Editorial pass: tactical, operational, and strategic improvements

TACTICAL (sentence-level):
- Improved topic-stress positioning (known → new info)
- Strengthened verb choice and reduced passive voice
- Enhanced stress positions (key info at sentence end)
- Tightened phrasing for clarity and impact

OPERATIONAL (paragraph/section):
- Improved transitions between subsections
- Enhanced flow within sections
- Clarified connections between ideas
- Strengthened section conclusions

STRATEGIC (document-level):
- Reinforced Heilmeier Catechism alignment
- Made Q&A structure more explicit
- Improved section summaries to clearly answer assigned questions
- Enhanced connections between sections

1-goals-and-outcomes/research_statement_v1.tex

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
 % GOAL PARAGRAPH
-I develop autonomous control systems with mathematical guarantees of safe and correct behavior.
+I develop autonomous control systems that guarantee safe and correct behavior mathematically.
 
 % INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH Hook
 Nuclear reactors today depend on extensively trained human operators who follow detailed written procedures and switch between control objectives as plant conditions change.
 % Gap
-Small modular reactors face a fundamental economic challenge: their per-megawatt staffing costs significantly exceed those of conventional plants, threatening economic viability. Autonomous control could manage complex operational sequences without constant supervision—but only if it provides safety assurance equal to or exceeding that of human operators.
+Small modular reactors face a fundamental economic challenge: their per-megawatt staffing costs significantly exceed those of conventional plants, threatening economic viability. Autonomous control could manage complex operational sequences without constant supervision—but only if safety assurance equals or exceeds that of human operators.
 
 % APPROACH PARAGRAPH Solution
-I produce hybrid control systems correct by construction, unifying formal methods from computer science with control theory. 
+I produce hybrid control systems correct by construction by unifying formal methods from computer science with control theory. 
 % Rationale
-Human operators already work this way: discrete logic switches between continuous control modes. Formal methods generate provably correct switching logic but cannot handle continuous dynamics. Control theory verifies continuous behavior but cannot prove discrete switching correctness. Both must work together to achieve end-to-end correctness.
+Human operators already work this way: discrete logic switches between continuous control modes. Formal methods generate provably correct switching logic but cannot handle continuous dynamics. Control theory verifies continuous behavior but cannot prove discrete switching correctness. Achieving end-to-end correctness requires both approaches working together.
 % Hypothesis and Technical Approach
 Three stages bridge this gap. First, NASA's Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET) translates written operating procedures into temporal logic specifications, structuring requirements by scope, condition, component, timing, and response. Realizability checking exposes conflicts and ambiguities before implementation begins. Second, reactive synthesis generates deterministic automata that are provably correct by construction. Third, reachability analysis verifies that continuous controllers satisfy the requirements each discrete mode imposes. Engineers design these continuous controllers using standard control theory techniques.
 

1-goals-and-outcomes/v1.tex

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 \section{Goals and Outcomes}
 
 % GOAL PARAGRAPH
-This research develops autonomous hybrid control systems with mathematical guarantees of safe and correct behavior.
+This research develops autonomous hybrid control systems that guarantee safe and correct behavior mathematically.
 
 % INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH Hook
 Nuclear power plants require the highest levels of control system reliability. Control system failures risk economic losses, service interruptions, or radiological release.
@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ Nuclear plants today depend on extensively trained human operators who follow de
 This reliance on human operators prevents autonomous control and creates a fundamental economic challenge for next-generation reactor designs. Small modular reactors face per-megawatt staffing costs far exceeding those of conventional plants, threatening economic viability. Autonomous control could manage complex operational sequences without constant supervision—but only if it provides safety assurance equal to or exceeding that of human operators.
 
