diff --git a/1-goals-and-outcomes/research_statement_v1.tex b/1-goals-and-outcomes/research_statement_v1.tex index 880d915..ebb19cc 100644 --- a/1-goals-and-outcomes/research_statement_v1.tex +++ b/1-goals-and-outcomes/research_statement_v1.tex @@ -2,16 +2,16 @@ This research develops autonomous control systems with mathematical guarantees of safe and correct behavior. % INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH Hook -Nuclear reactors today require human operators who follow detailed written procedures and switch between control objectives as plant conditions change. +Nuclear reactors today require human operators to follow detailed written procedures and switch between control objectives as plant conditions change. % Gap -Small modular reactors face a fundamental economic challenge: staffing costs per megawatt far exceed those of conventional plants, threatening economic viability. Autonomous control could manage complex operational sequences without constant supervision—but only if safety assurance equals or exceeds that of human operators. +Small modular reactors face a fundamental economic challenge: their staffing costs per megawatt far exceed those of conventional plants, threatening economic viability. Autonomous control could manage complex operational sequences without constant supervision—but only if it provides safety assurance equal to or exceeding that of human operators. % APPROACH PARAGRAPH Solution -This research unifies formal methods from computer science with control theory to produce hybrid control systems correct by construction. +This research unifies formal methods from computer science with control theory to produce hybrid control systems that are correct by construction. % Rationale -Human operators already work this way: discrete logic switches between continuous control modes. Formal methods generate provably correct switching logic but cannot verify continuous dynamics. Control theory verifies continuous behavior but cannot prove discrete logic correctness. Both are required for end-to-end correctness. +Human operators already work this way: discrete logic switches between continuous control modes. Formal methods generate provably correct switching logic but cannot verify continuous dynamics. Control theory verifies continuous behavior but cannot prove discrete logic correctness. End-to-end correctness requires both. % Hypothesis and Technical Approach -Three stages bridge this gap. First, NASA's Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET) translates written operating procedures into temporal logic specifications. FRET structures requirements by scope, condition, component, timing, and response. Realizability checking exposes conflicts and ambiguities before implementation begins. Second, reactive synthesis generates deterministic automata provably correct by construction. Third, reachability analysis verifies that continuous controllers satisfy each discrete mode's requirements. Engineers design these controllers using standard control theory. +Three stages bridge this gap. First, NASA's Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET) translates written operating procedures into temporal logic specifications, structuring requirements by scope, condition, component, timing, and response. Realizability checking then exposes conflicts and ambiguities before implementation begins. Second, reactive synthesis generates deterministic automata that are provably correct by construction. Third, reachability analysis verifies that continuous controllers—designed by engineers using standard control theory—satisfy each discrete mode's requirements. Continuous modes classify by control objective into three types. Transitory modes drive the plant between conditions. Stabilizing modes maintain operation within regions. Expulsory modes ensure safety under failures. Barrier certificates and assume-guarantee contracts prove mode transitions are safe. This enables local verification without global trajectory analysis. The methodology demonstrates on an Emerson Ovation control system—the industrial platform nuclear power plants already use. % Pay-off diff --git a/1-goals-and-outcomes/v1.tex b/1-goals-and-outcomes/v1.tex index 0398da6..2d78b76 100644 --- a/1-goals-and-outcomes/v1.tex +++ b/1-goals-and-outcomes/v1.tex @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ This research develops autonomous hybrid control systems with