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{"id":"a54ef0f53d23c989","x":-500,"y":-380,"width":360,"height":80,"type":"text","text":"WHAT BELONGS IN THE RESEARCH APPROACH?"},
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{"id":"3d90877135704e66","x":-720,"y":-200,"width":250,"height":60,"type":"text","text":"translation of procedures"},
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{"id":"7e9f07efeeac7725","x":-625,"y":-100,"width":250,"height":60,"type":"text","text":"Temporal logic"},
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{"id":"7e9c528ccdb4a1d3","x":-220,"y":-40,"width":250,"height":60,"type":"text","text":"Guard conditions between switching"},
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{"id":"47816cf87b1f4d37","x":-65,"y":-230,"width":250,"height":60,"type":"text","text":"Reactive Synthesis"},
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{"id":"aed191c3719f280b","x":-300,"y":-140,"width":250,"height":60,"type":"text","text":"Discrete automata"},
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{"id":"1f085c02451b41bf","x":80,"y":-110,"width":250,"height":60,"type":"text","text":"Continuous systems as transitions"}
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# ERLM Proposal Writing Review - Executive Summary
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**Date**: December 2, 2025 **Reviewer**: Claude Code
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**Framework**: Gopen's Sense of Structure
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---
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## Overview
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This proposal demonstrates strong technical content, clear
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methodology, and comprehensive coverage of all required
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||||||
elements. The research approach is well-conceived, and the
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progression from problem statement through solution is
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logical. The writing is generally clear and professional.
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**Key Strengths:**
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- Excellent technical depth and specificity
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- Strong motivation established through human factors
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statistics
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- Clear three-thrust research structure
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- Comprehensive risk analysis with concrete contingencies
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- Good use of specific examples (TMI accident, HARDENS
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project)
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**Priority Areas for Revision:**
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- Sentence-level: Strengthen stress positions to emphasize
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key claims
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- Paragraph-level: Sharpen point-issue structure in some
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sections
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- Section-level: Tighten organization in State of the Art
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section
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- Big picture: Strengthen "so what" connections throughout
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---
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## Priority Issues (Top 10)
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### 1. **SOTA Section Length and Organization**
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[SECTION-LEVEL] **Location**: State of the Art section (358
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lines) **Issue**: The SOTA section is the longest in the
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proposal and covers multiple distinct topics (current
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procedures, human factors, HARDENS). While comprehensive, it
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risks overwhelming readers and obscuring your key
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contributions. **Impact**: HIGH - Reviewers may lose track
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of your argument in the density **Recommendation**:
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Consider restructuring with clearer signposting. Each
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subsection should explicitly connect back to what gap
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you're filling. The current "\textbf{LIMITATION:}" callouts
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are excellent—ensure every major subsection has one.
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### 2. **Weak Stress Positions Throughout** [SENTENCE-LEVEL]
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**Location**: All sections, especially Goals and State of
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the Art **Issue**: Many sentences place old/known
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information in stress position (sentence-final), missing
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opportunities to emphasize new claims **Impact**:
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MEDIUM-HIGH - Reduces rhetorical impact of key claims **See
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Pattern**: "Stress Position Weakness" below for examples and
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fixes
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### 3. **Missing "So What" Connections** [BIG PICTURE]
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**Location**: Transitions between major sections **Issue**:
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The proposal moves from problem → approach → metrics without
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always explicitly stating "this matters because..." at
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transition points **Impact**: MEDIUM-HIGH - Reviewers may
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not fully grasp significance **Recommendation**: Add
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explicit "if successful, this enables..." statements at the
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end of Goals section and beginning of Metrics section
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### 4. **Passive Voice Obscuring Agency** [SENTENCE-LEVEL]
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**Location**: Research Approach, especially subsection
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introductions **Issue**: Passive constructions like "will be
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employed" and "will be used" hide who does what and reduce
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directness **Impact**: MEDIUM - Reduces clarity and makes
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writing feel less confident **See Pattern**: "Passive Voice"
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below
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### 5. **Point-Issue Structure in Paragraphs**
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[PARAGRAPH-LEVEL] **Location**: State of the Art, Risk
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sections **Issue**: Some paragraphs present information
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without first establishing why readers should care (the
|
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"issue") **Impact**: MEDIUM - Readers may wonder "why are
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you telling me this?" **See Pattern**: "Point-Issue
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Structure" below
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### 6. **Topic String Breaks** [PARAGRAPH-LEVEL]
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**Location**: Research Approach, subsection transitions
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**Issue**: Topic position doesn't always establish clear
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continuity from previous sentence, forcing readers to
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reconstruct connections **Impact**: MEDIUM - Increases
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cognitive load **See Pattern**: "Topic Position &
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Continuity" below
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### 7. **Nominalization Hiding Action** [SENTENCE-LEVEL]
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**Location**: Throughout, especially Research Approach
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**Issue**: Action buried in nouns (e.g., "implementation"
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instead of "implement", "verification" instead of "verify")
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**Impact**: MEDIUM - Makes writing feel static rather than
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dynamic **Recommendation**: Convert nominalizations to
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active verbs where possible
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### 8. **Long Complex Sentences** [SENTENCE-LEVEL]
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**Location**: State of the Art (lines 45-51), Risks (lines
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72-79) **Issue**: Some sentences exceed 40-50 words with
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multiple subordinate clauses, challenging comprehension
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**Impact**: MEDIUM - Reviewers may have to re-read
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**Recommendation**: Break into 2-3 shorter sentences with
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clear logical flow
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### 9. **Subsection Balance in Risks Section**
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[SECTION-LEVEL] **Location**: Risks and Contingencies
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section **Issue**: Four subsections of vastly different
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lengths (computational tractability gets more space than
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discrete-continuous interface, despite latter being more
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fundamental) **Impact**: LOW-MEDIUM - May suggest misaligned
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priorities **Recommendation**: Consider whether space
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allocation reflects actual risk magnitude
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### 10. **Broader Impacts Underutilized** [BIG PICTURE]
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**Location**: Broader Impacts section (75 lines vs 358 for
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SOTA) **Issue**: This section is relatively brief given that
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economic impact is a major motivation for SMRs **Impact**:
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LOW-MEDIUM - Missing opportunity to strengthen value
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proposition **Recommendation**: Consider expanding economic
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analysis or adding brief discussion of workforce/educational
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impacts
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---
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## Key Patterns Identified
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### Pattern 1: Stress Position Weakness
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**Principle** (Gopen): The stress position (end of sentence)
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should contain the most important new information. Readers
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expect climax at sentence-end and are disappointed when they
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find old information or weak phrases there.