 % APPROACH PARAGRAPH Solution
-This work produces hybrid control systems correct by construction, unifying formal methods with control theory.
+This work produces hybrid control systems correct by construction by unifying formal methods with control theory.
 % Rationale
-Human operators already work this way: discrete logic switches between continuous control modes. Formal methods generate provably correct switching logic from written requirements but cannot handle the continuous dynamics governing transitions. Control theory verifies continuous behavior but cannot prove discrete switching correctness. Both approaches must work together to achieve end-to-end correctness.
+Human operators already work this way: discrete logic switches between continuous control modes. Formal methods generate provably correct switching logic from written requirements but cannot handle the continuous dynamics governing transitions. Control theory verifies continuous behavior but cannot prove discrete switching correctness. Achieving end-to-end correctness requires both approaches working together.
 % Hypothesis
 Two steps close this gap. First, reactive synthesis generates discrete mode transitions directly from written operating procedures. Second, reachability analysis verifies continuous behavior against discrete requirements. This approach transforms operating procedures into logical specifications that constrain continuous dynamics, producing autonomous controllers provably free from design defects. 
 

2-state-of-the-art/v2.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 \textbf{Heilmeier Questions: What has been done? What are the limits of current practice?} 
 
-No current approach provides autonomous control with end-to-end correctness guarantees. This section examines why: human-centered operation cannot eliminate reliability limits, and formal methods verify only discrete or continuous behavior—never both. 
+No current approach provides autonomous control with end-to-end correctness guarantees. This section examines why: human-centered operation cannot eliminate reliability limits, and formal methods verify discrete or continuous behavior but never both. 
 
 Three subsections structure this analysis: first, reactor operators and their operating procedures; second, fundamental limitations of human-based operation; third, formal methods approaches that verify discrete logic or continuous dynamics but not both together.
 
@@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ Section 3 addresses the verification gap these limits establish.
 
 \subsection{Current Reactor Procedures and Operation}
 
-Current practice has two critical components: procedures and operators. This subsection examines procedures—their hierarchy, development process, and role in defining operational modes. The next subsection examines operators—their reliability limits and contribution to accidents.
+Current practice rests on two critical components: procedures and operators. This subsection examines procedures—their hierarchy, development process, and role in defining operational modes. The following subsection then examines operators—their reliability limits and contribution to accidents.
 
 Nuclear plant procedures form a strict hierarchy. Normal operating procedures govern routine operations. Abnormal operating procedures handle off-normal conditions. Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) manage design-basis accidents. Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) address beyond-design-basis events. Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) cover catastrophic damage. All procedures must comply with 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6)(ii); NUREG-0899 provides development guidance~\cite{NUREG-0899, 10CFR50.34}. 
 
-Procedure development relies on expert judgment and simulator validation—not formal verification. 10 CFR 55.59~\cite{10CFR55.59} requires rigorous assessment through technical evaluation, simulator validation testing, and biennial review. Yet key safety properties escape formal verification. Mathematical proofs do not confirm that procedures cover all possible plant states. Proofs do not show that required actions complete within available timeframes. Proofs do not demonstrate that transitions between procedure sets maintain safety invariants.
+Procedure development relies on expert judgment and simulator validation—not formal verification. 10 CFR 55.59~\cite{10CFR55.59} requires rigorous assessment through technical evaluation, simulator validation testing, and biennial review. Yet key safety properties escape formal verification. No mathematical proofs confirm that procedures cover all possible plant states, that required actions complete within available timeframes, or that transitions between procedure sets maintain safety invariants.
 
 \textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{Procedures lack formal verification of correctness
 and completeness.} Current procedure development relies on expert judgment and
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ This division between automated and human-controlled functions reveals the funda
 
 The previous subsection established that procedures lack formal verification despite rigorous development. This represents only half the reliability challenge. Perfect procedures cannot guarantee safe operation when humans execute them imperfectly.
 
-Human operators—the second pillar of current practice—introduce reliability limitations independent of procedure quality. Procedures define what to do. Operators determine when and how. This introduces persistent failure modes that training alone cannot eliminate.
+Human operators—the second pillar of current practice—introduce reliability limitations independent of procedure quality. While procedures define what to do, operators determine when and how to act. This human discretion introduces persistent failure modes that training alone cannot eliminate.
 
