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@ -114,4 +114,3 @@
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@ -36,4 +36,3 @@
[description:"Find out what 10 CFR is. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.34 and 10 CFR 55.59. Emergency Operating Procedures?" entry:"1760563307" modified:"1760563307" project:"thesis" status:"pending" uuid:"b0192186-bcbc-4d5c-a156-5e83fdfeda69"]
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@ -392,6 +392,3 @@ time 1760565119
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---
time 1760708047
new [description:"projet:thesis Read NUREG 899" entry:"1760708047" modified:"1760708047" priority:"H" status:"pending" tags:"reading" tags_reading:"x" uuid:"f93124b9-0ec8-4aa2-8f5c-46337768bbc2"]
---

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@ -33,9 +33,6 @@ responsibility under all conditions~\cite{Kemeny1979}. This tension
between operational flexibility and safety assurance remains unresolved
in current practice.
<<<<<<< HEAD
%how are procedures tested
=======
Nuclear plant procedures exist in a hierarchy: normal operating procedures for
routine operations, abnormal operating procedures for off-normal conditions,
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) for design-basis accidents, Severe
@ -72,7 +69,6 @@ Safety systems instead operate with implemented automation. Reactor
Protection Systems trip automatically on safety signals with millisecond
response times, and engineered safety features actuate automatically on accident
signals without operator action required.
>>>>>>> 568549999a24c6a86f19411cbdf12b642057ade9
The current division between automated and human-controlled functions
reveals the fundamental challenge of hybrid control. Highly
@ -94,34 +90,6 @@ decades of improvements in training and procedures, provides perhaps the
most compelling motivation for formal automated control with
mathematical safety guarantees.
<<<<<<< HEAD
%Whos in the control room
%how are reactor operators trained
% Humans are actually really bad at doing control
%most accidents are human error
%Three mile island
%Human factors probabilities
\subsection{HARDENS and Formal Methods}
% The NRC recognizes that automation and high assurance are important things to
% pursue
%They put out a grant to do rigorous digital engineering
%Won by formal methods group galois. Galois does a bunch of formal methods work.
%What is formal methods?
%Rigorous digital engineering to create a reactor trip system
%details of how it worked, and limitations therein
%Digital system ONLY
=======
Multiple independent analyses converge on a striking statistic: \textbf{70--80\%
of all nuclear power plant events are attributed to human error} versus
approximately 20\% to equipment failures~\cite{DOE-HDBK-1028-2009,WNA2020}. More
@ -387,4 +355,3 @@ demonstrated by HARDENS, urgent safety imperatives documented by
persistent human error statistics, and fundamental gaps in current
hybrid dynamics treatment creates a compelling and timely research
opportunity.
>>>>>>> 568549999a24c6a86f19411cbdf12b642057ade9