Edit Risks: generalize tool references, clarify boolean abstraction sentence
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\section{Risks and Contingencies}
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\section{Risks and Contingencies}
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This research relies on several critical assumptions that, if invalidated, would
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This research relies on several critical assumptions that, if invalidated,
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require scope adjustment or methodological revision.\splitnote{Honest acknowledgment of risks with clear contingencies — committee will appreciate this.} The primary risks to
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would require scope adjustment or methodological
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successful completion fall into four categories: computational tractability of
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revision.\splitnote{Honest acknowledgment of risks with clear contingencies
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synthesis and verification, complexity of the discrete-continuous interface,
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— committee will appreciate this.} The primary risks to successful
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completion fall into four categories: computational tractability of synthesis
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and verification, complexity of the discrete-continuous interface,
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completeness of procedure formalization, and hardware-in-the-loop integration
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completeness of procedure formalization, and hardware-in-the-loop integration
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challenges. Each risk has associated indicators for early detection and
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challenges. Each risk has associated indicators for early detection and
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contingency plans that preserve research value even if core assumptions prove
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contingency plans that preserve research value even if core assumptions prove
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@ -15,22 +17,23 @@ deployment.
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The first major assumption is that formalized startup procedures will yield
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The first major assumption is that formalized startup procedures will yield
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automata small enough for efficient synthesis and verification. Reactive
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automata small enough for efficient synthesis and verification. Reactive
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synthesis scales exponentially with specification complexity, creating risk that
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synthesis scales exponentially with specification complexity, creating risk
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temporal logic specifications derived from complete startup procedures may
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that temporal logic specifications derived from complete startup procedures
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produce automata with thousands of states. Such large automata would require
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may produce automata with thousands of states. Such large automata would
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synthesis times exceeding days or weeks, preventing demonstration of the
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require synthesis times exceeding days or weeks, preventing demonstration of
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complete methodology within project timelines. Reachability analysis for
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the complete methodology within project timelines. Reachability analysis for
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continuous modes with high-dimensional state spaces may similarly prove
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continuous modes with high-dimensional state spaces may similarly prove
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computationally intractable. Either barrier would constitute a fundamental
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computationally intractable. Either barrier would constitute a fundamental
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obstacle to achieving the research objectives.
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obstacle to achieving the research objectives.
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Several indicators would provide early warning of computational tractability
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Several indicators would provide early warning of computational tractability
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problems. Synthesis times exceeding 24 hours for simplified procedure subsets
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problems. Synthesis times exceeding 24 hours for simplified procedure subsets
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would suggest complete procedures are intractable. Generated automata containing
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would suggest complete procedures are intractable. Generated automata
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more than 1,000 discrete states would indicate the discrete state space is too
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containing more than 1,000 discrete states would indicate the discrete state
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large for efficient verification. Specifications flagged as unrealizable by FRET
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space is too large for efficient verification. Specifications flagged as
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or Strix\dasinline{Strix may not be the reactive synth
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unrealizable by \oldt{FRET or Strix} \newt{realizability checking
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tool anymore. Be more general.} would reveal fundamental conflicts in the formalized procedures.
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tools}\dasinline{Strix may not be the reactive synth tool anymore. Be more
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general.} would reveal fundamental conflicts in the formalized procedures.
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Reachability analysis failing to converge within reasonable time bounds would
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Reachability analysis failing to converge within reasonable time bounds would
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show that continuous mode verification cannot be completed with available
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show that continuous mode verification cannot be completed with available
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computational resources.
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computational resources.
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@ -38,122 +41,130 @@ computational resources.
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The contingency plan for computational intractability is to reduce scope to a
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The contingency plan for computational intractability is to reduce scope to a
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minimal viable startup sequence. This reduced sequence would cover only cold
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minimal viable startup sequence. This reduced sequence would cover only cold
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shutdown to criticality to low-power hold, omitting power ascension and other
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shutdown to criticality to low-power hold, omitting power ascension and other
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operational phases. The subset would still demonstrate the complete methodology
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operational phases. The subset would still demonstrate the complete
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while reducing computational burden. The research contribution would remain
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methodology while reducing computational burden. The research contribution
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valid even with reduced scope, proving that formal hybrid control synthesis is
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would remain valid even with reduced scope, proving that formal hybrid
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achievable for safety-critical nuclear applications. The limitation to
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control synthesis is achievable for safety-critical nuclear applications. The
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simplified operational sequences would be explicitly documented as a constraint
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limitation to simplified operational sequences would be explicitly documented
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rather than a failure.