 Current-generation nuclear power plants employ over 3,600 active NRC-licensed
 reactor operators in the United States~\cite{operator_statistics}. These
@@ -59,9 +59,9 @@ limitations are fundamental to human-driven control, not remediable defects.
 
 \subsection{Formal Methods}
 
-The previous two subsections established two fundamental limitations: procedures lack formal verification, and human operators introduce persistent reliability issues that training cannot eliminate. Both are fundamental constraints, not remediable defects.
+The previous two subsections established two fundamental limitations: procedures lack formal verification, and human operators introduce persistent reliability issues that training cannot eliminate. Both represent fundamental constraints, not remediable defects.
 
-Formal methods might eliminate both limitations by providing mathematical guarantees of correctness. But even the most advanced formal methods applications in nuclear control leave a critical verification gap.
+Formal methods could potentially eliminate both limitations by providing mathematical guarantees of correctness. However, even the most advanced formal methods applications in nuclear control leave a critical verification gap.
 
 This subsection examines two approaches illustrating this gap. HARDENS verified discrete logic without continuous dynamics. Differential dynamic logic handles hybrid verification only post-hoc. Each demonstrates the current state of formal methods while revealing the verification gap this research addresses.
 
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ primary assurance evidence.
 
 \subsubsection{Differential Dynamic Logic: Post-Hoc Hybrid Verification}
 
-HARDENS verified discrete control logic without continuous dynamics—leaving half the hybrid system unverified. Other researchers attacked the problem from the opposite direction, extending temporal logics to handle hybrid systems directly. This complementary approach produced differential dynamic logic (dL), which addresses continuous dynamics but encounters different limitations. dL introduces two additional operators
+HARDENS verified discrete control logic without continuous dynamics—leaving half the hybrid system unverified. Other researchers have attacked the problem from the opposite direction by extending temporal logics to handle hybrid systems directly. This complementary approach produced differential dynamic logic (dL), which addresses continuous dynamics but encounters different limitations. dL introduces two additional operators
 into temporal logic: the box operator and the diamond operator. The box operator
 \([\alpha]\phi\) states that for some region \(\phi\), the hybrid system
 \(\alpha\) always remains within that region. In this way, it is a safety
@@ -162,8 +162,8 @@ This section answered two Heilmeier questions: What has been done? What are the
 \end{itemize}
 Each approach has fundamental limitations. None addresses both discrete and continuous verification compositionally.
 
-\textbf{What are the limits of current practice?} The verification gap: no existing methodology synthesizes provably correct hybrid controllers from operational procedures with verification integrated into design. Current approaches verify either discrete logic or continuous dynamics—never both compositionally. Training improvements cannot overcome human reliability limits. Post-hoc verification cannot scale to system design.
+\textbf{What are the limits of current practice?} The verification gap emerges clearly: no existing methodology synthesizes provably correct hybrid controllers from operational procedures with verification integrated into design. Current approaches verify discrete logic or continuous dynamics but never both compositionally. Training improvements cannot overcome human reliability limits. Post-hoc verification cannot scale to system design.
 
-Two forces create urgency: economic necessity demands solutions, and technical maturity enables them. Small modular reactors cannot compete with per-megawatt staffing costs matching large conventional plants. Formal methods tools have matured to enable compositional hybrid verification.
+Two forces create urgency. Economic necessity demands solutions: small modular reactors cannot compete with per-megawatt staffing costs matching large conventional plants. Technical maturity enables solutions: formal methods tools have matured to enable compositional hybrid verification.
 
 Section 3 closes this verification gap by establishing what is new and why the approach will succeed.

3-research-approach/v3.tex

@@ -23,13 +23,13 @@ This section presents the complete technical approach for synthesizing provably
 % ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 % 1. INTRODUCTION AND HYBRID SYSTEMS DEFINITION
 % ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Previous approaches verified either discrete switching logic or continuous control behavior—never both simultaneously. Engineers validate continuous controllers through extensive simulation trials. They test discrete switching logic through simulated control room testing and human factors research. Neither method provides rigorous guarantees. Both consume enormous resources.
+Previous approaches verified discrete switching logic or continuous control behavior but never both simultaneously. Engineers validate continuous controllers through extensive simulation trials and test discrete switching logic through simulated control room testing and human factors research. Neither method provides rigorous guarantees, and both consume enormous resources.
 