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**Example 1** (Goals and Outcomes, lines 13-17): ```
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Current: "Currently, nuclear plant operations rely on
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extensively trained human operators who follow detailed
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written procedures and strict regulatory requirements to
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manage reactor control." ```
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- **Issue**: Sentence ends with "manage reactor control"—a
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restatement of the opening. The key claim is buried
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mid-sentence: "extensively trained...detailed
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procedures...strict requirements"
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- **Fixed**: "Currently, nuclear plant operations require
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extensively trained human operators following detailed
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written procedures under strict regulatory requirements."
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**Example 2** (State of the Art, lines 53-54): ``` Current:
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"Procedures lack formal verification of correctness and
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completeness." ```
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- **Issue**: Ends weakly with "completeness" which is minor
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compared to the bigger issue
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- **Fixed**: "Procedures lack formal verification, leaving
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correctness and completeness unproven."
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**Example 3** (Research Approach, lines 41-42): ``` Current:
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"The following sections discuss how these thrusts will be
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accomplished." ```
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- **Issue**: Pure metadiscourse in stress position, provides
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no new information
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- **Fixed**: Delete this sentence—the enumeration provides
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sufficient transition, or combine with previous sentence:
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"...through three main thrusts, each detailed below."
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**Similar instances**:
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- Goals lines 29-32: "...we will combine formal methods..."
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- State of the Art lines 81-85: "...no application of hybrid
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control theory exists..."
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- Research Approach lines 115-116: "...enable progression to
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the next step..."
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- Metrics lines 29-31: "...makes this metric directly
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relevant..."
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- Risks lines 12-13: "...identification of remaining
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barriers to deployment"
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**How to fix**: Identify the most important new claim in
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each sentence and move it to the end. Often this means
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converting from "X does Y to achieve Z" to "X achieves Z by
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doing Y."
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---
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### Pattern 2: Passive Voice Obscuring Agency
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**Principle** (Gopen): Passive voice obscures who does what
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and reduces directness. In proposal writing, active voice
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demonstrates confidence and control. Use passive only when
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the agent is truly unimportant or unknown.
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**Example 1** (Research Approach, line 118): ``` Current:
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"We will employ state-of-the-art reactive synthesis
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tools..." ```
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- **Issue**: "Employ" is weak; you're not hiring the tools,
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you're using them
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- **Better**: "We will use Strix, a state-of-the-art
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reactive synthesis tool..."
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- **Best**: "Strix will translate our temporal logic
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specifications into deterministic automata..." (Shows what
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the tool *does*, not just that you'll use it)
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**Example 2** (Research Approach, line 207): ``` Current:
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"Control barrier functions will be employed when..." ```
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- **Issue**: Passive—who employs them? And "employed" sounds
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formal/stuffy
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- **Fixed**: "We will use control barrier functions to
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verify..." or better "Control barrier functions verify..."
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**Example 3** (Metrics, line 67): ``` Current: "This
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milestone delivers an internal technical report..." ```
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- **Issue**: Milestones don't deliver, people do
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- **Fixed**: "We will deliver an internal technical report
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documenting..."
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**Similar instances**:
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- Research Approach lines 161, 175, 206, 220: "will be
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employed", "will be developed", "will be used"
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- Metrics lines 69, 73, 79, 84: "...delivers a [document]"
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- Risks lines 57, 109, 163: various passives
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**How to fix**:
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1. Identify the real agent (usually "we")
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2. Make agent the subject: "We will X" or "X will Y"
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3. Choose strong active verbs: use/apply/develop/verify (not
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employ/utilize)
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---
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### Pattern 3: Point-Issue Structure Weakness
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**Principle** (Gopen): Paragraphs should begin by
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establishing (1) the point/claim being made and (2) why it
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matters (the issue). Discussion then supports that point.
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Readers need context before details.
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**Example 1** (State of the Art, lines 88-107): ``` Current
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paragraph begins: "The persistent role of human error in
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nuclear safety incidents, despite decades of
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improvements..." ```
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- **Analysis**: This paragraph immediately dives into the
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"persistent role" without first establishing why we're
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discussing human factors at all. Reader thinks: "Wait,
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weren't we just talking about procedures?"
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- **Fixed**: Add issue statement first: "Human factors
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provide the most compelling motivation for formal automated
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control. Despite decades of improvements in training and
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procedures, human error persists in 70-80% of nuclear
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incidents—suggesting that operator-based control faces
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fundamental, not remediable, limitations."
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**Example 2** (Risks, first paragraph): ``` Current: "This
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research relies on several critical assumptions that, if
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invalidated, would require scope adjustment..." ```
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- **Analysis**: Good—this establishes both point (critical
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assumptions exist) and issue (invalidity requires
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adjustment) immediately. The paragraph then delivers on this
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promise. This is a good model!
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**Example 3** (Research Approach, lines 166-169): ```
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Current: "While discrete system components will be
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synthesized with correctness guarantees, they represent only
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half of the complete system." ```
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- **Analysis**: Good issue statement (discrete alone
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insufficient), but could be sharper about the point. What
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will this section show?
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- **Fixed**: "While discrete system components will be
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synthesized with correctness guarantees, they represent only
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half of the complete system. This section describes how we
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will develop continuous control modes, verify their
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correctness, and address the unique verification challenges
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at the discrete-continuous interface."
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**Similar instances**:
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- State of the Art lines 13-34: long paragraph with delayed
|
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point
|
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- Goals lines 103-119: impact paragraph could be tighter
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- Approach lines 178-208: three-mode classification needs
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clearer framing
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**How to fix**:
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1. First sentence should state the paragraph's point
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2. Second sentence (or same sentence) should state why this
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matters
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3. Remaining sentences provide supporting detail
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---
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### Pattern 4: Topic Position & Continuity
|
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**Principle** (Gopen): The topic position (beginning of
|
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sentence) should contain old/familiar information that links
|
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to what came before. This creates flow and coherence. Abrupt
|
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topic shifts disorient readers.
|
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**Example 1** (Goals, lines 18-23): ``` Sentence 1: "...this
|
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reliance on human operators prevents the introduction of
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autonomous control capabilities..."
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Sentence 2: "Emerging technologies like small modular
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reactors face significantly higher per-megawatt staffing
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costs..." ```
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- **Issue**: Topic shifts abruptly from "reliance on
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operators" to "emerging technologies". Connection exists
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(both about staffing challenges) but isn't explicit
|
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- **Fixed**: "...prevents autonomous control capabilities.
