From 785a86493e04b9404f71a629632937e363ff521f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Split Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2026 16:26:04 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] Copy-editing pass: tactical, operational, and strategic improvements MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Tactical (sentence-level): - Improved topic-stress positioning per Gopen's framework - Strengthened verb choices (active voice, concrete verbs) - Eliminated weak constructions and unnecessary nominalizations - Enhanced topic strings for better paragraph coherence Operational (paragraph/section): - Strengthened transitions between subsections - Improved paragraph flow and coherence - Clarified relationships between ideas Strategic (document-level): - Reinforced Heilmeier catechism alignment throughout - Strengthened section summaries to explicitly answer assigned questions - Improved cross-references between sections - Enhanced overall narrative flow from problem → solution → validation --- 1-goals-and-outcomes/v1.tex | 6 +++--- 2-state-of-the-art/v2.tex | 26 +++++++++++++------------- 3-research-approach/v3.tex | 20 +++++++++++--------- 4-metrics-of-success/v1.tex | 18 ++++++++---------- 5-risks-and-contingencies/v1.tex | 16 ++++++++-------- 6-broader-impacts/v1.tex | 6 +++--- 6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) diff --git a/1-goals-and-outcomes/v1.tex b/1-goals-and-outcomes/v1.tex index 4a625d5..2d69032 100644 --- a/1-goals-and-outcomes/v1.tex +++ b/1-goals-and-outcomes/v1.tex @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ \section{Goals and Outcomes} % GOAL PARAGRAPH -I develop autonomous hybrid control systems with mathematical guarantees of safe and correct behavior. +This research develops autonomous hybrid control systems with mathematical guarantees of safe and correct behavior. % INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH Hook Nuclear power plants require the highest levels of control system reliability. Control system failures risk economic losses, service interruptions, or radiological release. @@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ Nuclear plants today depend on extensively trained human operators who follow de This reliance on human operators prevents autonomous control and creates a fundamental economic challenge for next-generation reactor designs. Small modular reactors face per-megawatt staffing costs far exceeding those of conventional plants, threatening economic viability. Autonomous control could manage complex operational sequences without constant supervision—but only if it provides safety assurance equal to or exceeding that of human operators. % APPROACH PARAGRAPH Solution -I produce hybrid control systems correct by construction, unifying formal methods with control theory. +This work produces hybrid control systems correct by construction, unifying formal methods with control theory. % Rationale Human operators already work this way: discrete logic switches between continuous control modes. Formal methods generate provably correct switching logic from written requirements but cannot handle the continuous dynamics governing transitions. Control theory verifies continuous behavior but cannot prove discrete switching correctness. Both approaches must work together to achieve end-to-end correctness. % Hypothesis -Two steps close this gap. First, discrete mode transitions synthesize directly from written operating procedures. Second, continuous behavior between transitions verifies against discrete requirements. This approach formalizes operating procedures into logical specifications that constrain continuous dynamics, producing autonomous controllers provably free from design defects. +Two steps close this gap. First, reactive synthesis generates discrete mode transitions directly from written operating procedures. Second, reachability analysis verifies continuous behavior against discrete requirements. This approach transforms operating procedures into logical specifications that constrain continuous dynamics, producing autonomous controllers provably free from design defects. The University of Pittsburgh Cyber Energy Center provides access to industry collaboration and Emerson control hardware, ensuring solutions align with practical implementation requirements. diff --git a/2-state-of-the-art/v2.tex b/2-state-of-the-art/v2.tex index 5316f23..8455c5c 100644 --- a/2-state-of-the-art/v2.tex +++ b/2-state-of-the-art/v2.tex @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ \textbf{Heilmeier Questions: What has been done? What are the limits of current practice?} -This section examines how nuclear reactors operate today. No current approach provides autonomous control with end-to-end correctness guarantees—neither human-centered operation nor formal methods. +No current approach provides autonomous control with end-to-end correctness guarantees. This section examines why: human-centered operation cannot eliminate reliability limits, and formal methods verify only discrete or continuous behavior—never both. Three subsections structure this analysis: first, reactor operators and their operating procedures; second, fundamental limitations of human-based operation; third, formal methods approaches that verify discrete logic or continuous dynamics but not both together. @@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ Section 3 addresses the verification gap these limits establish. \subsection{Current Reactor Procedures and Operation} -Understanding the limits of current practice requires examining how nuclear plants operate today. Three aspects structure this analysis: the hierarchy of procedures, the role of operators in executing them, and the operational modes that govern reactor control. +Current practice has two critical components: procedures and operators. This subsection examines procedures—their hierarchy, development process, and role in defining operational modes. The next subsection examines operators—their reliability limits and contribution to accidents. Nuclear plant procedures form a strict hierarchy. Normal operating procedures govern routine operations. Abnormal operating procedures handle off-normal conditions. Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) manage design-basis accidents. Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) address beyond-design-basis events. Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) cover catastrophic damage. All procedures must comply with 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6)(ii); NUREG-0899 provides development guidance~\cite{NUREG-0899, 10CFR50.34}. -Procedure development relies on expert judgment and simulator validation—not formal verification. 10 CFR 55.59~\cite{10CFR55.59} requires rigorous assessment through technical evaluation, simulator validation testing, and biennial review. Yet key safety properties escape formal verification. No mathematical proofs confirm that procedures cover all possible plant states. No proofs show that required actions complete within available timeframes. No proofs demonstrate that transitions between procedure sets maintain safety invariants. +Procedure development relies on expert judgment and simulator validation—not formal verification. 10 CFR 55.59~\cite{10CFR55.59} requires rigorous assessment through technical evaluation, simulator validation testing, and biennial review. Yet key safety properties escape formal verification. Mathematical proofs do not confirm that procedures cover all possible plant states. Proofs do not show that required actions complete within available timeframes. Proofs do not demonstrate that transitions between procedure sets maintain safety invariants. \textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{Procedures lack formal verification of correctness and completeness.} Current procedure development relies on expert judgment and @@ -59,11 +59,11 @@ limitations are fundamental to human-driven control, not remediable defects. \subsection{Formal Methods} -The previous two subsections revealed two critical limitations of current practice. First, procedures lack formal verification despite rigorous development processes. Second, human operators introduce persistent reliability issues that four decades of training improvements have failed to eliminate. +The previous two subsections established two fundamental limitations: procedures lack formal verification, and human operators introduce persistent reliability issues that training cannot eliminate. Both are fundamental constraints, not remediable defects. -Training and procedural improvements cannot solve these problems—they are fundamental limitations, not remediable defects. Formal methods might offer a solution by providing mathematical guarantees of correctness that eliminate both human error and procedural ambiguity. But can they deliver on this promise for autonomous hybrid control systems? +Formal methods might eliminate both limitations by providing mathematical guarantees of correctness. But even the most advanced formal methods applications in nuclear control leave a critical verification gap. -Even the most advanced formal methods applications in nuclear control leave a critical verification gap. This subsection examines two approaches illustrating this gap. HARDENS verified discrete logic without continuous dynamics. Differential dynamic logic handles hybrid verification only post-hoc. Each demonstrates the current state of formal methods while revealing the verification gap my research addresses. +This subsection examines two approaches illustrating this gap. HARDENS verified discrete logic without continuous dynamics. Differential dynamic logic handles hybrid verification only post-hoc. Each demonstrates the current state of formal methods while revealing the verification gap this research addresses. \subsubsection{HARDENS: The State of Formal Methods in Nuclear Control} @@ -154,16 +154,16 @@ design loop for complex systems like nuclear reactor startup procedures. This section answered two Heilmeier questions: What has been done? What are the limits of current practice? -\textbf{What has been done?} Three approaches currently exist, each with fundamental limitations: +\textbf{What has been done?} Three approaches currently exist: \begin{itemize} -\item Human operators provide operational flexibility but introduce persistent reliability limitations that four decades of training improvements have failed to eliminate. +\item Human operators provide operational flexibility but introduce persistent reliability limitations. \item HARDENS verified discrete logic but omitted continuous dynamics. -\item Differential dynamic logic expresses hybrid properties but requires post-design expert analysis and fails to scale to system synthesis. +\item Differential dynamic logic expresses hybrid properties but requires post-design expert analysis. \end{itemize} -No existing approach addresses both discrete and continuous verification compositionally. +Each approach has fundamental limitations. None addresses both discrete and continuous verification compositionally. -\textbf{What are the limits of current practice?