-This approach bridges that gap by composing formal methods from computer science with control-theoretic verification, formalizing reactor operations as hybrid automata.
+This approach bridges that gap by composing formal methods from computer science with control-theoretic verification and formalizing reactor operations as hybrid automata.
 
 Hybrid system verification faces a fundamental challenge: discrete transitions change the governing vector field, creating discontinuities through the interaction between discrete and continuous dynamics. Traditional verification techniques cannot handle this interaction directly.
 
-This methodology decomposes the problem: it verifies discrete switching logic and continuous mode behavior separately, then composes them to establish guarantees for the complete hybrid system. This two-layer approach mirrors reactor operations. Discrete supervisory logic determines which control mode is active. Continuous controllers govern plant behavior within each mode.
+This methodology decomposes the problem by verifying discrete switching logic and continuous mode behavior separately, then composing them to establish guarantees for the complete hybrid system. This two-layer approach mirrors reactor operations. Discrete supervisory logic determines which control mode is active. Continuous controllers govern plant behavior within each mode.
 
 Hybrid systems require mathematical formalization. This work draws on automata theory, temporal logic, and control theory to provide that description.
 
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ where:
 
 A HAHACS requires this tuple together with proof artifacts demonstrating that the control system's actual implementation satisfies its intended behavior.
 
-\textbf{What is new in this research?} Existing approaches verify either discrete logic or continuous dynamics—never both compositionally. Section 2 established this limitation: reactive synthesis, reachability analysis, and barrier certificates exist independently. Prior work has not integrated them into a systematic design methodology spanning from procedures to verified implementation.
+\textbf{What is new in this research?} Existing approaches verify discrete logic or continuous dynamics but never both compositionally. Section 2 established this limitation: reactive synthesis, reachability analysis, and barrier certificates exist independently. Prior work has not integrated them into a systematic design methodology spanning from procedures to verified implementation.
 
 Three innovations enable this integration:
 
@@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ These factors combine to demonstrate feasibility on production control systems w
 
 \subsection{System Requirements, Specifications, and Discrete Controllers}
 
-The previous subsection established the hybrid automaton formalism—a mathematical framework describing discrete modes, continuous dynamics, guards, and invariants. Where do these formal descriptions originate?
+The previous subsection established the hybrid automaton formalism—a mathematical framework describing discrete modes, continuous dynamics, guards, and invariants. A critical question remains: where do these formal descriptions originate?
 
-Nuclear operations already possess a natural hybrid structure. This structure maps directly to the automaton formalism through three control scopes: strategic, operational, and tactical. This approach constructs formal hybrid systems from existing operational knowledge rather than imposing artificial abstractions. It leverages decades of domain expertise already encoded in operating procedures.
+The answer lies in existing practice. Nuclear operations already possess a natural hybrid structure. This structure maps directly to the automaton formalism through three control scopes: strategic, operational, and tactical. This approach constructs formal hybrid systems from existing operational knowledge rather than imposing artificial abstractions. It leverages decades of domain expertise already encoded in operating procedures.
 
 Human control of nuclear power divides into three scopes: strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic control represents high-level, long-term decision making spanning months or years, managing labor needs and supply chains to optimize scheduled maintenance and downtime.
 
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ This structure reveals why the operational and tactical levels fundamentally for
 \end{figure}
 
 
-This operational control level explains why nuclear control requires human operators: the hybrid nature of this control system makes proving controller performance against strategic requirements difficult, and no unified infrastructure exists for building and verifying hybrid systems. Humans fill this layer because their general intelligence provides a safe way to manage the system's hybrid nature, following prescriptive operating manuals where strict procedures govern what control to implement at any given time. These procedures provide the key to the operational control scope.
+This operational control level explains why nuclear control requires human operators: the hybrid nature of this control system makes proving controller performance against strategic requirements difficult, and no unified infrastructure exists for building and verifying hybrid systems. Humans fill this layer because their general intelligence provides a safe way to manage the system's hybrid nature by following prescriptive operating manuals where strict procedures govern what control to implement at any given time. These procedures provide the key to the operational control scope.
 
