answer to that question is still uncomfortable if I stay
+this course.
+
+At this point, Krzyszstof calls me randomly. Buddy's
+Mercedes broke down in the middle of campus and he was
+asking for help. I couldn't help him obviously being way out
+at my grandparents, but his interruption broke me of my
+stupor and I got the courage to call Matilda afterwards.
+
+I asked her how her afternoon was going. She said it was
+going well, and sounded very happy. She was arranging
+flowers for her mom's birthday this weekend. She is so sweet
+in that way. We had some small talk for a while before I
+changed the topic to us. I said that I've been thinking
+about us, and that I know this is sudden and is going to
+sound like a shock, but I think we should stop seeing each
+other. There was a long pause on the phone. When she spoke,
+her tone was immediately different and she politely asked
+why. I told her that over the past week, I've been dealing
+with some personal emotional difficulties and I've come to
+the conclusion that it is not a good time for me to be in a
+relationship right now. I told her I think she's wonderful,
+and that I think she is such an incredibly nice person in
+the way that she moves through the world and that I liked
+her a lot, but that she deserves someone who is all in for
+her and I just don't think I can be that guy for her. I
+apologized saying that I wish I knew this beforehand, but I
+didn't, and am sorry that I couldn't get there for her. She
+started to cry softly, and told me that I didn't need to
+hear it from her, but that besides being so smart, that I'm
+incredibly compassionate and thoughtful and know how to make
+her feel special. She appreciated me being honest and said
+that this sucks, but she understands. I told her the one
+thing that's most important to me for her to take away from
+this conversation is that this is not her fault. I offered
+if she wanted to be friends at some point I would be open to
+that, but that I know we're both going to need our space
+after this jolt. I said I genuinely think she's great and that she
+will find her person, just that I don't think it's me. I
+apologized again. She told me that she is thankful I was
+honest, and that she's rooting for me. She enjoyed our
+relationship even though it was so short. We wished each
+other good luck.
+
+And that's the last that I talked to her. I started to cry
+some too. I wish I could've done this in person on
+Wednesday, but for some reason, I just couldn't. 
+
+Afterwards I called Sam on the phone to talk to him. He was
+supportive in the sense that he knows I've got to do what's
+right for me, but cautioned me that he thinks I can make
+extremely reactive decisions. He's right. It's a weakness
+and a strength. On one hand, I'm able to cut my losses at
+times and move on quickly to the next thing, or adjust to
+changing circumstances, but on the other, sometimes I can
+act too quickly before I have all the cards. I don't think
+this situation is like that. Or at least this breakup,
+anyways. I've been dealing with this doubt for weeks, while
+really the reactive decision was escalating to asking her to
+be my girlfriend.
+
+It's over. This sucks, but I know deep down it's the right
+choice. My anxiety about the relationship is completely
+gone, and instead replaced with a profound loneliness. Part
+of me wonders if I blew up something that was good for no
+reason, but another part of me knows that's not seeing the
+forest for the trees. I feel so bad about this whole
+situation and hope these feelings subside soon. It's hard
+not to think about. I haven't texted her, and I deleted our
+conversation so I can't our chat history. It sucks that when
+a relationship like this ends, the whole friendship and
+camaraderie ends so quickly too. It's such a brutal cut and
+feels like a void has opened up out of nowhere.
+
+I went for a ride today on the bike. I rode over to South
+Park to whip around, and then stopped at Brusters. That was
+a *blast*. Anyways, I'm still bummed, but I know this was
+the right move and things will get better. Luis told me
+today that things like this are the price of dating and that
+it comes with the territory. He's right.
+
+I redownloaded Hinge. I'm not using it right now, but if
+Cinderella likes me I'll at least see it. Up next I'm going
+to really write down what I'm looking for in a partner in my
+next journal entry. This way, I'll have a list of clear
+targets to hit, and who knows, maybe I'll manifest her into
+existence. It worked for Lane, at least. 
+
+I see Rachel on Tuesday. Yeugh. Time to watch some of The
+Pitt tonight and try to relax. I think I might travel into
+Pitt tomorrow to go to the gym. I feel like I need it.
+
+I love you, me. We're figuring this shit out.