M Writing/ERLM/main.aux M Writing/ERLM/main.fdb_latexmk M Writing/ERLM/main.fls M Writing/ERLM/main.log M Writing/ERLM/main.pdf M Writing/ERLM/main.synctex.gz M Writing/ERLM/main.tex M Writing/ERLM/research-approach/v1.tex
240 lines
13 KiB
TeX
240 lines
13 KiB
TeX
\section{Research Approach}
|
|
|
|
This research will overcome the limitations of current practice to build
|
|
high-assurance hybrid control systems for critical infrastructure. To achieve
|
|
this goal, we must accomplish three main thrusts:
|
|
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
\item Translate operating procedures and requirements into temporal logic
|
|
formulae
|
|
|
|
\item Create the discrete half of a hybrid controller using reactive synthesis
|
|
|
|
\item Develop continuous controllers to operate between modes, and verify
|
|
their correctness using reachability analysis, barrier certificates, and
|
|
assume-guarantee contracts
|
|
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
|
|
The following sections discuss how these thrusts will be accomplished.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Requirements: $(Procedures \wedge FRET) \rightarrow Temporal Specifications$}
|
|
|
|
% COMMENT: Consider strengthening this opening with specific examples or
|
|
% statistics about nuclear plant automation levels vs other industries
|
|
|
|
The motivation behind this work stems from the fact that commercial nuclear
|
|
power operations remain manually controlled by human operators, despite
|
|
significant advances in control systems sophistication. The key insight is that
|
|
procedures performed by human operators are highly prescriptive and
|
|
well-documented. This suggests that human operators in nuclear power plants
|
|
may not be entirely necessary given today's available technology.
|
|
|
|
Written procedures and requirements in nuclear power are sufficiently detailed
|
|
that we may be able to translate them into logical formulae with minimal
|
|
effort. If successful, this approach would enable automation of existing
|
|
procedures without requiring system reengineering—a significant advantage for
|
|
deployment in existing facilities. The most efficient path to accomplish this
|
|
translation is through automated tools such as NASA's Formal Requirement
|
|
Elicitation Tool (FRET).
|
|
|
|
% COMMENT: Consider adding a brief example of a nuclear procedure that would
|
|
% benefit from this approach
|
|
|
|
FRET employs a specialized requirements language similar to natural language
|
|
called FRETish. FRETish restricts requirements to easily understood components
|
|
while eliminating ambiguity. FRET enforces this structure by requiring all
|
|
requirements to contain six components: %CITE FRET MANUAL
|
|
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
\item Scope: \textit{What modes does this requirement apply to?}
|
|
\item Condition: \textit{Scope plus additional specificity}
|
|
\item Component: \textit{What system element does this requirement affect?}
|
|
\item Shall
|
|
\item Timing: \textit{When does the response occur?}
|
|
\item Response: \textit{What action should be taken?}
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
|
|
% COMMENT: The realizability discussion could be clearer - consider defining
|
|
% "realizable" more precisely upfront
|
|
|
|
FRET provides functionality to check the \textit{realizability} of a system.
|
|
Realizability analysis determines whether written requirements are complete by
|
|
examining the six structural components. Complete requirements are those that
|
|
neither conflict with one another nor leave any behavior undefined. Systems
|
|
that are not realizable from their procedure definitions and design
|
|
requirements present problems beyond autonomous control implementation. Such
|
|
systems contain behavioral inconsistencies that represent the physical
|
|
equivalent of software bugs. Using FRET during autonomous controller
|
|
development allows us to identify and resolve these errors systematically.
|
|
|
|
The second category of realizability issues involves undefined behaviors that
|
|
are typically left to human judgment during control operations. This
|
|
ambiguity is undesirable for high-assurance systems, since even well-trained
|
|
humans remain prone to errors. By addressing these specification gaps in FRET
|
|
during autonomous controller development, we can deliver controllers free from
|
|
these vulnerabilities.
|
|
|
|
% COMMENT: This transition could be smoother - consider adding a sentence about
|
|
% how the temporal logic output connects to the next section
|
|
|
|
FRET also provides the capability to export requirements in temporal logic
|
|
format. This export functionality enables progression to the next step of our
|
|
approach: synthesizing discrete mode switching behavior from the formalized
|
|
requirements.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Discrete Synthesis: $(TemporalLogic \wedge ReactiveSynthesis) \rightarrow
|
|
DiscreteAutomata$}
|
|
|
|
This section describes how the discrete component of the hybrid system will be
|
|
constructed. The formal specifications created in FRET will be processed by
|
|
reactive synthesis tools to generate mode switching components. These
|
|
components effectively automate the human decision-making elements of reactor
|
|
operation by implementing the logic typically specified in written procedures.