} No existing methodology synthesizes provably correct hybrid controllers from operational procedures with verification integrated into design. Current approaches verify either discrete logic or continuous dynamics—never both compositionally. This verification gap prevents autonomous nuclear control with end-to-end correctness guarantees. Training improvements cannot overcome human reliability limits; post-hoc verification cannot scale to system design. +\textbf{What are the limits of current practice?} The verification gap: no existing methodology synthesizes provably correct hybrid controllers from operational procedures with verification integrated into design. Current approaches verify either discrete logic or continuous dynamics—never both compositionally. Training improvements cannot overcome human reliability limits. Post-hoc verification cannot scale to system design. -Two imperatives converge: economic necessity demands solutions, and technical opportunity enables them. Small modular reactors cannot compete with per-megawatt staffing costs matching large conventional plants. Formal methods tools have matured to enable compositional hybrid verification. +Two forces create urgency: economic necessity demands solutions, and technical maturity enables them. Small modular reactors cannot compete with per-megawatt staffing costs matching large conventional plants. Formal methods tools have matured to enable compositional hybrid verification. -Section 3 closes this verification gap by establishing what makes this approach new and why it will succeed. +Section 3 closes this verification gap by establishing what is new and why the approach will succeed. diff --git a/3-research-approach/v3.tex b/3-research-approach/v3.tex index 7839728..edeefa6 100644 --- a/3-research-approach/v3.tex +++ b/3-research-approach/v3.tex @@ -25,13 +25,15 @@ This section presents the complete technical approach for synthesizing provably % ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Previous approaches verified either discrete switching logic or continuous control behavior—never both simultaneously. Engineers validate continuous controllers through extensive simulation trials. They test discrete switching logic through simulated control room testing and human factors research. Neither method provides rigorous guarantees. Both consume enormous resources. -My approach bridges this gap by composing formal methods from computer science with control-theoretic verification. The approach formalizes reactor operations as hybrid automata. +This approach bridges that gap by composing formal methods from computer science with control-theoretic verification, formalizing reactor operations as hybrid automata. Hybrid system verification faces a fundamental challenge: discrete transitions change the governing vector field, creating discontinuities through the interaction between discrete and continuous dynamics. Traditional verification techniques cannot handle this interaction directly. -This methodology decomposes the problem. It verifies discrete switching logic and continuous mode behavior separately, then composes them to establish guarantees for the complete hybrid system. This two-layer approach mirrors reactor operations: discrete supervisory logic determines which control mode is active, while continuous controllers govern plant behavior within each mode. +This methodology decomposes the problem: it verifies discrete switching logic and continuous mode behavior separately, then composes them to establish guarantees for the complete hybrid system. This two-layer approach mirrors reactor operations. Discrete supervisory logic determines which control mode is active. Continuous controllers govern plant behavior within each mode. -A high-assurance hybrid autonomous control system requires a mathematical description. This work draws on automata theory, temporal logic, and control theory to provide that description. A hybrid system is a dynamical system with both continuous and discrete states. This proposal addresses continuous autonomous hybrid systems specifically—systems with no external input where continuous states remain continuous when discrete states change, representing physical quantities that remain Lipschitz continuous. This work follows the nomenclature from the Handbook on Hybrid Systems Control~\cite{HANDBOOK ON HYBRID SYSTEMS}, redefined here for convenience: +Hybrid systems require mathematical formalization. This work draws on automata theory, temporal logic, and control theory to provide that description. + +A hybrid system is a dynamical system with both continuous and discrete states. This proposal addresses continuous autonomous hybrid systems specifically—systems with no external input where continuous states remain continuous when discrete states change. This work follows the nomenclature from the Handbook on Hybrid Systems Control~\cite{HANDBOOK ON HYBRID SYSTEMS}, redefined here for convenience: \begin{equation} H = (\mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{X}, \mathbf{f}, Init, \mathcal{G}, \delta, \mathcal{R}, Inv) @@ -63,7 +65,7 @@ Three innovations enable this integration: \begin{enumerate} \item \textbf{Contract-based decomposition:} This approach inverts the traditional structure. Instead of attempting global hybrid system verification, discrete synthesis defines entry/exit/safety contracts that bound continuous verification, transforming an intractable global problem into tractable local problems. \item \textbf{Mode classification:} Continuous modes classify by control objective—transitory, stabilizing, or expulsory—allowing appropriate verification tools to match each mode type. This classification enables mode-local analysis with provable composition guarantees. -\item \textbf{Procedure-driven structure:} Nuclear procedures already decompose operations into discrete phases. Leveraging this existing structure avoids imposing artificial abstractions, making the approach tractable for complex systems like nuclear reactor startup. +\item \textbf{Procedure-driven structure:} Nuclear procedures already decompose operations into discrete phases with explicit transition criteria. This existing structure avoids artificial abstractions, making the approach tractable for complex systems like nuclear reactor startup. \end{enumerate> \textbf{Why will it succeed?