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This limitation creates particular challenges for emerging
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technologies like small modular reactors, which face
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significantly higher per-megawatt staffing costs..."
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**Example 2** (State of the Art, lines 234-243): ```
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Sentence about what HARDENS addressed: "...discrete digital
|
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control logic..."
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Next sentence: "However, the project did not address
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continuous dynamics..." ```
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||||||
- **Analysis**: Good use of "however, the project" in topic
|
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position—maintains focus on HARDENS while pivoting to
|
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limitation. This is a good model!
|
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||||||
|
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||||||
**Example 3** (Research Approach, lines 56-58): ``` Sentence
|
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||||||
1: "...we may be able to translate them into logical
|
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||||||
formulae..."
|
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||||||
|
|
||||||
Sentence 2: "Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) provides four
|
|
||||||
fundamental operators..." ```
|
|
||||||
- **Issue**: Abrupt topic shift from "translating
|
|
||||||
procedures" to "LTL provides". Missing: why LTL? Why now?
|
|
||||||
- **Fixed**: "...translate them into logical formulae. To
|
|
||||||
formalize these procedures, we will use Linear Temporal
|
|
||||||
Logic (LTL), which provides four fundamental operators..."
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Similar instances**:
|
|
||||||
- Goals lines 23-27: "emerging technologies" → "what is
|
|
||||||
needed"
|
|
||||||
- State of the Art lines 72-74: control modes → division
|
|
||||||
between automated/human
|
|
||||||
- Approach lines 183-185: stabilizing mode example →
|
|
||||||
transitory mode definition
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**How to fix**:
|
|
||||||
1. Identify the topic of the previous sentence
|
|
||||||
2. Begin next sentence with something related to that topic
|
|
||||||
3. Use transitional phrases when shifting topics: "This
|
|
||||||
[previous thing] leads to [new thing]"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Pattern 5: Long Complex Sentences
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Principle**: Sentences with multiple subordinate clauses
|
|
||||||
(especially over 35-40 words) tax reader working memory.
|
|
||||||
Breaking into multiple sentences often improves clarity
|
|
||||||
without losing sophistication.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Example 1** (State of the Art, lines 48-51): ``` Current
|
|
||||||
(51 words): "Procedures undergo technical evaluation,
|
|
||||||
simulator validation testing, and biennial review as part of
|
|
||||||
operator requalification under 10 CFR 55.59, but despite
|
|
||||||
these rigorous development processes, procedures
|
|
||||||
fundamentally lack formal verification of key safety
|
|
||||||
properties." ```
|
|
||||||
- **Issue**: Long sentence with list, subordinate clause,
|
|
||||||
and contrast—hard to parse
|
|
||||||
- **Fixed (2 sentences)**: "Procedures undergo technical
|
|
||||||
evaluation, simulator validation testing, and biennial
|
|
||||||
review as part of operator requalification under 10 CFR
|
|
||||||
55.59. Despite these rigorous development processes,
|
|
||||||
procedures fundamentally lack formal verification of key
|
|
||||||
safety properties."
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Example 2** (Risks, lines 72-78): ``` Current (57 words):
|
|
||||||
"Temporal logic operates on boolean predicates, while
|
|
||||||
continuous control requires reasoning about differential
|
|
||||||
equations and reachable sets, and guard conditions that
|
|
||||||
require complex nonlinear predicates may resist boolean
|
|
||||||
abstraction, making synthesis intractable." ```
|
|
||||||
- **Issue**: Run-on with multiple clauses strung together
|
|
||||||
with commas
|
|
||||||
- **Fixed (3 sentences)**: "Temporal logic operates on
|
|
||||||
boolean predicates, while continuous control requires
|
|
||||||
reasoning about differential equations and reachable sets.
|
|
||||||
Guard conditions requiring complex nonlinear predicates may
|
|
||||||
resist boolean abstraction. This mismatch could make
|
|
||||||
synthesis intractable."
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Similar instances**:
|
|
||||||
- State of the Art lines 44-51: procedure development
|
|
||||||
description
|
|
||||||
- Research Approach lines 40-45: hybrid system description
|
|
||||||
- Risks lines 17-24: computational tractability discussion
|
|
||||||
- Broader Impacts lines 13-23: economic analysis
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**How to fix**:
|
|
||||||
1. Identify natural breakpoints (usually where you have
|
|
||||||
"and" or "but")
|
|
||||||
2. Create new sentences at these breaks
|
|
||||||
3. Ensure each new sentence has clear topic position
|
|
||||||
4. May need to repeat/reference previous sentence's subject
|
|
||||||
for clarity
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Section-Level Issues
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Goals and Outcomes Section **Strengths**: Excellent
|
|
||||||
structure with clear goal → problem → approach → outcomes →
|
|
||||||
impact progression. The four-paragraph opening is very
|
|
||||||
strong.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Issues**:
|
|
||||||
- Lines 29-53 (Approach paragraph): This is dense and tries
|
|
||||||
to cover too much. Consider breaking into two paragraphs:
|
|
||||||
one on the approach concept, one on the hypothesis and
|
|
||||||
rationale.
|
|
||||||
- Outcomes enumeration: Very clear, but could strengthen the
|
|
||||||
transition from strategy to outcome in each item. Currently
|
|
||||||
reads as "we'll do X. [new sentence] This enables Y."
|
|
||||||
Consider: "We'll do X, enabling Y."
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### State of the Art Section **Strengths**: Comprehensive,
|
|
||||||
well-researched, excellent use of the HARDENS case study as
|
|
||||||
both positive example and gap identifier.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Issues**:
|
|
||||||
- **Length**: At 358 lines, this risks losing readers. Most
|
|
||||||
concerning: readers may forget your framing by the time they
|
|
||||||
reach your contribution.
|
|
||||||
- **Organization**: Four major subsections (procedures,
|
|
||||||
human factors, HARDENS, research imperative) would benefit
|
|
||||||
from a roadmap sentence at the beginning: "To understand the
|
|
||||||
need for hybrid control synthesis, we first examine..."
|
|
||||||
- **Balance**: HARDENS subsection is 89 lines—nearly 25% of
|
|
||||||
SOTA. While impressive, consider whether this should be a
|
|
||||||
separate section or whether some detail could move to an
|
|
||||||
appendix.