|
|
By eliminating the human component from control decisions, we remove the
|
|
possibility of human error and advance hybrid system autonomy.
|
|
|
|
Reactive synthesis is an active research field in computer science focused on
|
|
generating discrete controllers from temporal logic specifications. The term
|
|
"reactive" indicates that the system responds to environmental inputs to
|
|
produce control outputs. These synthesized systems are finite in size, where
|
|
each node represents a unique discrete state. The connections between nodes,
|
|
called \textit{state transitions}, specify the conditions under which the
|
|
discrete controller moves from state to state. This complete mapping of
|
|
possible states and transitions constitutes a \textit{discrete automaton}.
|
|
From the automaton graph, it becomes possible to fully describe the dynamics
|
|
of the discrete system and develop intuitive understanding of system behavior.
|
|
Once constructed, the automaton can be straightforwardly implemented using
|
|
standard programming control flow constructs.
|
|
|
|
% COMMENT: The "correct by construction" concept is important - consider
|
|
% expanding this explanation slightly
|
|
|
|
We will use discrete automata to represent the switching behavior of our hybrid
|
|
system. This approach yields an important theoretical guarantee: because the
|
|
discrete automaton is synthesized entirely through automated tools from design
|
|
requirements and operating procedures, we can prove that the automaton—and
|
|
therefore our hybrid switching behavior—is correct by construction.
|
|
|
|
Correctness of the switching controller is paramount to this work. Mode
|
|
switching represents the primary responsibility of human operators in control
|
|
rooms today. Human operators possess the advantage of real-time judgment—when
|
|
mistakes occur, they can correct them dynamically with capabilities that
|
|
extend beyond written procedures. Autonomous control lacks this adaptive
|
|
advantage. Instead, we must ensure that autonomous controllers replacing human
|
|
operators will not make switching errors between continuous modes. By
|
|
synthesizing controllers from logical specifications with guaranteed
|
|
correctness, we eliminate the possibility of switching errors.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{$(DiscreteAutomata \wedge ControlTheory \wedge Reachability)
|
|
\rightarrow ContinuousModes$}
|
|
|
|
While discrete system components will be synthesized with correctness
|
|
guarantees, they represent only half of the complete system. Autonomous
|
|
controllers like those we are developing exhibit continuous dynamics within
|
|
discrete states. This section describes how we will develop continuous control
|
|
modes, verify their correctness, and address the unique verification
|
|
challenges of hybrid systems.
|
|
|
|
% COMMENT: This "glaring problem" phrasing is a bit dramatic - consider toning
|
|
% down while maintaining the technical point
|
|
|
|
First, we must address the limitation left unresolved in the previous section.
|
|
The approach described for producing discrete automata yields physics-agnostic
|
|
specifications that represent only half of a complete hybrid autonomous
|
|
controller. These automata alone cannot define the full behavior of the
|
|
control systems we aim to construct. The continuous modes will be developed
|
|
after discrete automaton construction, leveraging the automaton structure and
|
|
transitions to design multiple smaller, specialized continuous controllers.
|
|
|
|
The discrete automaton transitions are key to the supervisory behavior of the
|
|
autonomous controller. These transitions mark decision points for switching
|
|
between continuous control modes and define their strategic objectives. We
|
|
will classify three types of high-level continuous controller objectives based
|
|
on discrete mode transitions:
|
|
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
\item \textbf{Stabilizing:} A stabilizing control mode has one primary
|
|
objective: maintaining the hybrid system within its current discrete mode.
|
|
This corresponds to steady-state normal operating modes, such as a
|
|
full-power load-following controller in a nuclear power plant. Stabilizing
|
|
modes can be identified from discrete automata as nodes with only incoming
|
|
transitions.
|
|
|
|
\item \textbf{Transitory:} A transitory control mode has the primary goal of
|
|
transitioning the hybrid system from one discrete state to another. In
|
|
nuclear applications, this might represent a controlled warm-up procedure.