 A HAHACS construction leverages two key observations about current practice. First, operational scope control is effectively discrete control. Second, operating procedures describe implementation rules before construction begins. A HAHACS's intended behavior must be completely described before construction. Requirements define the behavior of any control system: statements about what
 the system must do, must not do, and under what conditions. For nuclear systems,
@@ -260,9 +260,9 @@ FRET has been successfully applied to spacecraft control systems, autonomous veh
 
 \subsection{Discrete Controller Synthesis}
 
-Operating procedures translate into temporal logic specifications using FRET. These specifications define what the system must do. But how do we implement those requirements?
+Operating procedures translate into temporal logic specifications using FRET. These specifications define what the system must do, but a critical gap remains: how do we implement those requirements?
 
-Reactive synthesis provides the answer. It automatically constructs controllers guaranteed to satisfy temporal logic specifications.
+Reactive synthesis bridges this gap by automatically constructing controllers guaranteed to satisfy temporal logic specifications.
 
 Reactive synthesis automates the creation of reactive programs from temporal logic—programs that take input for a given state and produce output. Temporal logic specifications enable reactive synthesis to construct the discrete control system automatically. The current discrete state and status of guard conditions form the input; the next discrete state forms the output.
 
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ Reactive synthesis produces discrete mode-switching logic from procedures. The n
 
 \subsection{Continuous Control Modes}
 
-Reactive synthesis produces a provably correct discrete controller that determines when to switch between modes. But hybrid control requires more than correct mode switching—continuous dynamics executing within each discrete mode must also verify against requirements.
+Reactive synthesis produces a provably correct discrete controller that determines when to switch between modes. However, hybrid control requires more than correct mode switching—the continuous dynamics executing within each discrete mode must also verify against requirements.
 
 Control objectives determine the verification approach. Modes classify into three types—transitory, stabilizing, and expulsory—each requiring different verification tools matched to its distinct purpose. This subsection describes each type and its verification method. 
 
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ appropriate to the fidelity of the reactor models available.
 
 \subsubsection{Stabilizing Modes}
 
-Transitory modes drive the system toward exit conditions. They answer one question: "can we reach the target?"
+Transitory modes drive the system toward exit conditions and answer one question: "can we reach the target?"
 
 Stabilizing modes address a fundamentally different question: "will we stay within bounds?" These modes maintain the system within a desired operating region indefinitely. Examples include steady-state power operation, hot standby, and load-following at constant power level. This different control objective requires a different verification approach.
 
@@ -443,9 +443,9 @@ controller.
 
 \subsubsection{Expulsory Modes}
 
-The first two mode types handle nominal operations. Transitory modes move the plant between conditions. Stabilizing modes maintain the plant within regions. Both assume the plant dynamics match the design model. Both assume the plant behaves as expected.
+The first two mode types handle nominal operations. Transitory modes move the plant between conditions, while stabilizing modes maintain the plant within regions. Both assume the plant dynamics match the design model and that the plant behaves as expected.
 
-Expulsory modes address a fundamentally different scenario. They handle situations where the plant deviates from expected behavior. This deviation may result from component failures, sensor degradation, or unanticipated disturbances. Here, robustness matters more than optimality.
+Expulsory modes address a fundamentally different scenario by handling situations where the plant deviates from expected behavior. This deviation may result from component failures, sensor degradation, or unanticipated disturbances. Here, robustness matters more than optimality.
 
 Expulsory controllers prioritize robustness over optimality. The control objective shifts from reaching targets or maintaining regions to driving the plant to a safe shutdown state from potentially anywhere in the state space, under degraded or uncertain dynamics. Examples include emergency core cooling, reactor SCRAM sequences, and controlled depressurization procedures.
 
@@ -526,23 +526,23 @@ outcomes can align best with customer needs.
 
