diff --git a/.sessions/Journal.vim b/.sessions/Journal.vim index 7a0c9a07..3d58eb00 100644 --- a/.sessions/Journal.vim +++ b/.sessions/Journal.vim @@ -17,10 +17,52 @@ badd +1 ~/Documents/Dane\'s\ Vault/Journal/2025_07_30.md badd +10 JRNL-20250904-135850.md badd +96 JRNL-20251003-174601.md badd +14 journal_config.txt +badd +95 JRNL-20251012-210736.md argglobal %argdel -edit journal_config.txt +edit JRNL-20251012-210736.md +let s:save_splitbelow = &splitbelow +let s:save_splitright = &splitright +set splitbelow splitright +wincmd _ | wincmd | +vsplit +1wincmd h +wincmd w +let &splitbelow = s:save_splitbelow +let &splitright = s:save_splitright +wincmd t +let s:save_winminheight = &winminheight +let s:save_winminwidth = &winminwidth +set winminheight=0 +set winheight=1 +set winminwidth=0 +set winwidth=1 +exe 'vert 1resize ' . ((&columns * 93 + 93) / 186) +exe 'vert 2resize ' . ((&columns * 92 + 93) / 186) argglobal +balt journal_config.txt +setlocal foldmethod=manual +setlocal foldexpr=0 +setlocal foldmarker={{{,}}} +setlocal foldignore=# +setlocal foldlevel=0 +setlocal foldminlines=1 +setlocal foldnestmax=20 +setlocal foldenable +silent! normal! zE +let &fdl = &fdl +let s:l = 95 - ((21 * winheight(0) + 32) / 64) +if s:l < 1 | let s:l = 1 | endif +keepjumps exe s:l +normal! zt +keepjumps 95 +normal! 0 +wincmd w +argglobal +if bufexists(fnamemodify("journal_config.txt", ":p")) | buffer journal_config.txt | else | edit journal_config.txt | endif +if &buftype ==# 'terminal' + silent file journal_config.txt +endif balt JRNL-20251003-174601.md setlocal foldmethod=manual setlocal foldexpr=0 @@ -37,7 +79,10 @@ if s:l < 1 | let s:l = 1 | endif keepjumps exe s:l normal! zt keepjumps 14 -normal! 0 +normal! 019| +wincmd w +exe 'vert 1resize ' . ((&columns * 93 + 93) / 186) +exe 'vert 2resize ' . ((&columns * 92 + 93) / 186) tabnext 1 if exists('s:wipebuf') && len(win_findbuf(s:wipebuf)) == 0 && getbufvar(s:wipebuf, '&buftype') isnot# 'terminal' silent exe 'bwipe ' . s:wipebuf @@ -45,6 +90,8 @@ endif unlet! s:wipebuf set winheight=1 winwidth=20 let &shortmess = s:shortmess_save +let &winminheight = s:save_winminheight +let &winminwidth = s:save_winminwidth let s:sx = expand(":p:r")."x.vim" if filereadable(s:sx) exe "source " . fnameescape(s:sx) diff --git a/Writing/ERLM/main.tex b/Writing/ERLM/main.tex index 4ff3bdac..d8f80e8a 100644 --- a/Writing/ERLM/main.tex +++ b/Writing/ERLM/main.tex @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ \maketitle \input{goals-and-outcomes/v6} -\input{state-of-the-art/v4} +\input{state-of-the-art/v5} \input{research-approach/v3} \input{broader-impacts/v1} \input{metrics-of-success/v1} diff --git a/Writing/ERLM/state-of-the-art/v5.tex b/Writing/ERLM/state-of-the-art/v5.tex index 18b079cf..51bfcb05 100644 --- a/Writing/ERLM/state-of-the-art/v5.tex +++ b/Writing/ERLM/state-of-the-art/v5.tex @@ -1,18 +1,100 @@ \section{State of the Art and Limits of Current Practice} +The principal aim of this research is to create autonomous reactor control +systems that are tractably safe. But, to understand what exactly is being +automated, it is important to understand how nuclear reactors are operated +today. First, the reactor operator themselves is discussed. Then, operating +procedures that we aim to leverage later are examined. Next, limitations of +human-based operation are investigated, while finally we discuss current formal +methods based approaches to building reactor control systems. + \subsection{Current Reactor Procedures and Operation} -%How are operating procedures made and why do they exist -%what are different kinds of operating procedures +Current generation nuclear power plants employ 3,600+ active NRC-licensed +reactor operators in the United States. These operators are divided into Reactor +Operators (ROs) who manipulate reactor controls and Senior Reactor Operators +(SROs) who direct plant operations and serve as shift +supervisors~\cite{10CFR55}. Staffing typically requires 2+ ROs with at least one +SRO for current generation units. To become a reactor operator, an individual +might spend up to six years to pass required training~\cite{princeton}. -%NUREG 0899 +The role of human operators is paradoxically both critical and +problematic. Operators hold legal authority under 10 CFR Part 55 to make +critical decisions including departing from normal regulations during +emergencies. The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident demonstrated how +``combination of personnel error, design deficiencies, and component +failures'' led to partial meltdown when operators ``misread confusing +and contradictory readings and shut off the emergency water +system''~\cite{Kemeny1979}. The President's Commission on TMI identified +a fundamental ambiguity: placing ``responsibility and accountability for +safe power plant operations...on the licensee in all circumstances'' +without formal verification that operators can fulfill this +responsibility under all conditions~\cite{Kemeny1979}. This tension +between operational