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as a constraint rather than a failure.
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\subsection{Discrete-Continuous Interface Formalization}
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\subsection{Discrete-Continuous Interface Formalization}
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The second critical assumption concerns the mapping between boolean guard
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The second critical assumption concerns the mapping between boolean guard
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conditions in temporal logic and continuous state boundaries required for mode
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conditions in temporal logic and continuous state boundaries required for
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transitions. This interface represents the fundamental challenge of hybrid
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mode transitions. This interface represents the fundamental challenge of
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systems: relating discrete switching logic to continuous dynamics. Temporal
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hybrid systems: relating discrete switching logic to continuous dynamics.
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logic operates on boolean predicates, while continuous control requires
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Temporal logic operates on boolean predicates, while continuous control
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reasoning about differential equations and reachable sets. Guard conditions
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requires reasoning about differential equations and reachable sets.
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requiring complex nonlinear predicates may resist boolean abstraction, making
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\oldt{Guard conditions requiring complex nonlinear predicates may resist
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synthesis intractable.\dasinline{What does this mean?} Continuous safety regions that cannot be expressed as
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boolean abstraction, making synthesis intractable.} \newt{Some guard
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conjunctions of verifiable constraints would similarly create insurmountable
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conditions may require complex nonlinear predicates that cannot be cleanly
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verification challenges. The risk extends beyond static interface definition to
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expressed as boolean combinations of simple threshold checks, making
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dynamic behavior across transitions: barrier certificates may fail to exist for
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synthesis intractable.}\dasinline{What does this mean?} Continuous safety
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proposed transitions, or continuous modes may be unable to guarantee convergence
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regions that cannot be expressed as conjunctions of verifiable constraints
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to discrete transition boundaries.
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would similarly create insurmountable verification challenges. The risk
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extends beyond static interface definition to dynamic behavior across
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transitions: barrier certificates may fail to exist for proposed transitions,
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or continuous modes may be unable to guarantee convergence to discrete
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transition boundaries.
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Early indicators of interface formalization problems would appear during both
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Early indicators of interface formalization problems would appear during both
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synthesis and verification phases. Guard conditions requiring complex nonlinear
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synthesis and verification phases. Guard conditions requiring complex
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predicates that resist boolean abstraction would suggest fundamental misalignment
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nonlinear predicates that resist boolean abstraction would suggest
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between discrete specifications and continuous realities. Continuous safety
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fundamental misalignment between discrete specifications and continuous
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regions that cannot be expressed as conjunctions of half-spaces or polynomial
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realities. Continuous safety regions that cannot be expressed as conjunctions
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inequalities would indicate the interface between discrete guards and continuous
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of half-spaces or polynomial inequalities would indicate the interface
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invariants is too complex. Failure to construct barrier certificates proving
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between discrete guards and continuous invariants is too complex. Failure to
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safety across mode transitions would reveal that continuous dynamics cannot be
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construct barrier certificates proving safety across mode transitions would
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formally related to discrete switching logic. Reachability analysis showing that
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reveal that continuous dynamics cannot be formally related to discrete
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continuous modes cannot reach intended transition boundaries from all possible
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switching logic. Reachability analysis showing that continuous modes cannot
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initial conditions would demonstrate the synthesized discrete controller is
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reach intended transition boundaries from all possible initial conditions
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incompatible with achievable continuous behavior.
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would demonstrate the synthesized discrete controller is incompatible with
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achievable continuous behavior.
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The primary contingency for interface complexity is restricting continuous modes
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The primary contingency for interface complexity is restricting continuous
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to operate within polytopic invariants. Polytopes are state regions defined as
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modes to operate within polytopic invariants. Polytopes are state regions
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intersections of linear half-spaces, which map directly to boolean predicates
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defined as intersections of linear half-spaces, which map directly to boolean
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through linear inequality checks. This restriction ensures tractable synthesis
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predicates through linear inequality checks. This restriction ensures
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while maintaining theoretical rigor, though at the cost of limiting
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tractable synthesis while maintaining theoretical rigor, though at the cost
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expressiveness compared to arbitrary nonlinear regions. The discrete-continuous
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of limiting expressiveness compared to arbitrary nonlinear regions. The
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interface remains well-defined and verifiable with polytopic restrictions,
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discrete-continuous interface remains well-defined and verifiable with
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providing a clear fallback position that preserves the core methodology.