|
|
||||||
- **Transition to Approach**: The "Research Imperative"
|
|
||||||
subsection is excellent but feels like it belongs at the
|
|
||||||
start of Research Approach rather than end of SOTA.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Research Approach Section **Strengths**: Clear
|
|
||||||
three-thrust structure, good use of equations and examples,
|
|
||||||
strong technical detail.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Issues**:
|
|
||||||
- **Subsection transitions**: The transitions between the
|
|
||||||
three main subsections (Procedures→Temporal,
|
|
||||||
Temporal→Discrete, Discrete→Continuous) could be smoother.
|
|
||||||
Each starts somewhat abruptly.
|
|
||||||
- **SmAHTR introduction**: The SmAHTR demonstration case is
|
|
||||||
introduced suddenly at line 253. Consider introducing it
|
|
||||||
earlier (perhaps in Goals section or at start of Approach)
|
|
||||||
so readers know it's coming.
|
|
||||||
- **Three-mode classification**: Lines 178-208 present the
|
|
||||||
stabilizing/transitory/expulsory framework, which is
|
|
||||||
innovative. This deserves more prominence—consider
|
|
||||||
highlighting it as a key contribution.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Metrics of Success Section **Strengths**: TRL framework
|
|
||||||
is well-justified, progression through levels is clear.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Issues**:
|
|
||||||
- **Defensive tone**: Lines 11-30 spend considerable space
|
|
||||||
justifying why TRL is appropriate. This is good but could be
|
|
||||||
more concise. Consider: one paragraph on why TRLs (lines
|
|
||||||
10-19) rather than two.
|
|
||||||
- **Grading criteria**: The TRL definitions (3, 4, 5) are
|
|
||||||
excellent. Very concrete and measurable.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Risks and Contingencies Section **Strengths**:
|
|
||||||
Comprehensive, each risk has indicators and contingencies,
|
|
||||||
well-organized.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Issues**:
|
|
||||||
- **Subsection balance**: Four subsections range from 41
|
|
||||||
lines (computational) to 65 lines (discrete-continuous).
|
|
||||||
Ensure space reflects actual risk level.
|
|
||||||
- **Mitigation vs. contingency**: Some subsections blur
|
|
||||||
"mitigation" (preventing problems) and "contingency"
|
|
||||||
(response if they occur). Consider clarifying this
|
|
||||||
structure.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Broader Impacts Section **Strengths**: Clear economic
|
|
||||||
motivation, good connection to SMRs and datacenter
|
|
||||||
application.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Issues**:
|
|
||||||
- **Brevity**: At 75 lines, this is the shortest technical
|
|
||||||
section. Given that economic viability is a key motivation,
|
|
||||||
consider expanding.
|
|
||||||
- **Missed opportunities**: Could briefly mention
|
|
||||||
workforce/educational impacts (training future engineers in
|
|
||||||
formal methods), equity (providing reliable clean energy to
|
|
||||||
underserved areas), broader applicability beyond nuclear.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Budget Section **Brief review**: Budget is
|
|
||||||
comprehensive, well-justified, appropriate. Minor note:
|
|
||||||
Consider whether the high-performance workstation (Year 1)
|
|
||||||
might need upgrades in Year 2-3 as synthesis scales up.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Schedule Section **Brief review**: Schedule is ambitious
|
|
||||||
but realistic. Six trimesters for dissertation research is
|
|
||||||
reasonable. Publication strategy is smart (nuclear community
|
|
||||||
first, then broader control theory community). Minor note:
|
|
||||||
Line 73 has a space issue ("t ranslation").
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Big Picture Observations
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Narrative and Argument Structure
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Strengths**:
|
|
||||||
- Clear problem-solution arc: operators make errors →
|
|
||||||
procedures lack formal guarantees → hybrid control synthesis
|
|
||||||
provides guarantees
|
|
||||||
- Good use of motivating examples (TMI, human error
|
|
||||||
statistics, HARDENS)
|
|
||||||
- Technical progression is logical: discrete synthesis →
|
|
||||||
continuous verification → integrated system
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Opportunities**:
|
|
||||||
1. **Strengthen "so what" transitions**: The proposal
|
|
||||||
sometimes presents information without explicitly stating
|
|
||||||
significance. Add more "This matters because..." statements.
|
|
||||||
2. **Emphasize novelty earlier**: The three-mode
|
|
||||||
classification and discrete-continuous interface
|
|
||||||
verification are novel contributions. Signal this earlier
|
|
||||||
and more explicitly.
|
|
||||||
3. **Create more callbacks**: When describing Research
|
|
||||||
Approach, refer back to specific limitations identified in
|
|
||||||
State of the Art. Currently these connections are implicit.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Rhetorical Effectiveness
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Credibility established through**:
|
|
||||||
- Comprehensive literature review
|
|
||||||
- Specific technical detail
|
|
||||||
- Access to industry hardware (Emerson partnership)
|
|
||||||
- Prior conference recognition (best student paper)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Value proposition**:
|
|
||||||
- Clear economic impact (O&M cost reduction)
|
|
||||||
- Safety improvement (mathematical guarantees vs. human
|
|
||||||
operators)
|
|
||||||
- Broader applicability (methodology generalizes)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Could strengthen**:
|
|
||||||
- More explicit statements of what's novel vs. what's
|
|
||||||
established practice
|
|
||||||
- Stronger emphasis on the unique combination of discrete
|
|
||||||
synthesis + continuous verification (others do one or the
|
|
||||||
other, not both)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Content Gaps and Consistency
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Terminology**:
|
|
||||||
- Generally consistent
|
|
||||||
- Good introduction of technical terms (hybrid automata,
|
|
||||||
temporal logic, reachability analysis)
|
|
||||||
- Minor: "correct by construction" vs. "provably
|
|
||||||
correct"—used interchangeably, which is fine, but could note
|
|
||||||
they're synonymous
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Scope consistency**:
|
|
||||||
- Excellent—stays focused on startup procedures for SmAHTR
|
|
||||||
- Appropriately acknowledges limitations (TRL 5, not
|
|
||||||
deployment-ready)
|
|
||||||
- Risk section addresses what happens if scope must narrow
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Potential gaps**:
|
|
||||||
1. **Cybersecurity**: Not mentioned. For autonomous nuclear
|
|
||||||
control, shouldn't there be at least a paragraph on security
|
|
||||||
verification?
|
|
||||||
2. **Regulatory path**: You mention "regulatory
|
|
||||||
requirements" but don't detail what NRC approval process
|
|
||||||
would look like. Even a paragraph would strengthen
|
|
||||||
credibility.