 This section answered two critical Heilmeier questions: What is new? Why will it succeed?
 
-\textbf{What is new in this research?} This work integrates reactive synthesis, reachability analysis, and barrier certificates into a compositional methodology for hybrid control synthesis through three innovations. 
+\textbf{What is new in this research?} This work integrates reactive synthesis, reachability analysis, and barrier certificates into a compositional methodology for hybrid control synthesis through three innovations: 
 
-First: contract-based decomposition inverts traditional global analysis. Discrete synthesis defines verification contracts that bound continuous verification. 
+\textit{First: contract-based decomposition} inverts traditional global analysis. Discrete synthesis defines verification contracts that bound continuous verification. 
 
-Second: mode classification enables mode-local analysis with provable composition guarantees. It matches continuous modes to appropriate verification tools. 
+\textit{Second: mode classification} enables mode-local analysis with provable composition guarantees by matching continuous modes to appropriate verification tools. 
 
-Third: procedure-driven structure leverages existing procedural decomposition. This avoids intractable state explosion.
+\textit{Third: procedure-driven structure} leverages existing procedural decomposition, avoiding intractable state explosion.
 
-Section 2 established that prior work verified either discrete logic or continuous dynamics—never both compositionally. This compositional verification enables what global analysis cannot achieve.
+Section 2 established that prior work verified discrete logic or continuous dynamics but never both compositionally. This compositional verification enables what global analysis cannot achieve.
 
-\textbf{Why will this approach succeed?} Three factors ensure practical feasibility. 
+\textbf{Why will this approach succeed?} Three factors ensure practical feasibility: 
 
-First: nuclear procedures already decompose operations into discrete phases with explicit transition criteria. This allows formalization of existing structure without imposing artificial abstractions. 
+\textit{First: existing structure.} Nuclear procedures already decompose operations into discrete phases with explicit transition criteria, allowing formalization of existing structure without imposing artificial abstractions. 
 
-Second: mode-level verification bounds each verification problem locally. This avoids the state explosion that makes global hybrid system analysis intractable. 
+\textit{Second: bounded complexity.} Mode-level verification bounds each verification problem locally, avoiding the state explosion that makes global hybrid system analysis intractable. 
 
-Third: the Emerson collaboration provides domain expertise to validate procedure formalization. It provides industrial hardware to demonstrate implementation feasibility. This ensures solutions address real deployment constraints.
+\textit{Third: industrial validation.} The Emerson collaboration provides domain expertise to validate procedure formalization and industrial hardware to demonstrate implementation feasibility, ensuring solutions address real deployment constraints.
 
 The complete technical methodology is now established. Section 2 answered what has been done and what limits current practice. This section answered what is new and why it will succeed.
 

4-metrics-of-success/v1.tex

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
 
 \textbf{Heilmeier Question: How do we measure success?}
 
-Section 3 established the technical approach. It answered what is new: compositional verification bridging discrete synthesis with continuous control. It answered why the approach will succeed: existing procedural structure, bounded complexity, and industrial validation. This section addresses the next Heilmeier question: how to measure success. 
+Section 3 established the technical approach and answered what is new: compositional verification bridging discrete synthesis with continuous control. It answered why the approach will succeed: existing procedural structure, bounded complexity, and industrial validation. This section addresses the next Heilmeier question: how to measure success. 
 
 Technology Readiness Level advancement from fundamental concepts (TRL 2--3) to validated prototype demonstration (TRL 5) measures success.
 
-This work begins at TRL 2--3 and aims to reach TRL 5, where system components operate successfully in a relevant laboratory environment. TRL advancement provides the most appropriate success metric: it explicitly measures the gap between academic proof-of-concept and practical deployment. This section explains why TRLs measure success appropriately, then defines specific criteria for each level from TRL 3 through TRL 5.
+This work begins at TRL 2--3 and targets TRL 5, where system components operate successfully in a relevant laboratory environment. TRL advancement provides the most appropriate success metric: it explicitly measures the gap between academic proof-of-concept and practical deployment. This section explains why TRLs measure success appropriately, then defines specific criteria for each level from TRL 3 through TRL 5.
 