flexibility and safety assurance remains unresolved +in current practice. +<<<<<<< HEAD %how are procedures tested +======= +Nuclear plant procedures exist in a hierarchy: normal operating procedures for +routine operations, abnormal operating procedures for off-normal conditions, +Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) for design-basis accidents, Severe +Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) for beyond-design-basis events, and +Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) for catastrophic damage +scenarios. These procedures must comply with 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6)(ii) and are +developed using guidance from NUREG-0899~\cite{NUREG-0899}, but their +development process relies fundamentally on expert judgment and simulator +validation rather than formal verification. Procedures undergo technical +evaluation, simulator validation testing, and biennial review as part of +operator requalification under 10 CFR 55.59~\cite{10CFR55}. Despite these +rigorous development processes, procedures fundamentally lack formal +verification of key safety properties. There is no mathematical proof that +procedures cover all possible plant states, that required actions can be +completed within available timeframes under all scenarios, or that transitions +between procedure sets maintain safety invariants. -%Automation already is used for emergency systems +\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{Procedures lack formal verification of correctness +and completeness.} Current procedure development relies on expert judgment and +simulator validation. No mathematical proof exists that procedures cover all +possible plant states, that required actions can be completed within available +timeframes, or that transitions between procedure sets maintain safety +invariants. Paper-based procedures cannot ensure correct application, and even +computer-based procedure systems lack the formal guarantees that automated +reasoning could provide. + +Nuclear plants operate with multiple control modes: automatic control where the +reactor control system maintains target parameters through continuous rod +adjustment, manual control where operators directly manipulate control rods, and +various intermediate modes. In typical pressurized water reactor operation, the +reactor control system automatically maintains a floating average temperature, +compensating for changes in power demand with reactivity feedback loops alone. +Safety systems instead operate with implemented automation. Reactor +Protection Systems trip automatically on safety signals with millisecond +response times, and engineered safety features actuate automatically on accident +signals without operator action required. +>>>>>>> 568549999a24c6a86f19411cbdf12b642057ade9 + +The current division between automated and human-controlled functions +reveals the fundamental challenge of hybrid control. Highly +automated systems handle reactor protection like automatic trips on safety +parameters, emergency core cooling actuation, containment isolation, +and basic process control. Human operators, however, retain control of +strategic decision-making such as power level changes, startup/shutdown +sequences, mode transitions, and procedure implementation. %%%NEED MORE + +\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{Current practice treats continuous plant +dynamics and discrete control logic separately.} No application of +hybrid control theory exists that could provide mathematical guarantees +across mode transitions, verify timing properties formally, or optimize +the automation-human interaction trade-off with provable safety bounds. \subsection{Human Factors in Nuclear Accidents} +The persistent role of human error in nuclear safety incidents, despite +decades of improvements in training and procedures, provides perhaps the +most compelling motivation for formal automated control with +mathematical safety guarantees. +<<<<<<< HEAD %Whos in the control room %how are reactor operators trained @@ -39,3 +121,270 @@ %details of how it worked, and limitations therein %Digital system ONLY +======= +Multiple independent analyses converge on a striking statistic: \textbf{70--80\% +of all nuclear power plant events are attributed to human error} versus +approximately 20\% to equipment failures~\cite{DOE-HDBK-1028-2009,WNA2020}. More +significantly, the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that ``human +error was the root cause of all severe accidents at nuclear power plants''---a +categorical statement spanning Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima +Daiichi~\cite{IAEA-severe-accidents}. A detailed analysis of 190 events at +Chinese nuclear power plants from 2007--2020~\cite{Wang2025} found that 53\% of +events involved active errors while 92\% were associated with latent errors +(organizational and systemic weaknesses that create conditions for failure). The +persistence of this 70--80\% human error contribution