|
|
||||||
3. **Comparison with alternatives**: What about machine
|
|
||||||
learning approaches to autonomous control? Worth a paragraph
|
|
||||||
explaining why formal methods are superior for
|
|
||||||
safety-critical systems.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Gopen Framework Quick Reference
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Stress Position**: End of sentence should contain most
|
|
||||||
important new information. Readers expect climax there.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Topic Position**: Beginning of sentence should contain
|
|
||||||
familiar information that links to previous sentence.
|
|
||||||
Creates flow.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Point-Issue Structure**: Paragraphs should open by stating
|
|
||||||
(1) the point/claim and (2) why it matters, before providing
|
|
||||||
supporting detail.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Topic String**: The chain of topics across sentences in a
|
|
||||||
paragraph. Strong topic strings create coherence; broken
|
|
||||||
ones confuse readers.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Old→New Information Flow**: Information should flow from
|
|
||||||
familiar (old) to unfamiliar (new) within sentences and
|
|
||||||
paragraphs.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Next Steps
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
1. **Start with Priority Issues 1-3**: These have the
|
|
||||||
highest impact
|
|
||||||
2. **Apply Patterns**: Use the pattern examples to fix
|
|
||||||
similar instances throughout
|
|
||||||
3. **Consult Detailed Document**: For comprehensive
|
|
||||||
checkbox-by-checkbox revisions
|
|
||||||
4. **Section-by-section revision**: Work through one section
|
|
||||||
at a time, applying patterns
|
|
||||||
5. **Final pass for consistency**: Ensure changes maintain
|
|
||||||
consistent terminology and tone
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This proposal has strong technical content and a solid
|
|
||||||
structure. The revisions suggested here will strengthen
|
|
||||||
clarity, emphasize key contributions, and make the argument
|
|
||||||
even more compelling for reviewers. Good luck with your
|
|
||||||
revisions!
|
|
||||||
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@ -1,547 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
% Foundational Papers
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{alur1995algorithmic,
|
|
||||||
title={The algorithmic analysis of hybrid systems},
|
|
||||||
author={Alur, Rajeev and Courcoubetis, Costas and Halbwachs, Nicolas and Henzinger, Thomas A and Ho, Pei-Hsin and Nicollin, Xavier and Olivero, Alfredo and Sifakis, Joseph and Yovine, Sergio},
|
|
||||||
journal={Theoretical Computer Science},
|
|
||||||
volume={138},
|
|
||||||
number={1},
|
|
||||||
pages={3--34},
|
|
||||||
year={1995},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Elsevier}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@inproceedings{alur1993hybrid,
|
|
||||||
title={Hybrid automata: An algorithmic approach to the specification and verification of hybrid systems},
|
|
||||||
author={Alur, Rajeev and Courcoubetis, Costas and Henzinger, Thomas A and Ho, Pei-Hsin},
|
|
||||||
booktitle={Hybrid Systems},
|
|
||||||
pages={209--229},
|
|
||||||
year={1993},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Springer}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{mitchell2005time,
|
|
||||||
title={A time-dependent Hamilton-Jacobi formulation of reachable sets for continuous dynamic games},
|
|
||||||
author={Mitchell, Ian M and Bayen, Alexandre M and Tomlin, Claire J},
|
|
||||||
journal={IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control},
|
|
||||||
volume={50},
|
|
||||||
number={7},
|
|
||||||
pages={947--957},
|
|
||||||
year={2005},
|
|
||||||
publisher={IEEE}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{platzer2008differential,
|
|
||||||
title={Differential dynamic logic for hybrid systems},
|
|
||||||
author={Platzer, Andr{\'e}},
|
|
||||||
journal={Journal of Automated Reasoning},
|
|
||||||
volume={41},
|
|
||||||
number={2},
|
|
||||||
pages={143--189},
|
|
||||||
year={2008},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Springer}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{platzer2017complete,
|
|
||||||
title={A complete uniform substitution calculus for differential dynamic logic},
|
|
||||||
author={Platzer, Andr{\'e}},
|
|
||||||
journal={Journal of Automated Reasoning},
|
|
||||||
volume={59},
|
|
||||||
number={2},
|
|
||||||
pages={219--265},
|
|
||||||
year={2017},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Springer}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@inproceedings{donze2010robust,
|
|
||||||
title={Robust satisfaction of temporal logic over real-valued signals},
|
|
||||||
author={Donz{\'e}, Alexandre and Maler, Oded},
|
|
||||||
booktitle={International Conference on Formal Modeling and Analysis of Timed Systems},
|
|
||||||
pages={92--106},
|
|
||||||
year={2010},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Springer}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% Control Theory and Stability
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{geromel2006stability,
|
|
||||||
title={Stability and stabilization of continuous-time switched linear systems},
|
|
||||||
author={Geromel, Jos{\'e} C and Colaneri, Patrizio},
|
|
||||||
journal={SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization},
|
|
||||||
volume={45},
|
|
||||||
number={5},
|
|
||||||
pages={1915--1930},
|
|
||||||
year={2006},
|
|
||||||
publisher={SIAM}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@book{liberzon2003switching,
|
|
||||||
title={Switching in systems and control},
|
|
||||||
author={Liberzon, Daniel},
|
|
||||||
year={2003},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Birkh{\"a}user Boston}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{branicky1998multiple,
|
|
||||||
title={Multiple Lyapunov functions and other analysis tools for switched and hybrid systems},
|
|
||||||
author={Branicky, Michael S},
|
|
||||||
journal={IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control},
|
|
||||||
volume={43},
|
|
||||||
number={4},
|
|
||||||
pages={475--482},
|
|
||||||
year={1998},
|
|
||||||
publisher={IEEE}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% Recent Advances (2020-2025)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{yang2024learning,
|
|
||||||
title={Learning Local Control Barrier Functions for Hybrid Systems},
|
|
||||||
author={Yang, Shuo and Chen, Yiwei and Yin, Xiang and Mangharam, Rahul},
|
|
||||||
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.14907},
|
|
||||||
year={2024}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@inproceedings{su2024switching,
|
|
||||||
title={Switching Controller Synthesis for Hybrid Systems Against STL Formulas},
|
|
||||||
author={Su, Mingyu and Vizel, Yakir and Vardi, Moshe Y},
|
|
||||||
booktitle={International Symposium on Formal Methods},
|
|
||||||
pages={231--248},
|
|
||||||
year={2024},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Springer}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{yao2024model,
