Edit Research Statement: address DAS+Split comments with oldt/newt markup
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% GOAL PARAGRAPH
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% GOAL PARAGRAPH
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The goal of this research is to develop a methodology for creating autonomous
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The goal of this research is to develop a methodology for creating autonomous
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control systems with event-driven control laws that have guarantees of safe and
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\oldt{control systems with event-driven control laws that have guarantees of
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correct behavior.\splitnote{Strong, direct opening. Sets scope immediately.}
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safe and correct behavior.} \newt{hybrid control systems with mathematical
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guarantees of safe and correct behavior.}\splitnote{Strong, direct opening.
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Sets scope immediately.}
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\dasinline{Title needs updated to High Assurance Hybrid
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\dasinline{Title needs updated to High Assurance Hybrid
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Control Systems. Maybe removal of `formal'?}
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Control Systems. Maybe removal of `formal'?}
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% INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH Hook
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% INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH Hook
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Nuclear power relies on extensively trained operators who follow detailed
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Nuclear power relies on extensively trained operators who follow detailed
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written procedures to manage reactor control.\dasinline{Why is there any
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written procedures to manage reactor control. Based on these procedures and
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hyphenation at all? Why not full justification?} Based on these procedures and
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\oldt{operators'} \newt{their} interpretation of plant conditions,
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\oldt{operators'} \newt{their} interpretation of plant conditions, \oldt{operators} \newt{they} make critical decisions
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\oldt{operators} \newt{they} make critical decisions about when to switch
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about when to switch between control objectives.
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between control objectives.
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\splitinline{Consider: ``operators'' appears 3x in two sentences. Maybe:
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``Based on these procedures and their interpretation of plant conditions,
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they make critical decisions...''}
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% Gap
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% Gap
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\oldt{But, reliance} \newt{This reliance} on human operators has created an economic challenge for
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\oldt{But, reliance} \newt{This reliance} on human operators has created an
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next-generation nuclear power plants.
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economic challenge for next-generation nuclear power plants. Small modular
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\splitinline{``But, reliance'' — the comma after ``But'' is unusual. Either
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reactors face significantly higher per-megawatt staffing costs than
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drop it or restructure: ``However, this reliance...'' or ``This reliance,
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conventional plants.\dasinline{Obvious but source required.} Autonomous
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however, has created...''}
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control systems \oldt{are needed that can} \newt{must} safely manage complex
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\dasinline{Or just straight up ``this reliance''.
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Right to the topic.}
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Small modular reactors face significantly higher per-megawatt staffing costs
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than conventional
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plants.\dasinline{Obvious but source required.} Autonomous control systems \oldt{are
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needed that can} \newt{must} safely manage complex
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operational sequences with the same assurance as human-operated systems, but
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operational sequences with the same assurance as human-operated systems, but
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without constant supervision.
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without constant supervision.
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\splitinline{``are needed that can'' --- passive. Try: ``Autonomous control
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systems must safely manage...''}
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% APPROACH PARAGRAPH Solution
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% APPROACH PARAGRAPH Solution
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To address this need, we will combine formal methods from computer science with
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To address this need, we will combine formal methods from computer science
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control theory to build hybrid control systems that are correct by
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with control theory \oldt{to build hybrid control systems that are correct by
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construction.\splitnote{Clear statement of approach.}\dasinline{Add
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construction.} \newt{to build hybrid control systems that are correct by
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``and leverage existing domain knowledge'' or similar.
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construction, leveraging the extensive domain knowledge already embedded in
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Industry knowledge can be reused here --- less like
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existing operating procedures and safety analyses.}
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starting from scratch.}
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% Rationale
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% Rationale
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Hybrid systems use discrete logic to switch between continuous control modes,
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Hybrid systems use discrete logic to switch between continuous control modes,
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similar to how operators change control strategies. Existing formal methods
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similar to how operators change control strategies. Existing formal methods
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generate provably correct switching logic but cannot handle continuous dynamics
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generate provably correct switching logic but cannot handle continuous
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during transitions, while traditional control theory verifies continuous
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dynamics during transitions, while traditional control theory verifies
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behavior but lacks tools for proving discrete switching
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continuous behavior but lacks tools for proving discrete switching
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correctness.\splitnote{Nice parallel structure showing the gap.}
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correctness.\splitnote{Nice parallel structure showing the gap.}
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% Hypothesis and Technical Approach
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% Hypothesis and Technical Approach
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We will bridge this gap through a three-stage methodology. First, we will
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We will bridge this gap through a three-stage methodology. First, we will
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translate written operating procedures into temporal logic specifications using
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translate written operating procedures into temporal logic specifications
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NASA's Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET), which structures
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using NASA's Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET). \oldt{which
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requirements into scope, condition, component, timing, and response elements.