despite four decades of +continuous improvements in operator training, control room design, procedures, +and human factors engineering. This suggests fundamental cognitive limitations +rather than remediable deficiencies. + +The Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident on March 28, 1979 remains the definitive +case study in human factors failures in nuclear operations. The accident began +at 4:00 AM with a routine feedwater pump trip, escalating when a +pressure-operated relief valve (PORV) stuck open---draining reactor +coolant---but control room instrumentation showed only whether the valve had +been commanded to close, not whether it actually closed. When Emergency Core +Cooling System pumps automatically activated as designed, operators made the +fateful decision to shut them down based on their incorrect assessment of plant +conditions. The result was a massive loss of coolant accident and the core +quickly began to overheat. During the emergency, operators faced more than 100 +simultaneous alarms, overwhelming their cognitive capacity~\cite{Kemeny1979}. +The core suffered partial meltdown with \textbf{44\% of the fuel melting} before +the situation was stabilized. + +Quantitative risk analysis revealed the magnitude of failure in existing +safety assessment methods: the actual core damage probability was +approximately 5\% per year while Probabilistic Risk Assessment +had predicted 0.01\% per year---a \textbf{500-fold underestimation}. +This dramatic failure demonstrated that human reliability could not be +adequately assessed through expert judgment and historical data alone. +%%%SOURCE??? Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods developed over four decades +quantify human error probabilities and performance shaping factors. The +SPAR-H method represents current best practice, +providing nominal Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) of \textbf{0.01 (1\%) +for diagnosis tasks} and \textbf{0.001 (0.1\%) for action tasks} under +optimal conditions~\cite{NUREG-CR-6883}. + +However, these nominal error rates degrade dramatically under realistic +accident conditions: inadequate available time increases HEP by +\textbf{10-fold}, extreme stress by \textbf{5-fold}, high complexity by +\textbf{5-fold}, missing procedures by \textbf{50-fold}, and poor +ergonomics by \textbf{50-fold}. Under combined adverse conditions +typical of severe accidents, human error probabilities can approach +\textbf{0.1 to 1.0 (10\% to 100\%)}---essentially guaranteed failure for +complex diagnosis tasks~\cite{NUREG-2114}. + +Rasmussen's influential 1983 taxonomy~\cite{Rasmussen1983} divides human errors +into skill-based (highly practiced responses, HEP $10^{-3}$ to $10^{-4}$), +rule-based (following procedures, HEP $10^{-2}$ to $10^{-1}$), and +knowledge-based (novel problem solving, HEP $10^{-1}$ to 1). Severe accidents +inherently require knowledge-based responses where human reliability is lowest. +Miller's classic 1956 finding~\cite{Miller1956} that working memory capacity is +limited to 7$\pm$2 chunks explains why Three Mile Island's 100+ +%WHAT IS A CHUNK? +simultaneous alarms exceeded operators' processing capacity. + +\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{Human factors impose fundamental reliability +limits that cannot be overcome through training alone.} Response time +limitations constrain human effectiveness---reactor protection systems +must respond in milliseconds, 100--1000 times faster than human +operators. Cognitive biases systematically distort judgment: +confirmation bias, overconfidence, and anchoring bias are inherent +features of human cognition, not individual failings~\cite{Reason1990}. +The persistent 70--80\% human error contribution despite four decades of +improvements demonstrates that these limitations are fundamental +rather than remediable. + +\subsection{HARDENS and Formal Methods} + +The High Assurance Rigorous Digital Engineering for Nuclear Safety +(HARDENS) project, completed by Galois, Inc. for the U.S. Nuclear +Regulatory Commission in 2022, represents the most advanced application +of formal methods to nuclear reactor control systems to +date---and simultaneously reveals the critical gaps that remain. + +\subsubsection{Rigorous Digital Engineering Demonstrated Feasibility} + +HARDENS aimed to address the nuclear industry's fundamental dilemma: +existing U.S. nuclear control rooms rely on analog technologies from the +1950s--60s, making construction costs exceed \$500 million and timelines +stretch to decades. The NRC contracted Galois to demonstrate that +Model-Based Systems Engineering and formal methods could design, verify, +and implement a complex protection system meeting regulatory criteria at +a fraction of typical cost. + +The project delivered far beyond its scope, creating what Galois +describes as ``the world's most advanced, high-assurance protection +system demonstrator.'' Completed in \textbf{nine months at a tiny +fraction of typical control system