mathematical guara % INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH Hook Nuclear power plants require the highest levels of control system reliability. Control system failures risk economic losses, service interruptions, or radiological release. % Known information -Extensively trained human operators control nuclear plants today, following detailed written procedures and strict regulatory requirements. They switch between control modes based on plant conditions and procedural guidance. +Extensively trained human operators control nuclear plants today. They follow detailed written procedures and strict regulatory requirements, switching between control modes based on plant conditions and procedural guidance. % Gap -This reliance on human operators prevents autonomous control and creates a fundamental economic challenge for next-generation reactor designs. Small modular reactors face staffing costs per megawatt far exceeding those of conventional plants, threatening economic viability. Autonomous control could manage complex operational sequences without constant supervision—but only if safety assurance equals or exceeds that of human operators. +This reliance on human operators prevents autonomous control and creates a fundamental economic challenge for next-generation reactor designs. Small modular reactors face staffing costs per megawatt that far exceed those of conventional plants, threatening their economic viability. Autonomous control could manage complex operational sequences without constant supervision—but only if it provides safety assurance equal to or exceeding that of human operators. % APPROACH PARAGRAPH Solution This research unifies formal methods with control theory to produce hybrid control systems correct by construction. diff --git a/3-research-approach/v3.tex b/3-research-approach/v3.tex index 1069347..c32e297 100644 --- a/3-research-approach/v3.tex +++ b/3-research-approach/v3.tex @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Three innovations enable compositional verification: \item \textbf{Contract-based decomposition:} Instead of attempting global hybrid system verification, discrete synthesis defines entry/exit/safety contracts that bound continuous verification, transforming an intractable global problem into tractable local problems. \item \textbf{Mode classification:} Continuous modes classify by control objective—transitory, stabilizing, or expulsory—allowing appropriate verification tools to match each mode type and enabling mode-local analysis with provable composition guarantees. \item \textbf{Procedure-driven structure:} Nuclear procedures already decompose operations into discrete phases with explicit transition criteria, providing existing structure that avoids artificial abstractions and makes the approach tractable for complex systems like nuclear reactor startup. -\end{enumerate> +\end{enumerate} \textbf{Why will it succeed?} Three factors ensure practical feasibility where prior work has failed. diff --git a/main.aux b/main.aux index 7ac2242..b2383fc 100644 --- a/main.aux +++ b/main.aux @@ -28,45 +28,29 @@ \@writefile{lof}{\contentsline {figure}{\numberline {2}{\ignorespaces Control scope hierarchy in nuclear power operations. 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Rep. NUREG-0899, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1982. - -\bibitem{10CFR50.34} -{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}, ``{10 CFR Part 50.34}.'' Code of Federal Regulations. - -\bibitem{10CFR55.59} -{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}, ``{10 CFR Part 55.59}.'' Code of Federal Regulations. - -\bibitem{WRPS.Description} -``{Westinghouse RPS System Description},'' tech. rep., Westinghouse Electric Corporation. - -\bibitem{gentillon_westinghouse_1999} -C.~D. Gentillon, D.~Marksberry, D.~Rasmuson, M.~B. Calley, S.~A. Eide, and T.~Wierman, ``Westinghouse reactor protection system unavailability, 1984-1995.'' -\newblock Number: {INEEL}/{CON}-99-00374 Publisher: Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. - -\bibitem{operator_statistics} -{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}, ``{Operator Licensing}.'' \url{https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operator-licensing}. - -\bibitem{10CFR55} -{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}, ``{Part 55—Operators' Licenses}.'' \url{https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part055/full-text}. - -\bibitem{10CFR50.54} -{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}, ``{§ 50.54 Conditions of Licenses}.'' \url{https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0054}. - -\bibitem{Kemeny1979} -J.