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568549999a
@ -114,4 +114,3 @@
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{"description":"edit State of the art","entry":"20251015T215116Z","modified":"20251015T215116Z","project":"ERLM","status":"pending","uuid":"fb11e8ef-4884-4e7e-b5fa-b00bb22c27d9"}
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{"description":"Write whitepaper","due":"20251020T040000Z","entry":"20251015T215139Z","modified":"20251015T215139Z","project":"ERLM","status":"pending","uuid":"52b4cc9a-33c7-472b-b3b6-3e9504649e19","depends":["fb11e8ef-4884-4e7e-b5fa-b00bb22c27d9"]}
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{"description":"Rewrite state of the art for nuclear controls engineering and hybrid systems","due":"20250929T040000Z","end":"20251015T215159Z","entry":"20250924T164019Z","modified":"20251015T215159Z","project":"ERLM","status":"completed","uuid":"e0636009-9061-47d0-9b59-1f2464a252a7","tags":["editing"]}
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{"description":"projet:thesis Read NUREG 899","entry":"20251017T133407Z","modified":"20251017T133407Z","priority":"H","status":"pending","uuid":"f93124b9-0ec8-4aa2-8f5c-46337768bbc2","tags":["reading"]}
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@ -36,4 +36,3 @@
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[description:"Find out what 10 CFR is. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.34 and 10 CFR 55.59. Emergency Operating Procedures?" entry:"1760563307" modified:"1760563307" project:"thesis" status:"pending" uuid:"b0192186-bcbc-4d5c-a156-5e83fdfeda69"]
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[description:"edit State of the art" entry:"1760565076" modified:"1760565076" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" uuid:"fb11e8ef-4884-4e7e-b5fa-b00bb22c27d9"]
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[dep_fb11e8ef-4884-4e7e-b5fa-b00bb22c27d9:"x" depends:"fb11e8ef-4884-4e7e-b5fa-b00bb22c27d9" description:"Write whitepaper" due:"1760932800" entry:"1760565099" modified:"1760565099" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" uuid:"52b4cc9a-33c7-472b-b3b6-3e9504649e19"]
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[description:"projet:thesis Read NUREG 899" entry:"1760708047" modified:"1760708047" priority:"H" status:"pending" tags:"reading" tags_reading:"x" uuid:"f93124b9-0ec8-4aa2-8f5c-46337768bbc2"]
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@ -392,6 +392,3 @@ time 1760565119
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old [description:"Rewrite state of the art for nuclear controls engineering and hybrid systems" due:"1759118400" entry:"1758732019" modified:"1758732076" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" tags:"editing" tags_editing:"x" uuid:"e0636009-9061-47d0-9b59-1f2464a252a7"]
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new [description:"Rewrite state of the art for nuclear controls engineering and hybrid systems" due:"1759118400" end:"1760565119" entry:"1758732019" modified:"1760565119" project:"ERLM" status:"completed" tags:"editing" tags_editing:"x" uuid:"e0636009-9061-47d0-9b59-1f2464a252a7"]
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---
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time 1760708047
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new [description:"projet:thesis Read NUREG 899" entry:"1760708047" modified:"1760708047" priority:"H" status:"pending" tags:"reading" tags_reading:"x" uuid:"f93124b9-0ec8-4aa2-8f5c-46337768bbc2"]
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---
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@ -33,9 +33,6 @@ responsibility under all conditions~\cite{Kemeny1979}. This tension
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between operational flexibility and safety assurance remains unresolved
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in current practice.
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<<<<<<< HEAD
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%how are procedures tested
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=======
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Nuclear plant procedures exist in a hierarchy: normal operating procedures for
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routine operations, abnormal operating procedures for off-normal conditions,
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Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) for design-basis accidents, Severe
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@ -72,7 +69,6 @@ Safety systems instead operate with implemented automation. Reactor
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Protection Systems trip automatically on safety signals with millisecond
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response times, and engineered safety features actuate automatically on accident
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signals without operator action required.
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>>>>>>> 568549999a24c6a86f19411cbdf12b642057ade9
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The current division between automated and human-controlled functions
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reveals the fundamental challenge of hybrid control. Highly
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@ -94,34 +90,6 @@ decades of improvements in training and procedures, provides perhaps the
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most compelling motivation for formal automated control with
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mathematical safety guarantees.
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<<<<<<< HEAD
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%Whos in the control room
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%how are reactor operators trained
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% Humans are actually really bad at doing control
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%most accidents are human error
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%Three mile island
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%Human factors probabilities
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\subsection{HARDENS and Formal Methods}
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% The NRC recognizes that automation and high assurance are important things to
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% pursue
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%They put out a grant to do rigorous digital engineering
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%Won by formal methods group galois. Galois does a bunch of formal methods work.
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%What is formal methods?
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%Rigorous digital engineering to create a reactor trip system
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%details of how it worked, and limitations therein
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%Digital system ONLY
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=======
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Multiple independent analyses converge on a striking statistic: \textbf{70--80\%
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of all nuclear power plant events are attributed to human error} versus
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approximately 20\% to equipment failures~\cite{DOE-HDBK-1028-2009,WNA2020}. More
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@ -387,4 +355,3 @@ demonstrated by HARDENS, urgent safety imperatives documented by
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persistent human error statistics, and fundamental gaps in current
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hybrid dynamics treatment creates a compelling and timely research
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opportunity.
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>>>>>>> 568549999a24c6a86f19411cbdf12b642057ade9
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