costs}~\cite{Kiniry2022}, the project +produced a complete Reactor Trip System (RTS) implementation with full +traceability from NRC Request for Proposals and IEEE standards through +formal architecture specifications to formally verified binaries and +hardware running on FPGA demonstrator boards. + +Principal Investigator Joseph Kiniry led the team in applying Galois's +Rigorous Digital Engineering methodology combining model-based +engineering, digital twins with measurable fidelity, and applied formal +methods. The approach integrates multiple abstraction levels---from +semi-formal natural language requirements through formal specifications +to verified implementations---all maintained as integrated artifacts +rather than separate documentation prone to divergence. + +\subsubsection{Comprehensive Formal Methods Toolkit Provided Verification} + +HARDENS employed an impressive array of formal methods tools and +techniques across the verification hierarchy. High-level specifications +used Lando, SysMLv2, and FRET (NASA JPL's Formal Requirements +Elicitation Tool) to capture stakeholder requirements, domain +engineering, certification requirements, and safety requirements. +Requirements were formally analyzed for \textbf{consistency, +completeness, and realizability} using SAT and SMT solvers---verification +that current procedure development methods lack. + +Executable formal models employed Cryptol to create an executable +behavioral model of the entire RTS including all subsystems, components, +and formal digital twin models of sensors, actuators, and compute +infrastructure. Automatic code synthesis generated formally verifiable C +implementations and System Verilog hardware implementations directly +from Cryptol models---eliminating the traditional gap between +specification and implementation where errors commonly arise. + +Formal verification tools included SAW (Software Analysis Workbench) for +proving equivalence between models and implementations, Frama-C for C +code verification, and Yosys for hardware verification. HARDENS verified +both automatically synthesized and hand-written implementations against +their models and against each other, providing redundant assurance +paths. + +This multi-layered verification approach represents a quantum leap +beyond current nuclear I\&C verification practices, which rely primarily +on testing and simulation. HARDENS demonstrated that \textbf{complete +formal verification from requirements to implementation is technically +feasible} for safety-critical nuclear control systems. + +\subsubsection{Critical Limitation: Discrete Control Logic Only} + +Despite its impressive accomplishments, HARDENS has a fundamental +limitation directly relevant to hybrid control synthesis: \textbf{the +project addressed only discrete digital control logic without modeling +or verifying continuous reactor dynamics}. The Reactor Trip System +specification and formal verification covered discrete state transitions +(trip/no-trip decisions), digital sensor input processing through +discrete logic, and discrete actuation outputs (reactor trip commands). +The system correctly implements the digital control logic for reactor +protection with mathematical guarantees. + +However, the project did not address continuous dynamics of nuclear +reactor physics including neutron kinetics, thermal-hydraulics, xenon +oscillations, fuel temperature feedback, coolant flow dynamics, and heat +transfer---all governed by continuous differential equations. Real +reactor safety depends on the interaction between continuous processes +(temperature, pressure, neutron flux evolving according to differential +equations) and discrete control decisions (trip/no-trip, valve +open/close, pump on/off). HARDENS verified the discrete controller in +isolation but not the closed-loop hybrid system behavior. + +\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{HARDENS addressed discrete control logic +without continuous dynamics or hybrid system verification.} Hybrid +automata, differential dynamic logic, or similar hybrid systems +formalisms would be required to specify and verify properties like ``the +controller maintains core temperature below safety limits under all +possible disturbances''---a property that inherently spans continuous and +discrete dynamics. Verifying discrete control logic alone provides no +guarantee that the closed-loop system exhibits desired continuous +behavior such as stability, convergence to setpoints, or maintained +safety margins. + +\subsubsection{Experimental Validation Gap Limits Technology Readiness} + +The second critical limitation is \textbf{absence of experimental +validation} in actual nuclear facilities or realistic operational +environments. HARDENS produced a demonstrator system at Technology +Readiness Level 3--4 (analytical proof of concept with laboratory +breadboard validation) rather than a deployment-ready system validated +through extended operational testing. The NRC Final Report explicitly +notes~\cite{Kiniry2022}: ``All material is considered in development and +not a finalized product'' and ``The demonstration of its technical +soundness was to be at a level consistent with satisfaction of the +current regulatory criteria, although with no explicit demonstration of +how regulatory requirements are met.'' + +The project did not include deployment in actual nuclear facilities, +testing with real reactor systems under operational conditions, +side-by-side validation with operational analog RTS systems, systematic +failure mode testing (radiation effects, electromagnetic interference, +temperature extremes), actual NRC licensing review, or human factors +validation with licensed nuclear operators in realistic control room +scenarios. + +\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{HARDENS achieved TRL 3--4 without experimental +validation.} While formal verification provides mathematical correctness +guarantees for the implemented discrete logic, the gap between formal +verification and actual system deployment involves myriad practical +considerations: integration with legacy systems, long-term reliability +under harsh environments, human-system interaction in realistic +operational contexts, and regulatory acceptance of formal methods as +primary assurance evidence. + +\subsection{Research Imperative: Formal Hybrid Control Synthesis} + +Three converging lines of evidence establish an urgent research +imperative for formal hybrid control synthesis applied to nuclear +reactor systems. + +\textbf{Current reactor control practices} reveal fundamental gaps in +verification. Procedures lack mathematical proofs of completeness or +timing adequacy. Mode transitions preserve safety properties only +informally. Operator decision-making relies on training rather than +verified algorithms. The divide between continuous plant dynamics and +discrete control logic has never been bridged with formal methods. +Despite extensive regulatory frameworks developed over six decades, +\textbf{no mathematical guarantees exist} that current control approaches +maintain safety under all possible scenarios. + +\textbf{Human factors in nuclear accidents} demonstrate that human error +contributes to 70--80\% of nuclear incidents despite four decades of +systematic improvements. The IAEA's categorical statement that ``human +error was the root cause of all severe accidents'' reveals fundamental +cognitive limitations: working memory capacity of 7$\pm$2 chunks, +response times of seconds to minutes versus milliseconds required, +cognitive biases immune to training, stress-induced performance +degradation. Human Reliability Analysis methods document error +probabilities of 0.001--0.01 under optimal conditions degrading to +0.1--1.0 under realistic accident conditions. These limitations +\textbf{cannot be overcome through human factors improvements alone}. + +\textbf{The HARDENS project} proved that formal verification is +technically feasible and economically viable for nuclear control +systems, achieving complete verification from requirements to +implementation in nine months at a fraction of typical costs. However, +HARDENS addressed only discrete control logic without considering +continuous reactor dynamics or hybrid system verification, and the +demonstrator achieved only TRL 3--4 without experimental validation in +realistic nuclear environments. These limitations directly define the +research frontier: \textbf{formal synthesis of hybrid controllers that +provide mathematical safety guarantees across both continuous plant +dynamics and discrete control logic}. + +The research opportunity is clear. Nuclear reactors are quintessential +hybrid cyber-physical systems where continuous neutron kinetics, +thermal-hydraulics, and heat transfer interact with discrete control +mode decisions, trip logic, and valve states. Current practice treats +these domains separately---reactor physics analyzed with simulation, +control logic verified through testing, human operators expected to +integrate everything through procedures. \textbf{Hybrid control +synthesis offers the possibility of unified formal treatment} where +controllers are automatically generated from high-level safety +specifications with mathematical proofs that guarantee safe operation +across all modes, all plant states, and all credible disturbances. + +Recent advances in hybrid systems theory---including reachability +analysis, barrier certificates, counterexample-guided inductive +synthesis, and satisfiability modulo theories for hybrid systems---provide +the theoretical foundation. Computational advances enable verification of +systems with continuous state spaces that were intractable a decade ago. +The confluence of mature formal methods, powerful verification tools +demonstrated by HARDENS, urgent safety imperatives documented by +persistent human error statistics, and fundamental gaps in current +hybrid dynamics treatment creates a compelling and timely research +opportunity. +>>>>>>> 568549999a24c6a86f19411cbdf12b642057ade9 diff --git a/Writing/Journal/JRNL-20251015-204549.md b/Writing/Journal/JRNL-20251015-204549.