 Technology Readiness Levels provide the ideal success metric. They explicitly measure the gap between academic proof-of-concept and practical deployment. This is precisely what my work bridges. 
 

6-broader-impacts/v1.tex

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ Three stakeholder groups converge on one economic constraint—high operating co
 
 This research directly addresses a \$21--28 billion annual cost barrier by enabling economically viable small modular reactors for datacenter power and establishing a generalizable framework for safety-critical autonomous systems across critical infrastructure.
 
-Why now? Exponentially growing AI infrastructure demands have transformed this longstanding challenge into an immediate crisis. This creates a market demanding solutions that did not exist before.
+Why now? Exponentially growing AI infrastructure demands have transformed this longstanding challenge into an immediate crisis, creating a market demanding solutions that did not exist before.
 
 Nuclear power presents both a compelling application domain and an urgent economic challenge. Recent interest in powering artificial intelligence infrastructure has renewed focus on small modular reactors (SMRs), particularly for hyperscale datacenters requiring hundreds of megawatts of continuous power. SMRs deployed at datacenter sites minimize transmission losses and eliminate emissions. At this scale, nuclear power economics demand careful attention to operating costs.
 
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ adoption across critical infrastructure.
 
 This section answered three critical Heilmeier questions: Who cares? Why now? What difference will it make?
 
-\textbf{Who cares?} Three stakeholder groups face the same constraint. 
+\textbf{Who cares?} Three stakeholder groups face the same constraint: 
 
 The nuclear industry faces an economic crisis for small modular reactors due to per-megawatt staffing costs. 
 
@@ -70,18 +70,18 @@ Datacenter operators need hundreds of megawatts of continuous clean power for AI
 
 Clean energy advocates need nuclear power to be economically competitive. 
 
-All three groups need autonomous control with safety guarantees.
+All three groups require autonomous control with safety guarantees.
 
-\textbf{Why now?} Two forces converge. 
+\textbf{Why now?} Two forces converge to create urgency: 
 
-First: exponentially growing AI infrastructure demands create immediate need for economical nuclear power at datacenter scale. Projections show datacenter electricity demand reaching 1,050 terawatt-hours annually by 2030. 
+\textit{First: exponentially growing demand.} AI infrastructure demands create immediate need for economical nuclear power at datacenter scale. Projections show datacenter electricity demand reaching 1,050 terawatt-hours annually by 2030. 
 
-Second: formal methods tools have matured sufficiently to make compositional hybrid verification computationally achievable. What was theoretically possible but practically intractable a decade ago is now feasible. 
+\textit{Second: technical maturity.} Formal methods tools have matured sufficiently to make compositional hybrid verification computationally achievable. What was theoretically possible but practically intractable a decade ago is now feasible. 
 
 The problem is urgent. The tools exist.
 
-\textbf{What difference will it make?} This research addresses a \$21--28 billion annual cost barrier. It enables autonomous control with mathematical safety guarantees. Beyond immediate economic impact, the methodology establishes a generalizable framework for safety-critical autonomous systems across critical infrastructure. Impact extends beyond nuclear power to any safety-critical system requiring provable correctness.
+\textbf{What difference will it make?} This research addresses a \$21--28 billion annual cost barrier and enables autonomous control with mathematical safety guarantees. Beyond immediate economic impact, the methodology establishes a generalizable framework for safety-critical autonomous systems across critical infrastructure. Impact extends beyond nuclear power to any safety-critical system requiring provable correctness.
 
 The complete research plan spans technical approach, success metrics, risk mitigation, and broader impact. One final Heilmeier question remains: How long will it take?
 
-Section 8 provides a structured 24-month research plan progressing through milestones tied to Technology Readiness Level advancement. This demonstrates the proposed work is achievable within a doctoral timeline.
+Section 8 provides a structured 24-month research plan progressing through milestones tied to Technology Readiness Level advancement, demonstrating the proposed work is achievable within a doctoral timeline.