|
|
||||||
title={Model predictive control of stochastic hybrid systems with signal temporal logic constraints},
|
|
||||||
author={Yao, Li and Wang, Yiming and Chen, Xiang},
|
|
||||||
journal={Automatica},
|
|
||||||
volume={159},
|
|
||||||
pages={111037},
|
|
||||||
year={2024},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Elsevier}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{yu2024online,
|
|
||||||
title={Online control synthesis for uncertain systems under signal temporal logic specifications},
|
|
||||||
author={Yu, Pian and Gao, Yulong and Jiang, Frank J and Johansson, Karl H and Dimarogonas, Dimos V},
|
|
||||||
journal={The International Journal of Robotics Research},
|
|
||||||
volume={43},
|
|
||||||
number={3},
|
|
||||||
pages={284--307},
|
|
||||||
year={2024},
|
|
||||||
publisher={SAGE}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% Tools and Frameworks
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@inproceedings{meyer2018strix,
|
|
||||||
title={Strix: Explicit reactive synthesis strikes back!},
|
|
||||||
author={Meyer, Philipp J and Luttenberger, Michael},
|
|
||||||
booktitle={International Conference on Computer Aided Verification},
|
|
||||||
pages={578--586},
|
|
||||||
year={2018},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Springer}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@techreport{giannakopoulou2022fret,
|
|
||||||
title={Capturing and Analyzing Requirements with FRET},
|
|
||||||
author={Giannakopoulou, Dimitra and Mavridou, Anastasia and Rhein, Julian and Pressburger, Thomas and Schumann, Johann and Shi, Nija},
|
|
||||||
institution={NASA Ames Research Center},
|
|
||||||
year={2022},
|
|
||||||
number={NASA/TM-20220007610}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@inproceedings{fulton2015keymaera,
|
|
||||||
title={KeYmaera X: An axiomatic tactical theorem prover for hybrid systems},
|
|
||||||
author={Fulton, Nathan and Mitsch, Stefan and Quesel, Jan-David and V{\"o}lp, Marcus and Platzer, Andr{\'e}},
|
|
||||||
booktitle={International Conference on Automated Deduction},
|
|
||||||
pages={527--538},
|
|
||||||
year={2015},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Springer}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@inproceedings{frehse2011spaceex,
|
|
||||||
title={SpaceEx: Scalable verification of hybrid systems},
|
|
||||||
author={Frehse, Goran and Le Guernic, Colas and Donz{\'e}, Alexandre and Cotton, Scott and Ray, Rajarshi and Lebeltel, Olivier and Ripado, Rodolfo and Girard, Antoine and Dang, Thao and Maler, Oded},
|
|
||||||
booktitle={International Conference on Computer Aided Verification},
|
|
||||||
pages={379--395},
|
|
||||||
year={2011},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Springer}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@inproceedings{chen2013flow,
|
|
||||||
title={Flow*: An analyzer for non-linear hybrid systems},
|
|
||||||
author={Chen, Xin and {\'A}brah{\'a}m, Erika and Sankaranarayanan, Sriram},
|
|
||||||
booktitle={International Conference on Computer Aided Verification},
|
|
||||||
pages={258--263},
|
|
||||||
year={2013},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Springer}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@inproceedings{larsen1997uppaal,
|
|
||||||
title={UPPAAL in a nutshell},
|
|
||||||
author={Larsen, Kim G and Pettersson, Paul and Yi, Wang},
|
|
||||||
journal={International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer},
|
|
||||||
volume={1},
|
|
||||||
number={1-2},
|
|
||||||
pages={134--152},
|
|
||||||
year={1997},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Springer}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% Reachability and Verification
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@INPROCEEDINGS{bansal2017hamilton,
|
|
||||||
author={Bansal, Somil and Chen, Mo and Herbert, Sylvia and Tomlin, Claire J.},
|
|
||||||
booktitle={2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)},
|
|
||||||
title={Hamilton-Jacobi reachability: A brief overview and recent advances},
|
|
||||||
year={2017},
|
|
||||||
volume={},
|
|
||||||
pages={2242-2253},
|
|
||||||
keywords={Games;Safety;Tools;Trajectory;Tutorials;Level set;Aircraft},
|
|
||||||
doi={10.1109/CDC.2017.8263977}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{althoff2021set,
|
|
||||||
title={Set propagation techniques for reachability analysis},
|
|
||||||
author={Althoff, Matthias and Frehse, Goran and Girard, Antoine},
|
|
||||||
journal={Annual Review of Control, Robotics, and Autonomous Systems},
|
|
||||||
volume={4},
|
|
||||||
pages={369--395},
|
|
||||||
year={2021},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Annual Reviews}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@inproceedings{tabuada2004compositional,
|
|
||||||
title={Compositional abstractions of hybrid control systems},
|
|
||||||
author={Tabuada, Paulo and Pappas, George J and Lima, Pedro},
|
|
||||||
journal={Discrete Event Dynamic Systems},
|
|
||||||
volume={14},
|
|
||||||
number={2},
|
|
||||||
pages={203--238},
|
|
||||||
year={2004},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Springer}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% Applications
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{varaiya1993smart,
|
|
||||||
title={Smart cars on smart roads: Problems of control},
|
|
||||||
author={Varaiya, Pravin},
|
|
||||||
journal={IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control},
|
|
||||||
volume={38},
|
|
||||||
number={2},
|
|
||||||
pages={195--207},
|
|
||||||
year={1993},
|
|
||||||
publisher={IEEE}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{verlinden2024hybrid,
|
|
||||||
title={Hybrid reliability modeling of nuclear safety systems: A case study on the reactor protection system of a research reactor},
|
|
||||||
author={Verlinden, S and Deridder, F and Wagemans, P},
|
|
||||||
journal={Nuclear Engineering and Design},
|
|
||||||
volume={417},
|
|
||||||
pages={112868},
|
|
||||||
year={2024},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Elsevier}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% Competitions and Benchmarks
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@inproceedings{hscc2024proceedings,
|
|
||||||
title={Proceedings of the 27th ACM International Conference on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control},
|
|
||||||
booktitle={HSCC '24},
|
|
||||||
year={2024},
|
|
||||||
publisher={ACM},
|
|
||||||
address={New York, NY, USA}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@inproceedings{jacobs2017syntcomp,
|
|
||||||
title={The 4th reactive synthesis competition (SYNTCOMP 2017): Benchmarks, participants \& results},
|
|
||||||
author={Jacobs, Swen and Bloem, Roderick and Brenguier, Romain and others},
|
|
||||||
booktitle={6th Workshop on Synthesis},
|
|
||||||
year={2017},
|
|
||||||
series={EPTCS},
|
|
||||||
volume={260}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% Supporting Papers
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{wabersich2018linear,
|
|
||||||
title={Linear model predictive safety certification for learning-based control},