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structures requirements into scope, condition, component, timing, and
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This structured approach enables realizability checking to identify conflicts
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response elements. This structured approach enables realizability checking to
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and ambiguities in procedures before
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identify conflicts and ambiguities in procedures before implementation.}
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implementation.\dasinline{Had to read this twice.} Second, we will synthesize
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\newt{FRET structures requirements into scope, condition, component, timing,
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discrete mode switching logic using reactive
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and response elements, enabling realizability checking that identifies
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synthesis\dasinline{Also had to read this twice. A lot of
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conflicts and ambiguities in procedures before implementation.}
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\dasinline{Had to read this twice.}
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Second, we will synthesize discrete mode switching logic using reactive
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synthesis \oldt{to generate deterministic automata that are provably correct
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by construction.} \newt{to produce deterministic automata that are correct by
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construction.}\dasinline{Also had to read this twice. A lot of
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jargon. Check topic stress.}
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jargon. Check topic stress.}
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to generate deterministic automata that are provably
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Third, we will develop continuous controllers for each discrete mode using
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correct by construction. Third, we will develop continuous
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standard control theory and reachability analysis. We will classify
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controllers for each discrete mode using standard control theory and
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continuous modes based on their transition objectives \oldt{, and then employ
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reachability analysis. We will classify continuous modes based on their
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assume-guarantee contracts and barrier certificates to prove that mode
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transition objectives, and then employ assume-guarantee contracts\dasinline{I don't think
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transitions occur safely and as defined by the deterministic automata.}
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I ever mention this phrase again specifically. Might be a
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\newt{and verify safe mode transitions using barrier certificates and
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dogwhistle to other work unintentionally. Must be
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reachability analysis.}\dasinline{I don't think I ever mention this phrase
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careful.} and barrier
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again specifically. Might be a dogwhistle to other work unintentionally. Must
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certificates to prove that mode transitions occur safely and as defined by the
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be careful.}
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deterministic automata. This compositional approach enables local verification
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of continuous modes without requiring global trajectory analysis across the
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This compositional approach enables local verification of continuous modes
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entire hybrid system. We will demonstrate this on an Emerson Ovation control
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without requiring global trajectory analysis across the entire hybrid system.
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system.\dasinline{Where did this come from? Needs context.}
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\oldt{We will demonstrate this on an Emerson Ovation control system.}
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\splitinline{This paragraph is dense. Consider breaking after the three
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\newt{We will validate this methodology through hardware-in-the-loop testing
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stages, then a new paragraph for the compositional verification point and
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on an Emerson Ovation distributed control system, made possible through the
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Emerson demo.}
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University of Pittsburgh Cyber Energy Center's industry partnership.}
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\dasinline{Where did this come from? Needs context.}
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% Pay-off
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% Pay-off
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This approach \oldt{will demonstrate autonomous control can be used for} \newt{enables autonomous management of} complex
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This approach \oldt{will demonstrate autonomous control can be used for}
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nuclear power operations while maintaining safety
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\newt{enables autonomous management of} complex nuclear power operations
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guarantees.
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while maintaining safety guarantees.
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\splitinline{``can be used for'' — weak. Try: ``...will demonstrate that
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autonomous control can manage complex nuclear power operations while
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maintaining safety guarantees.'' Or even stronger: ``...enables autonomous
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management of complex nuclear power operations with safety guarantees.''}
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% OUTCOMES PARAGRAPHS
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% OUTCOMES PARAGRAPHS
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If this research is successful, we will be able to do the following:
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If this research is successful, we will be able to do the following:
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@ -91,12 +85,12 @@ If this research is successful, we will be able to do the following:
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into formal specifications. These specifications will be synthesized into
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into formal specifications. These specifications will be synthesized into
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discrete control logic using reactive synthesis tools.
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discrete control logic using reactive synthesis tools.
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% Outcome
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% Outcome
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Control engineers will be able to generate mode-switching controllers from
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\oldt{Control engineers will be able to generate mode-switching
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regulatory procedures with little formal methods
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controllers from regulatory procedures with little formal methods
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expertise,\dasinline{This may not be true, and perhaps
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expertise, reducing barriers to high-assurance control systems.}
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does not belong.} reducing
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\newt{This will reduce barriers to high-assurance control systems by
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barriers to high-assurance control
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generating verified mode-switching controllers directly from regulatory
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systems.\splitnote{Good practical framing --- emphasizes accessibility.}
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procedures.}\dasinline{This may not be true, and perhaps does not belong.}
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% OUTCOME 2 Title
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% OUTCOME 2 Title
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\item \textit{Verify continuous control behavior across mode transitions.}
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\item \textit{Verify continuous control behavior across mode transitions.}
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@ -113,15 +107,15 @@ If this research is successful, we will be able to do the following:
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guarantees.}
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guarantees.}
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% Strategy
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% Strategy
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We will implement this methodology on a small modular reactor simulation
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We will implement this methodology on a small modular reactor simulation
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using industry-standard control hardware. % Outcome
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using industry-standard control hardware.
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Control engineers will be able to \oldt{implement high-assurance autonomous
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% Outcome
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controls on industrial platforms they already use, enabling users to
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\oldt{Control engineers will be able to achieve autonomy without
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achieve autonomy without retraining costs or developing new
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retraining costs or developing new equipment by implementing
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equipment.} \newt{achieve autonomy without retraining costs or developing new equipment by implementing high-assurance autonomous controls on industrial platforms they already use.}\splitnote{Strong industrial grounding --- the ``platforms they
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high-assurance autonomous controls on industrial platforms they already
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already use'' point is compelling for
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use.} \newt{Without retraining costs or new equipment, control engineers
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adoption.}\dasinline{Flip the clauses. Put retraining
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will be able to implement high-assurance autonomous controls on industrial
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and new equipment before the comma, end with building
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platforms they already use.}\dasinline{Flip the clauses. Put retraining
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HAHACs with control hardware they already use.
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and new equipment before the comma, end with building HAHACs with control
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That's the more important part.}
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hardware they already use. That's the more important part.}
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\end{enumerate}
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\end{enumerate}
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