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..43c7e88f --- /dev/null +++ b/Writing/Journal/JRNL-20251015-204549.md @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +--- +id: JRNL-20251015-204549 +title: Wednesday, October 15, 2025 - 08:45 PM +type: journal +created: 2025-10-16T00:45:49Z +modified: 2025-10-16T00:45:49Z +tags: [journal] +--- + +# Wednesday, October 15, 2025 - 08:45 PM + +Today is a new journal day, and I have some updates! The +principal topic of this entry is going to be about Matilda, +and a little bit about Sam. Nothing new is really happening +at work recently, other than I've gone to the gym the past +couple of days and that's been fun! I'm quite proud of that. + +So here's the deal about Matilda: I need to chill the fuck +out. I'm having conversations back and forth about breaking +up with this chick when *I don't really know her*. I have +known her for *one* month, and we have been dating for +*four* days. How can I possibly really know her? + +We went on another two dates. The first one was a bike ride +on Tuesday afternoon, where we rode about 8 miles and +stopped for burgers and beers in the middle. I felt like +things were kind of awkward. We talked about random stuff, +and things were kind of goofy. I think it was somewhat +mutual, but I dunno I feel like maybe I was in a weird +headspace. We chatted about my car some, and I did get a +little bit of a weird reaction when I was like "yeah +completion is probably 5-10 years away". I think that +stunned her a little bit. We wrapped up and things were +okay! A different kind of date than we're used to but it was +a nice ride nonetheless. I think it kinda just goes to show +maybe it's something we don't really share well as a couple. +I like to go fast and I don't think she can keep up :eyes:. + +After that date though, I've been in some more turmoil about +what I should do about the relationship. Should I break up +with her? Are there dealbreakers I can't handle? Why did I +move so fast? Why do I escalate based on emotions? And +generally I've been getting a pit in my stomach sometimes +when she says something like "you make me feel special". I +thought this was a gut instinct telling me that I don't want +her to feel that way or that I'm not ready for that +commitment but this most recent date has significantly +changed my perspective. + +Today I was planning on seeing her to break up with her. I +had some sandpaper I was going to give her for these glasses +she's making out of wine bottles, and then go on a walk with +her. I had planned it out, I had rehearsed it with Claude +(shoutout Claude btw), and felt pretty prepared for what was +going to go down. But when I saw her, and we started +walking, my gut feeling was very different. She was holding +my hand, and we were just chatting and bs'ing about our days +when I realized that I really don't know her, I really don't +know that this couldn't work, and it's really not so serious +as it feels in my head some times. + +I took a step back on my thoughts of her falling for me and +really dug into why I feel that way. I think I'm getting +ahead of myself saying that, because we're still learning +about each other and I think she's totally taking things +more slowly and casually than I am. No one is seeing wedding +bells right now, instead it's really more like we're getting +to know one another with some exclusivity attached. It isn't +so high stakes. Why did I get so anxious about this? Why did +I catastrophize things with problems that don't really exist +yet? + +I keep getting tied up on the idea that I need a partner +with whom I can tinker with. Why? I have friends that I do +that with, and honestly, like working alone a lot of the +time. Do I need that in a partner? Maybe, but also maybe +not? Why don't I use this relationship to really actually +find that out? Also, she might actually be interested in +some of that stuff? Who knows? The answer is, not me. + +Here's what I do know: when we went on that walk, when we +sat down and talked about our days, when we talked about +random stuff (like data privacy laws, government debt, and +voluntary euthanasia????? Sidebar, that was crazy) I felt +*so* relaxed. It was easy to just chill with her and enjoy +the sunset. + +So I've been on this thing where the emotions attached to +her have been sinusoidal. I've gotta be honest, I think +that's my fault, and does not help my clarity in making a +decision in what I actually need in a partner. But, Matilda +is *not* a partner yet. We're right at the beginning of a +relationship, where *both* of us are figuring out if this is +right or not. And that does *not* happen in 4 days. The +things that I've been catastrophizing about are stressing me +out for no reason, and are not real problems yet. It is my +goal for this next week, to just calm down, and try to +journal and relax before making