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polytopic restrictions, providing a clear fallback position that preserves
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Conservative over-approximations offer an alternative approach: a nonlinear safe
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the core methodology. Conservative over-approximations offer an alternative
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region can be inner-approximated by a polytope, sacrificing operational
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approach: a nonlinear safe region can be inner-approximated by a polytope,
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flexibility to maintain formal guarantees. The three-mode classification already
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sacrificing operational flexibility to maintain formal guarantees. The
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structures the problem to minimize complex transitions, with critical safety
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three-mode classification already structures the problem to minimize complex
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properties concentrated in expulsory modes that can receive additional design
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transitions, with critical safety properties concentrated in expulsory modes
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attention.
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that can receive additional design attention.
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Mitigation strategies focus on designing continuous controllers with discrete
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Mitigation strategies focus on designing continuous controllers with discrete
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transitions as primary objectives from the outset. Rather than designing
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transitions as primary objectives from the outset. Rather than designing
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continuous control laws independently and verifying transitions post-hoc, the
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continuous control laws independently and verifying transitions post-hoc, the
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approach uses transition requirements as design constraints. Control barrier
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approach uses transition requirements as design constraints. Control barrier
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functions provide a systematic method to synthesize controllers that guarantee
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functions provide a systematic method to synthesize controllers that
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forward invariance of safe sets and convergence to transition boundaries. This
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guarantee forward invariance of safe sets and convergence to transition
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design-for-verification approach reduces the likelihood that interface
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boundaries. This design-for-verification approach reduces the likelihood that
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complexity becomes insurmountable. Focusing verification effort on expulsory
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interface complexity becomes insurmountable. Focusing verification effort on
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modes---where safety is most critical---allows more complex analysis to be
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expulsory modes---where safety is most critical---allows more complex
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applied selectively rather than uniformly across all modes, concentrating
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analysis to be applied selectively rather than uniformly across all modes,
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computational resources where they matter most for safety assurance.
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concentrating computational resources where they matter most for safety
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assurance.
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\subsection{Procedure Formalization Completeness}
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\subsection{Procedure Formalization Completeness}
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The third assumption is that existing startup procedures contain sufficient
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The third assumption is that existing startup procedures contain sufficient
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detail and clarity for translation into temporal logic specifications. Nuclear
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detail and clarity for translation into temporal logic specifications.
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operating procedures, while extensively detailed, were written for human
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Nuclear operating procedures, while extensively detailed, were written for
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operators who bring contextual understanding and adaptive reasoning to their
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human operators who bring contextual understanding and adaptive reasoning to
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interpretation. Procedures may contain implicit knowledge, ambiguous directives,
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their interpretation. Procedures may contain implicit knowledge, ambiguous
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or references to operator judgment that resist formalization in current
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directives, or references to operator judgment that resist formalization in
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specification languages. Underspecified timing constraints, ambiguous condition
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current specification languages. Underspecified timing constraints, ambiguous
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definitions, or gaps in operational coverage would cause synthesis to fail or
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condition definitions, or gaps in operational coverage would cause synthesis
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produce incorrect automata. The risk is not merely that formalization is
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to fail or produce incorrect automata. The risk is not merely that
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difficult, but that current procedures fundamentally lack the precision required
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formalization is difficult, but that current procedures fundamentally lack
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for autonomous control, revealing a gap between human-oriented documentation and
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the precision required for autonomous control, revealing a gap between
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machine-executable specifications.
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human-oriented documentation and machine-executable specifications.