|
|
||||||
author={Wabersich, Kim P and Zeilinger, Melanie N},
|
|
||||||
journal={Automatica},
|
|
||||||
volume={97},
|
|
||||||
pages={48--59},
|
|
||||||
year={2018},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Elsevier}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@inproceedings{prajna2004safety,
|
|
||||||
title={Safety verification of hybrid systems using barrier certificates},
|
|
||||||
author={Prajna, Stephen and Jadbabaie, Ali},
|
|
||||||
booktitle={International Workshop on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control},
|
|
||||||
pages={477--492},
|
|
||||||
year={2004},
|
|
||||||
publisher={Springer}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{ames2017control,
|
|
||||||
title={Control barrier function based quadratic programs for safety critical systems},
|
|
||||||
author={Ames, Aaron D and Xu, Xiangru and Grizzle, Jessy W and Tabuada, Paulo},
|
|
||||||
journal={IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control},
|
|
||||||
volume={62},
|
|
||||||
number={8},
|
|
||||||
pages={3861--3876},
|
|
||||||
year={2017},
|
|
||||||
publisher={IEEE}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{srinivasan2018control,
|
|
||||||
title={Control of mobile robots using barrier functions under temporal logic specifications},
|
|
||||||
author={Srinivasan, Mohit and Coogan, Samuel},
|
|
||||||
journal={IEEE Transactions on Robotics},
|
|
||||||
volume={37},
|
|
||||||
number={2},
|
|
||||||
pages={363--374},
|
|
||||||
year={2021},
|
|
||||||
publisher={IEEE}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
%broader impacts
|
|
||||||
@techreport{eia_lcoe_2022,
|
|
||||||
author = {{U.S. Energy Information Administration}},
|
|
||||||
title = {Levelized Costs of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2022},
|
|
||||||
institution = {U.S. Energy Information Administration},
|
|
||||||
year = {2022},
|
|
||||||
month = {March},
|
|
||||||
type = {Report},
|
|
||||||
url = {https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf},
|
|
||||||
note = {See Table 1b, page 9}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@misc{eesi_datacenter_2024,
|
|
||||||
author = {{Environmental and Energy Study Institute}},
|
|
||||||
title = {Data Center Energy Needs Are Upending Power Grids and Threatening the Climate},
|
|
||||||
howpublished = {Web article},
|
|
||||||
year = {2024},
|
|
||||||
url = {https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/data-center-energy-needs-are-upending-power-grids-and-threatening-the-climate},
|
|
||||||
note = {Accessed: 2025-09-29}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@techreport{DOE-HDBK-1028-2009,
|
|
||||||
title = {Human Performance Handbook},
|
|
||||||
author = {{U.S. Department of Energy}},
|
|
||||||
institution = {U.S. Department of Energy},
|
|
||||||
year = {2009},
|
|
||||||
number = {DOE-HDBK-1028-2009},
|
|
||||||
type = {Handbook}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@misc{WNA2020,
|
|
||||||
title = {Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors},
|
|
||||||
author = {{World Nuclear Association}},
|
|
||||||
year = {2020},
|
|
||||||
howpublished = {\url{https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/safety-of-nuclear-power-reactors.aspx}}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{Wang2025,
|
|
||||||
title = {Analysis of Human Error in Nuclear Power Plant Operations: A Systematic Review of Events from 2007--2020},
|
|
||||||
author = {Wang, Y. and others},
|
|
||||||
journal = {Journal of Nuclear Safety},
|
|
||||||
year = {2025},
|
|
||||||
note = {Analysis of 190 events at Chinese nuclear power plants}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@misc{10CFR55,
|
|
||||||
title = {Operators' Licenses},
|
|
||||||
author = {{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}},
|
|
||||||
howpublished = {10 CFR Part 55},
|
|
||||||
note = {Code of Federal Regulations}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@techreport{Kemeny1979,
|
|
||||||
title = {Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island},
|
|
||||||
author = {Kemeny, John G. and others},
|
|
||||||
institution = {President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island},
|
|
||||||
year = {1979},
|
|
||||||
month = {October}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@misc{10CFR50,
|
|
||||||
title = {Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities},
|
|
||||||
author = {{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}},
|
|
||||||
howpublished = {10 CFR Part 50},
|
|
||||||
note = {Code of Federal Regulations}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@techreport{NUREG-0899,
|
|
||||||
title = {Guidelines for the Preparation of Emergency Operating Procedures},
|
|
||||||
author = {{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}},
|
|
||||||
institution = {U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission},
|
|
||||||
year = {1982},
|
|
||||||
number = {NUREG-0899}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@techreport{IAEA-TECDOC-1580,
|
|
||||||
title = {Good Practices for Cost Effective Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants},
|
|
||||||
author = {{International Atomic Energy Agency}},
|
|
||||||
institution = {International Atomic Energy Agency},
|
|
||||||
year = {2007},
|
|
||||||
number = {TECDOC-1580}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@techreport{NUREG-2114,
|
|
||||||
title = {Cognitive Basis for Human Reliability Analysis},
|
|
||||||
author = {{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}},
|
|
||||||
institution = {U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission},
|
|
||||||
year = {2016},
|
|
||||||
number = {NUREG-2114}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{Zerovnik2023,
|
|
||||||
title = {Knowledge Transfer Challenges in Nuclear Operations},
|
|
||||||
author = {\v{Z}erovnik, Gašper and others},
|
|
||||||
journal = {Nuclear Engineering and Design},
|
|
||||||
year = {2023},
|
|
||||||
note = {Analysis of knowledge transfer from experienced operators}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{Jo2021,
|
|
||||||
title = {Automation Paradox in Nuclear Power Plant Control: Effects on Operator Situation Awareness},
|
|
||||||
author = {Jo, Y. and others},
|
|
||||||
journal = {Nuclear Engineering and Technology},
|
|
||||||
year = {2021},
|
|
||||||
note = {Empirical study of automation effects on operator performance}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@techreport{IAEA2008,
|
|
||||||
title = {Modern Instrumentation and Control for Nuclear Power Plants: A Guidebook},
|
|
||||||
author = {{International Atomic Energy Agency}},
|
|
||||||
institution = {International Atomic Energy Agency},
|
|
||||||
year = {2008},
|
|
||||||
number = {Technical Reports Series No. 387}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{Lee2019,
|
|
||||||
title = {Autonomous Control of Nuclear Reactors Using Long Short-Term Memory Networks},
|
|
||||||
author = {Lee, D. and others},
|
|
||||||
journal = {Nuclear Engineering and Technology},
|
|
||||||
year = {2019},
|
|
||||||