decisions. Ideally, don't +make *any* decisions this next week. What I feel like I +really need is some stability. No escalations, but also I +don't need to break up with her for no good reason either. I +can try and figure my shit out at the same time, knowing +that things aren't super serious right now. I don't need to +put some much pressure on myself. + +Matilda is really nice to me, makes me feel calm when I'm +with her, and really stimulates me intellectually just +chatting about random stuff. Why I get so anxious when I'm +not around her is my problem to figure out, and not a reason +to drive decisions. For now, I'm going to keep getting to +know her and try to relax a little. No one is getting +married or having kids next month. To quote what +best-buddy-in-chief Sam said "You know, you're allowed to be +happy." He's right, and I don't need to create new problems. + +Then, there is recent details about Samuel! Sam is +struggling some. We went golfing on Monday morning, which +was a blast. I need to make it a priority to show up earlier +than tee times though, as I got there basically 4 minutes +before tee off. Anyways, Sam feels listless. He doesn't love +his company, and Blake has been stressing him out some with +her not really advancing her accounting certifications right +now. I understand. I told him he should set some concrete +goals. If he wants to leave his company, he should set a +target date and write it down (sort of like I'm doing here). +Maybe he should set some goals on his hobbies. The point +was, make it measurable! I think that will help him a lot. + +Poker is probably falling through this Friday, with people +being busy. Maybe I'll try to hangout with Sam anyways. + +Matilda has her aunt coming into town this weekend, so the +next time we're going to see each other is Sunday. No more +escalating for now, no more "should I blow it all up????" +for a bit, instead, let me just enjoy getting to know this +new person without putting the Atlas-like pressure on it. +That can be enough. + diff --git a/Writing/Journal/JRNL-20251017-193513.md b/Writing/Journal/JRNL-20251017-193513.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5a669838 --- /dev/null +++ b/Writing/Journal/JRNL-20251017-193513.md @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +--- +id: JRNL-20251017-193513 +title: Friday, October 17, 2025 - 07:35 PM +type: journal +created: 2025-10-17T23:35:13Z +modified: 2025-10-17T23:35:13Z +tags: [journal] +--- + +# Friday, October 17, 2025 - 07:35 PM + +Yeah, so y'know how I said I was going to enjoy getting to +know her, and that that would be enough? Yeah, that didn't +work out. I broke up with Matilda yesterday. + +Yesterday I went to my grandparents to do some laundry. In +the morning I felt okay about how things were left with +Matilda, but as the day progressed, bits and pieces of that +anxiety about the relationship and issues I had kept +creeping in. It's really hard because Matilda is such a nice +and good person, but ultimately, there were things about my +values that didn't line up. We were keeping a +Sunday-sleepover up in the air, and this was also kind of a +determining factor for me. I really think that if she would +have stayed over on Sunday that we would have had sex. Or at +least, I would have had to refuse and make things very +awkward. + +Matilda told me early on that she didn't want to have sex +unless she was in a committed relationship. I said that's +completely fair! I totally get it. Then, about two weeks +ago, she gave me a heads up that she was getting back on +birth control. It was a weird heads up to get, but we talked +about it, agreed we were going in that direction, and it was +okay. But, recently, there had been some flirtatious action +where we were basically soft sexting that really indicated +to me we would have sex soon. And with me on the fence about +the whole thing, escalating to sex is the exact opposite of +what I wanted to do. I told myself last entry that I would +not escalate, and that I would calm down. Well, I tried to +calm down, but I've arranged things that I will definitely +not be escalating. + +I told my grandparents about the situation. How she's such a +nice person, but I can't shake this gut feeling that +something is wrong. They try to be helpful, and are +generally supportive, but they met in high school and have +been together since. Neither of them have really 'dated'. So +to that end, I was kind of on my own. + +Then, I'm sitting in the basement while the dryer is running +and I got to a point where I thought to myself "I cannot +keep waffling on this, this anxiety is killing me and I need +to just end it." I texted her asking her how her evening was +going, and she responded that it was going well. She also +sent me a picture of the Christmas tree Downtown and said +'Great news!', and then asked if I'd want to go ice skating +with her or maybe go on a double date with Sam and Blake ice +skating. I never texted back. + +I sat in a chair instead, and thought for a long time about +what I was going to do. I thought for a long time if +sticking it out was worth it, but I thought about +conversations with Claude and thought about 'If I don't do +this now, how am I going to feel in a week or two weeks?'