~G. Kemeny {\em et~al.}, ``Report of the president's commission on the accident at three mile island,'' tech. rep., President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, October 1979. - -\bibitem{WNA2020} -{World Nuclear Association}, ``Safety of nuclear power reactors.'' \url{https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/safety-of-nuclear-power-reactors.aspx}, 2020. - -\bibitem{hogberg_root_2013} -L.~Högberg, ``Root causes and impacts of severe accidents at large nuclear power plants,'' vol.~42, no.~3, pp.~267--284. - -\bibitem{zhang_analysis_2025} -M.~Zhang, L.~Dai, W.~Chen, and E.~Pang, ``Analysis of human errors in nuclear power plant event reports,'' vol.~57, no.~10, p.~103687. - -\bibitem{Kiniry2024} -J.~Kiniry, A.~Bakst, S.~Hansen, M.~Podhradsky, and A.~Bivin, ``High assurance rigorous digital engineering for nuclear safety (hardens) final technical report,'' Tech. Rep. TLR-RES-RES/DE-2024-005, Galois, Inc. / U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2024. -\newblock NRC Contract 31310021C0014. - -\bibitem{eia_lcoe_2022} -{U.S. Energy Information Administration}, ``Levelized costs of new generation resources in the annual energy outlook 2022,'' report, U.S. Energy Information Administration, March 2022. -\newblock See Table 1b, page 9. - -\bibitem{eesi_datacenter_2024} -{Environmental and Energy Study Institute}, ``Data center energy needs are upending power grids and threatening the climate.'' Web article, 2024. -\newblock Accessed: 2025-09-29. - -\end{thebibliography} diff --git a/main.blg b/main.blg deleted file mode 100644 index 5c8f818..0000000 --- a/main.blg +++ /dev/null @@ -1,67 +0,0 @@ -This is BibTeX, Version 0.99d (TeX Live 2025) -Capacity: max_strings=200000, hash_size=200000, hash_prime=170003 -The top-level auxiliary file: main.aux -White space in argument---line 23 of file main.aux - : \citation{HANDBOOK - : ON HYBRID SYSTEMS} -I'm skipping whatever remains of this command -White space in argument---line 30 of file main.aux - : \citation{MANYUS - : THESIS} -I'm skipping whatever remains of this command -The style file: ieeetr.bst -Database file #1: references.bib -Warning--entry type for "gentillon_westinghouse_1999" isn't style-file defined ---line 32 of file references.bib -Warning--entry type for "operator_statistics" isn't style-file defined ---line 45 of file references.bib -Warning--entry type for "10CFR50.54" isn't style-file defined ---line 59 of file references.bib -Warning--empty author in WRPS.Description -Warning--empty year in WRPS.Description -Warning--empty journal in hogberg_root_2013 -Warning--empty year in hogberg_root_2013 -Warning--empty journal in zhang_analysis_2025 -Warning--empty year in zhang_analysis_2025 -You've used 15 entries, - 1876 wiz_defined-function locations, - 555 strings with 5820 characters, -and the built_in function-call counts, 2404 in all, are: -= -- 221 -> -- 100 -< -- 2 -+ -- 42 -- -- 27 -* -- 143 -:= -- 371 -add.period$ -- 18 -call.type$ -- 15 -change.case$ -- 18 -chr.to.int$ -- 0 -cite$ -- 21 -duplicate$ -- 102 -empty$ -- 259 -format.name$ -- 27 -if$ -- 575 -int.to.chr$ -- 0 -int.to.str$ -- 15 -missing$ -- 2 -newline$ -- 52 -num.names$ -- 14 -pop$ -- 64 -preamble$ -- 1 -purify$ -- 0 -quote$ -- 0 -skip$ -- 78 -stack$ -- 0 -substring$ -- 44 -swap$ -- 22 -text.length$ -- 2 -text.prefix$ -- 0 -top$ -- 0 -type$ -- 0 -warning$ -- 6 -while$ -- 18 -width$ -- 17 -write$ -- 128 -(There were 2 error messages) diff --git a/main.log b/main.log index e619e37..5fe4a8d 100644 --- a/main.log +++ b/main.log @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -This is pdfTeX, Version 3.141592653-2.6-1.40.28 (TeX Live 2025) (preloaded format=pdflatex 2026.2.12) 9 MAR 2026 17:32 +This is pdfTeX, Version 3.141592653-2.6-1.40.28 (TeX Live 2025) (preloaded format=pdflatex 2026.2.12) 9 MAR 2026 17:35 entering extended mode restricted \write18 enabled. %&-line parsing enabled. @@ -948,16 +948,10 @@ Overfull \hbox (2.19873pt too wide) in paragraph at lines 66--67 \OT1/ptm/m/n/12 dis-crete syn-the-sis de-fines en-try/exit/safety con-tracts that bound con-tin-u-ous ver-i-fi-ca-tion, trans- [] -Runaway argument? -{enumerate> -! 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