|
|
Transitory modes ultimately drive the system toward a stabilizing
|
|
steady-state mode. These modes may have secondary objectives within a
|
|
discrete state, such as maintaining specific temperature ramp rates before
|
|
reaching full-power operation.
|
|
|
|
\item \textbf{Expulsory:} An expulsory mode is a specialized transitory mode
|
|
with additional safety constraints. Expulsory modes ensure the system is
|
|
directed to a safe stabilizing mode during failure conditions. For example,
|
|
if a transitory mode fails to achieve its intended transition, the
|
|
expulsory mode activates to immediately and irreversibly guide the system
|
|
toward a globally safe state. A reactor SCRAM exemplifies an expulsory
|
|
continuous mode: when initiated, it must reliably terminate the nuclear
|
|
reaction and direct the reactor toward stabilizing decay heat removal.
|
|
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
|
|
% COMMENT: This paragraph has some word choice issues ("alieviate" ->
|
|
% "alleviate") - fixed in revision
|
|
|
|
Building continuous modes after constructing discrete automata enables local
|
|
controller design focused on satisfying discrete transitions. The primary
|
|
challenge in hybrid system verification is ensuring global stability across
|
|
transitions. Current techniques struggle with this problem because dynamic
|
|
discontinuities complicate verification. This work alleviates these problems
|
|
by designing continuous controllers specifically with transitions in mind. By
|
|
decomposing continuous modes according to their required behavior at
|
|
transition points, we avoid solving trajectories through the entire hybrid
|
|
system. Instead, we can use local behavior information at transition
|
|
boundaries.
|
|
|
|
To ensure continuous modes satisfy their requirements, we will employ three
|
|
main techniques: reachability analysis, assume-guarantee contracts, and
|
|
barrier certificates. Reachability analysis computes the reachable set of
|
|
states for a given input set. While trivial for linear continuous systems,
|
|
recent advances have extended reachability to complex nonlinear systems. We
|
|
will use reachability to define continuous state ranges at discrete transition
|
|
boundaries and verify that requirements are satisfied within continuous modes.
|
|
Assume-guarantee contracts will be employed when continuous state boundaries
|
|
are not explicitly defined. For any given mode, the input range for
|
|
reachability analysis is defined by the output ranges of discrete modes that
|
|
transition to it. This ensures each continuous controller is prepared for its
|
|
possible input range, enabling subsequent reachability analysis. Finally, we
|
|
will use barrier certificates to prove that mode transitions are satisfied.
|
|
Barrier certificates ensure that continuous modes on either side of a
|
|
transition behave appropriately. For example, a barrier certificate can
|
|
guarantee that a transitory mode transferring control to a stabilizing mode
|
|
will always move away from the transition boundary, rather than destabilizing
|
|
the target mode. Combining these three techniques will enable us to prove that
|
|
continuous components of our hybrid controller satisfy discrete requirements.
|
|
|
|
% COMMENTS FOR FUTURE REVISION:
|
|
% 1. Add concrete examples throughout (specific nuclear procedures, requirements)
|
|
% 2. Include a figure showing the overall workflow/methodology
|
|
% 3. Consider adding a subsection on validation approach
|
|
% 4. Strengthen the connections between subsections
|
|
% 5. Add discussion of limitations and assumptions
|
|
% 6. Consider reorganizing the continuous modes classification earlier
|
|
|
|
This unified approach addresses a fundamental gap in hybrid system design by
|
|
bridging formal methods and control theory through a systematic, tool-supported
|
|
methodology. By translating existing nuclear procedures into temporal logic,
|
|
synthesizing provably correct discrete switching logic, and developing
|
|
verified continuous controllers, we create a complete framework for
|
|
autonomous hybrid control with mathematical guarantees. The result is an
|
|
autonomous controller that not only replicates human operator decision-making
|
|
but does so with formal assurance that switching logic is correct by
|
|
construction and continuous behavior satisfies safety requirements. This
|
|
methodology transforms nuclear reactor control from a manually intensive
|
|
operation requiring constant human oversight into a fully autonomous system
|
|
with higher reliability than human-operated alternatives. More broadly, this
|
|
approach establishes a replicable framework for developing high-assurance
|
|
autonomous controllers in any domain where operating procedures are
|
|
well-documented and safety is paramount.
|