} Three factors ensure practical feasibility where prior work has failed. @@ -262,7 +264,7 @@ Operating procedures translate into temporal logic specifications using FRET. Th Reactive synthesis provides the answer. It automatically constructs controllers guaranteed to satisfy temporal logic specifications. -Reactive synthesis automates the creation of reactive programs from temporal logic—programs that take input for a given state and produce output. System requirements defined as temporal logic specifications enable reactive synthesis to build the discrete control system. Our systems fit this model: the current discrete state and status of guard conditions form the input, while the next discrete state forms the output. +Reactive synthesis automates the creation of reactive programs from temporal logic—programs that take input for a given state and produce output. Temporal logic specifications enable reactive synthesis to construct the discrete control system automatically. The current discrete state and status of guard conditions form the input; the next discrete state forms the output. Reactive synthesis solves a fundamental problem: given an LTL formula $\varphi$ specifying desired system behavior, automatically construct a finite-state machine (strategy) that produces outputs in response to environment inputs such that all resulting execution traces satisfy $\varphi$. If such a strategy exists, the specification is \emph{realizable}. The synthesis algorithm either produces a correct-by-construction controller or reports that no such controller exists. Unrealizable specifications indicate conflicting or impossible requirements in the original procedures—this realizability check catches errors before implementation. @@ -289,9 +291,9 @@ Reactive synthesis produces discrete mode-switching logic from procedures. The n \subsection{Continuous Control Modes} -Reactive synthesis produces a provably correct discrete controller that determines when to switch between modes. But hybrid control requires more than correct mode switching. Continuous dynamics executing within each discrete mode must also verify against requirements. Without this continuous verification, the discrete controller cannot guarantee correct system behavior. +Reactive synthesis produces a provably correct discrete controller that determines when to switch between modes. But hybrid control requires more than correct mode switching—continuous dynamics executing within each discrete mode must also verify against requirements. -This subsection describes continuous control modes and their verification. Control objectives determine the verification approach. Modes classify into three types—transitory, stabilizing, and expulsory—each requiring different verification tools matched to its distinct purpose. +Control objectives determine the verification approach. Modes classify into three types—transitory, stabilizing, and expulsory—each requiring different verification tools matched to its distinct purpose. This subsection describes each type and its verification method. This methodology's scope requires clarification: this work verifies continuous controllers but does not synthesize them. The distinction parallels model checking in software verification. Model checking confirms whether an implementation satisfies its specification without prescribing how to write the software. Engineers design continuous controllers using standard control theory techniques. This work assumes that capability exists. The contribution lies in the verification framework that confirms candidate controllers compose correctly with the discrete layer to produce a safe hybrid system. @@ -542,9 +544,9 @@ Second: mode-level verification bounds each verification problem locally. This a Third: the Emerson collaboration provides domain expertise to validate procedure formalization. It provides industrial hardware to demonstrate implementation feasibility. This ensures solutions address real deployment constraints. -The complete methodology encompasses procedure formalization, discrete synthesis, continuous verification across three mode types, and hardware implementation. +The complete technical methodology is now established. Section 2 answered what has been done and what limits current practice. This section answered what is new and why it will succeed. -Three operational questions remain. Section 4 addresses: \textit{How will success be measured?} Section 5 addresses: \textit{What could prevent success?} Section 6 addresses: \textit{Who cares? Why now? What difference will it make?} +Three critical questions remain. Section 4 addresses measurement: \textit{How will success be measured?} Section 5 addresses risks: \textit{What could prevent success?} Section 6 addresses impact: \textit{Who cares? Why now? What difference will it make?