. +The answer to that question is still uncomfortable if I stay +this course. + +At this point, Krzyszstof calls me randomly. Buddy's +Mercedes broke down in the middle of campus and he was +asking for help. I couldn't help him obviously being way out +at my grandparents, but his interruption broke me of my +stupor and I got the courage to call Matilda afterwards. + +I asked her how her afternoon was going. She said it was +going well, and sounded very happy. She was arranging +flowers for her mom's birthday this weekend. She is so sweet +in that way. We had some small talk for a while before I +changed the topic to us. I said that I've been thinking +about us, and that I know this is sudden and is going to +sound like a shock, but I think we should stop seeing each +other. There was a long pause on the phone. When she spoke, +her tone was immediately different and she politely asked +why. I told her that over the past week, I've been dealing +with some personal emotional difficulties and I've come to +the conclusion that it is not a good time for me to be in a +relationship right now. I told her I think she's wonderful, +and that I think she is such an incredibly nice person in +the way that she moves through the world and that I liked +her a lot, but that she deserves someone who is all in for +her and I just don't think I can be that guy for her. I +apologized saying that I wish I knew this beforehand, but I +didn't, and am sorry that I couldn't get there for her. She +started to cry softly, and told me that I didn't need to +hear it from her, but that besides being so smart, that I'm +incredibly compassionate and thoughtful and know how to make +her feel special. She appreciated me being honest and said +that this sucks, but she understands. I told her the one +thing that's most important to me for her to take away from +this conversation is that this is not her fault. I offered +if she wanted to be friends at some point I would be open to +that, but that I know we're both going to need our space +after this jolt. I said I genuinely think she's great and that she +will find her person, just that I don't think it's me. I +apologized again. She told me that she is thankful I was +honest, and that she's rooting for me. She enjoyed our +relationship even though it was so short. We wished each +other good luck. + +And that's the last that I talked to her. I started to cry +some too. I wish I could've done this in person on +Wednesday, but for some reason, I just couldn't. + +Afterwards I called Sam on the phone to talk to him. He was +supportive in the sense that he knows I've got to do what's +right for me, but cautioned me that he thinks I can make +extremely reactive decisions. He's right. It's a weakness +and a strength. On one hand, I'm able to cut my losses at +times and move on quickly to the next thing, or adjust to +changing circumstances, but on the other, sometimes I can +act too quickly before I have all the cards. I don't think +this situation is like that. Or at least this breakup, +anyways. I've been dealing with this doubt for weeks, while +really the reactive decision was escalating to asking her to +be my girlfriend. + +It's over. This sucks, but I know deep down it's the right +choice. My anxiety about the relationship is completely +gone, and instead replaced with a profound loneliness. Part +of me wonders if I blew up something that was good for no +reason, but another part of me knows that's not seeing the +forest for the trees. I feel so bad about this whole +situation and hope these feelings subside soon. It's hard +not to think about. I haven't texted her, and I deleted our +conversation so I can't our chat history. It sucks that when +a relationship like this ends, the whole friendship and +camaraderie ends so quickly too. It's such a brutal cut and +feels like a void has opened up out of nowhere. + +I went for a ride today on the bike. I rode over to South +Park to whip around, and then stopped at Brusters. That was +a *blast*. Anyways, I'm still bummed, but I know this was +the right move and things will get better. Luis told me +today that things like this are the price of dating and that +it comes with the territory. He's right. + +I redownloaded Hinge. I'm not using it right now, but if +Cinderella likes me I'll at least see it. Up next I'm going +to really write down what I'm looking for in a partner in my +next journal entry. This way, I'll have a list of clear +targets to hit, and who knows, maybe I'll manifest her into +existence. It worked for Lane, at least. + +I see Rachel on Tuesday. Yeugh. Time to watch some of The +Pitt tonight and try to relax. I think I might travel into +Pitt tomorrow to go to the gym. I feel like I need it. + +I love you, me. We're figuring this shit out.