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Several indicators would reveal formalization completeness problems early in the
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Several indicators would reveal formalization completeness problems early in
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project. FRET realizability checks failing due to underspecified behaviors or
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the project. FRET realizability checks failing due to underspecified
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conflicting requirements would indicate procedures do not form a complete
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behaviors or conflicting requirements would indicate procedures do not form a
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specification. Multiple valid interpretations of procedural steps with no clear
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complete specification. Multiple valid interpretations of procedural steps
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resolution would demonstrate procedure language is insufficiently precise for
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with no clear resolution would demonstrate procedure language is
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automated synthesis. Procedures referencing ``operator judgment,'' ``as
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insufficiently precise for automated synthesis. Procedures referencing
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appropriate,'' or similar discretionary language for critical decisions would
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``operator judgment,'' ``as appropriate,'' or similar discretionary language
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explicitly identify points where human reasoning cannot be directly formalized.
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for critical decisions would explicitly identify points where human reasoning
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Domain experts unable to provide crisp answers to specification questions about
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cannot be directly formalized. Domain experts unable to provide crisp answers
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edge cases would suggest the procedures themselves do not fully define system
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to specification questions about edge cases would suggest the procedures
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behavior, relying instead on operator training and experience to fill gaps.
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themselves do not fully define system behavior, relying instead on operator
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training and experience to fill gaps.
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The contingency plan treats inadequate specification as itself a research
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The contingency plan treats inadequate specification as itself a research
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contribution rather than a project failure. Documenting specific ambiguities
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contribution rather than a project failure. Documenting specific ambiguities
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encountered would create a taxonomy of formalization barriers: timing
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encountered would create a taxonomy of formalization barriers: timing
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underspecification, missing preconditions, discretionary actions, and undefined
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underspecification, missing preconditions, discretionary actions, and
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failure modes. Each category would be analyzed to understand why current
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undefined failure modes. Each category would be analyzed to understand why
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procedure-writing practices produce these gaps and what specification languages
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current procedure-writing practices produce these gaps and what specification
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would need to address them. Proposed extensions to FRETish or similar
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languages would need to address them. Proposed extensions to FRETish or
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specification languages would demonstrate how to bridge the gap between current
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similar specification languages would demonstrate how to bridge the gap
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procedures and the precision needed for autonomous control. The research output
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between current procedures and the precision needed for autonomous control.
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would shift from ``here is a complete autonomous controller'' to ``here is what
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The research output would shift from ``here is a complete autonomous
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formal autonomous control requires that current procedures do not provide, and
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controller'' to ``here is what formal autonomous control requires that
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here are language extensions to bridge that gap.'' This contribution remains
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current procedures do not provide, and here are language extensions to bridge
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valuable to both the nuclear industry and formal methods community, establishing
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that gap.'' This contribution remains valuable to both the nuclear industry
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clear requirements for next-generation procedure development and autonomous
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and formal methods community, establishing clear requirements for
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control specification languages.
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next-generation procedure development and autonomous control specification
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languages.
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Early-stage procedure analysis with domain experts provides the primary
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Early-stage procedure analysis with domain experts provides the primary
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mitigation strategy. Collaboration through the University of Pittsburgh Cyber
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mitigation strategy. Collaboration through the University of Pittsburgh Cyber
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Energy Center enables identification and resolution of ambiguities before
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Energy Center enables identification and resolution of ambiguities before
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synthesis attempts, rather than discovering them during failed synthesis runs.
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synthesis attempts, rather than discovering them during failed synthesis
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Iterative refinement with reactor operators and control engineers can clarify
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runs. Iterative refinement with reactor operators and control engineers can
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procedural intent before formalization begins, reducing the risk of discovering
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clarify procedural intent before formalization begins, reducing the risk of
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insurmountable specification gaps late in the project. Comparison with
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discovering insurmountable specification gaps late in the project. Comparison
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procedures from multiple reactor designs---pressurized water reactors, boiling
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with procedures from multiple reactor designs---pressurized water reactors,
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water reactors, and advanced designs---may reveal common patterns and standard
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boiling water reactors, and advanced designs---may reveal common patterns and
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ambiguities amenable to systematic resolution. This cross-design analysis would
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standard ambiguities amenable to systematic resolution. This cross-design
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strengthen the generalizability of any proposed specification language
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analysis would strengthen the generalizability of any proposed specification
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extensions, ensuring they address industry-wide practices rather than specific
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language extensions, ensuring they address industry-wide practices rather
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quirks.
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than specific quirks.
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