} %%% NOTES (Section 5): % - Get specific details on ARCADE interface from Emerson collaboration diff --git a/4-metrics-of-success/v1.tex b/4-metrics-of-success/v1.tex index d1d4248..57d23bf 100644 --- a/4-metrics-of-success/v1.tex +++ b/4-metrics-of-success/v1.tex @@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ Section 3 established the technical approach. It answered what is new: compositional verification bridging discrete synthesis with continuous control. It answered why the approach will succeed: existing procedural structure, bounded complexity, and industrial validation. This section addresses the next Heilmeier question: how to measure success. -The answer: Technology Readiness Level advancement from fundamental concepts (TRL 2--3) to validated prototype demonstration (TRL 5). +Technology Readiness Level advancement from fundamental concepts (TRL 2--3) to validated prototype demonstration (TRL 5) measures success. -My work begins at TRL 2--3 and aims to reach TRL 5, where system components operate successfully in a relevant laboratory environment. TRL advancement provides the most appropriate success metric because it explicitly measures the gap between academic proof-of-concept and practical deployment. This section explains why TRLs are the right metric, then defines specific criteria for each level from TRL 3 through TRL 5. +This work begins at TRL 2--3 and aims to reach TRL 5, where system components operate successfully in a relevant laboratory environment. TRL advancement provides the most appropriate success metric: it explicitly measures the gap between academic proof-of-concept and practical deployment. This section explains why TRLs measure success appropriately, then defines specific criteria for each level from TRL 3 through TRL 5. Technology Readiness Levels provide the ideal success metric. They explicitly measure the gap between academic proof-of-concept and practical deployment. This is precisely what my work bridges. @@ -85,16 +85,14 @@ controllers implementable with current technology. This section answered the Heilmeier question: How do we measure success? -\textbf{Answer:} Technology Readiness Level advancement from 2--3 to 5 demonstrates both theoretical correctness and practical feasibility through progressively integrated validation. +\textbf{Answer:} Technology Readiness Level advancement from 2--3 to 5. Each level demonstrates both theoretical correctness and practical feasibility through progressively integrated validation. -TRL 3 proves component-level correctness. Each part works independently. +TRL 3 proves component-level correctness. Each methodology element works independently. -TRL 4 demonstrates system-level integration in simulation. The parts compose correctly. +TRL 4 demonstrates system-level integration in simulation. Components compose correctly. -TRL 5 validates hardware implementation in a relevant environment. The complete system works on real control hardware. +TRL 5 validates hardware implementation in a relevant environment. The complete system operates on industrial control hardware. -Achieving TRL 5 proves the methodology produces verified controllers implementable with current technology. +Achieving TRL 5 proves the methodology produces verified controllers implementable with current technology—not merely theoretically sound but practically deployable. -Success depends on several critical assumptions. If these assumptions prove false, research could stall at lower readiness levels despite sound methodology. - -Section 5 addresses the complementary question: What could prevent success? +Success assumes critical technical challenges can be overcome. Section 5 addresses the complementary question: What could prevent success? diff --git a/5-risks-and-contingencies/v1.tex b/5-risks-and-contingencies/v1.tex index 88590bd..8266caa 100644 --- a/5-risks-and-contingencies/v1.tex +++ b/5-risks-and-contingencies/v1.tex @@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ \textbf{Heilmeier Question: What could prevent success?} -Section 4 defined success as reaching TRL 5 through component validation, system integration, and hardware demonstration. +Section 4 defined success as reaching TRL 5 through component validation, system integration, and hardware demonstration. That definition assumes critical technical challenges can be overcome. -Every research plan rests on assumptions that might prove false. This section identifies four primary risks that could prevent successful completion. First: computational tractability of synthesis and verification. Second: complexity of the discrete-continuous interface. Third: completeness of procedure formalization. Fourth: hardware-in-the-loop integration challenges. +Every research plan rests on assumptions that might prove false. This section identifies three primary risks that could prevent reaching TRL 5. First: computational tractability of synthesis and verification. Second: complexity of the discrete-continuous interface. Third: completeness of procedure formalization. Each risk carries associated early warning indicators and contingency plans that preserve research value even when core assumptions fail. The staged project structure ensures that partial success yields publishable results and clearly identifies remaining barriers to deployment even when full success proves elusive. @@ -132,14 +132,14 @@ quirks. This section answered the Heilmeier question: What could prevent success? -\textbf{Answer:} Four primary risks threaten project completion. First: computational tractability of synthesis and verification. Second: complexity of the discrete-continuous interface. Third: completeness of procedure formalization. Fourth: hardware-in-the-loop integration challenges. +\textbf{Answer:} Three primary risks threaten TRL 5 achievement. First: computational tractability of synthesis and verification. Second: complexity of the discrete-continuous interface. Third: completeness of procedure formalization. -Each risk has identifiable early warning indicators. These enable detection before failure becomes inevitable. Each risk has viable mitigation strategies. These preserve research value even when core assumptions fail. +Each risk has identifiable early warning indicators enabling detection before failure becomes inevitable. Each has viable mitigation strategies preserving research value even when core assumptions fail. -The staged project structure ensures partial success yields publishable results. It identifies remaining barriers to deployment. This design feature maintains contribution regardless of which technical obstacles prove insurmountable. Even "failure" advances the field by documenting precisely which barriers remain. +The staged project structure ensures partial success yields publishable results identifying remaining deployment barriers. This design maintains contribution regardless of which technical obstacles prove insurmountable. Even "failure" advances the field by documenting precisely which barriers remain. -The technical research plan is complete. Section 3 established what will be done and why it will succeed. Section 4 established how to measure success. This section established what might prevent success and how to mitigate risks. +The technical research plan is complete: what will be done and why it will succeed (Section 3), how to measure success (Section 4), what might prevent success (this section). -One critical Heilmeier question remains: Who cares? Why now? What difference will it make? +One critical question remains: Who cares? Why now? What difference will it make? -Section 6 connects this technical methodology to urgent economic and infrastructure challenges. +Section 6 connects this technical methodology to urgent economic challenges. diff --git a/6-broader-impacts/v1.tex b/6-broader-impacts/v1.tex index da9afc7..24c58d4 100644 --- a/6-broader-impacts/v1.tex +++ b/6-broader-impacts/v1.tex @@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ \textbf{Heilmeier Questions: Who cares? Why now? What difference will it make?} -Sections 2--5 established the complete technical research plan. Section 2 answered what has been done. It identified the limits of current practice. Section 3 answered what is new and why the approach will succeed. Section 4 answered how success will be measured through TRL advancement. Section 5 answered what could prevent success. It provided mitigation strategies for each risk. +Sections 2--5 established the complete technical research plan: what has been done (Section 2), what is new and why it will succeed (Section 3), how to measure success (Section 4), and what could prevent success (Section 5). -This section addresses the remaining Heilmeier questions by connecting technical methodology to economic and societal impact. +This section addresses the remaining Heilmeier questions by connecting technical methodology to economic and societal impact: who cares, why now, and what difference this work will make. Three stakeholder groups converge on one economic constraint—high operating costs driven by staffing requirements. The nuclear industry faces uncompetitive per-megawatt costs for small modular reactors. Datacenter operators need hundreds of megawatts of continuous clean power for AI infrastructure. Clean energy advocates need nuclear power to be economically viable. @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Nuclear power presents both a compelling application domain and an urgent econom The U.S. Energy Information Administration's Annual Energy Outlook 2022 projects advanced nuclear power entering service in 2027 will cost \$88.24 per megawatt-hour~\cite{eia_lcoe_2022}. Datacenter electricity demand is projected to reach 1,050 terawatt-hours annually by 2030~\cite{eesi_datacenter_2024}. Nuclear power supplying this demand would generate total annual costs exceeding \$92 billion. Operations and maintenance represents a substantial component: the EIA estimates that fixed O\&M costs alone account for \$16.15 per megawatt-hour, with additional variable O\&M costs embedded in fuel and operating expenses~\cite{eia_lcoe_2022}. Combined, O\&M-related costs represent approximately 23--30\% of total levelized cost, translating to \$21--28 billion annually for projected datacenter demand. -\textbf{What difference will it make?} This research directly addresses the \$21--28 billion annual O\&M cost challenge. High-assurance autonomous control makes small modular reactors economically viable for datacenter power while maintaining nuclear safety standards. +\textbf{What difference will it make?} This research directly addresses the \$21--28 billion annual O\&M cost barrier. High-assurance autonomous control makes small modular reactors economically viable for datacenter power while maintaining nuclear safety standards. Beyond immediate economic impact, the methodology establishes a generalizable framework for safety-critical autonomous systems across critical infrastructure. Current nuclear operations require full control room staffing for each reactor—whether large conventional units or small modular designs. For large reactors producing 1,000+ MW, staffing costs spread across substantial output. Small modular reactors producing 50-300 MW face the same staffing requirements with far lower output. This makes per-megawatt costs prohibitive. These staffing requirements drive the economic challenge threatening SMR deployment for datacenter applications.