note = {Demonstration of LSTM-based autonomous control in LOC and SGTR scenarios}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@inproceedings{IEEE2019,
|
|
||||||
title = {Formal Verification Challenges for Nuclear I\&C Systems},
|
|
||||||
author = {{IEEE Working Group}},
|
|
||||||
booktitle = {IEEE Conference on Nuclear Power Instrumentation, Control and Human-Machine Interface Technologies},
|
|
||||||
year = {2019},
|
|
||||||
note = {Discussion of state space explosion in formal verification}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@misc{IAEA-severe-accidents,
|
|
||||||
title = {Human Error as Root Cause in Severe Nuclear Accidents},
|
|
||||||
author = {{International Atomic Energy Agency}},
|
|
||||||
howpublished = {IAEA Safety Report},
|
|
||||||
note = {Analysis of TMI, Chernobyl, and Fukushima accidents}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{Dumas1999,
|
|
||||||
title = {Worker Error and Safety in Nuclear Facilities},
|
|
||||||
author = {Dumas, Lloyd},
|
|
||||||
journal = {Journal of Nuclear Safety},
|
|
||||||
year = {1999},
|
|
||||||
note = {Study of incidents at 10 nuclear centers}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@techreport{IAEA-INSAG-1,
|
|
||||||
title = {Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident},
|
|
||||||
author = {{International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group}},
|
|
||||||
institution = {International Atomic Energy Agency},
|
|
||||||
year = {1986},
|
|
||||||
number = {INSAG-1}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@techreport{IAEA-INSAG-7,
|
|
||||||
title = {The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1},
|
|
||||||
author = {{International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group}},
|
|
||||||
institution = {International Atomic Energy Agency},
|
|
||||||
year = {1992},
|
|
||||||
number = {INSAG-7}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@techreport{NUREG-CR-1278,
|
|
||||||
title = {Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications (THERP)},
|
|
||||||
author = {Swain, A. D. and Guttmann, H. E.},
|
|
||||||
institution = {U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission},
|
|
||||||
year = {1983},
|
|
||||||
number = {NUREG/CR-1278}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@techreport{NUREG-CR-6883,
|
|
||||||
title = {The SPAR-H Human Reliability Analysis Method},
|
|
||||||
author = {Gertman, D. and others},
|
|
||||||
institution = {U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission},
|
|
||||||
year = {2005},
|
|
||||||
number = {NUREG/CR-6883}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@techreport{NUREG-2127,
|
|
||||||
title = {International HRA Empirical Study: Phase 1 Report},
|
|
||||||
author = {{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}},
|
|
||||||
institution = {U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission},
|
|
||||||
year = {2013},
|
|
||||||
number = {NUREG-2127}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{Rasmussen1983,
|
|
||||||
title = {Skills, Rules, and Knowledge; Signals, Signs, and Symbols, and Other Distinctions in Human Performance Models},
|
|
||||||
author = {Rasmussen, J.},
|
|
||||||
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics},
|
|
||||||
year = {1983},
|
|
||||||
volume = {SMC-13},
|
|
||||||
number = {3},
|
|
||||||
pages = {257--266}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{Miller1956,
|
|
||||||
title = {The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information},
|
|
||||||
author = {Miller, George A.},
|
|
||||||
journal = {Psychological Review},
|
|
||||||
year = {1956},
|
|
||||||
volume = {63},
|
|
||||||
number = {2},
|
|
||||||
pages = {81--97}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@techreport{NUREG-2256,
|
|
||||||
title = {Integrated Human Event Analysis System for Emergency Crew Actions (IDHEAS-ECA)},
|
|
||||||
author = {{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}},
|
|
||||||
institution = {U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission},
|
|
||||||
year = {2022},
|
|
||||||
number = {NUREG-2256}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@book{Reason1990,
|
|
||||||
title = {Human Error},
|
|
||||||
author = {Reason, James},
|
|
||||||
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
|
|
||||||
year = {1990}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@article{Lee2018,
|
|
||||||
title = {Deep Reinforcement Learning for Autonomous Nuclear Reactor Control},
|
|
||||||
author = {Lee, D. and others},
|
|
||||||
journal = {Nuclear Engineering and Design},
|
|
||||||
year = {2018},
|
|
||||||
note = {Demonstration of autonomous control superior to human-plus-automation}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@techreport{Kiniry2022,
|
|
||||||
title = {High Assurance Rigorous Digital Engineering for Nuclear Safety (HARDENS) Final Technical Report},
|
|
||||||
author = {Kiniry, Joseph and Bakst, Alexander and Podhradsky, Michal and Hansen, Simon and Bivin, Andrew},
|
|
||||||
institution = {Galois, Inc. / U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission},
|
|
||||||
year = {2022},
|
|
||||||
number = {ML22326A307},
|
|
||||||
note = {NRC Contract 31310021C0014}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
Binary file not shown.
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@ -1,421 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
% PROJECT SUMMARY
|
|
||||||
\section*{Project Summary}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\subsection*{Overview}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This research will develop a methodology for creating autonomous hybrid control
|
|
||||||
systems with mathematical guarantees of safe and correct behavior. Nuclear power
|
|
||||||
plants require the highest levels of control system reliability, where failures
|
|
||||||
can result in significant economic losses or radiological release. Currently,
|
|
||||||
nuclear operations rely on extensively trained human operators who follow
|
|
||||||
detailed written procedures to manage reactor control. However, reliance on
|
|
||||||
human operators prevents introduction of autonomous control capabilities and
|
|
||||||
creates fundamental economic challenges for next-generation reactor designs.
|
|
||||||
Without introducing automation, emerging technologies like small modular
|
|
||||||
reactors face significantly higher per-megawatt staffing costs than conventional
|
|
||||||
plants, threatening their economic viability.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
To address this need, we will combine formal methods from computer science
|
|
||||||
with control theory to build hybrid control systems that are correct by
|
|
||||||
construction. Hybrid systems use discrete logic to switch between continuous
|
|
||||||
control modes, similar to how operators change control strategies. Existing
|
|
||||||
formal methods can generate provably correct switching logic from written
|
|
||||||
requirements, but they cannot handle the continuous dynamics that occur during
|
|
||||||
transitions between modes. Meanwhile, traditional control theory can verify
|
|
||||||
continuous behavior but lacks tools for proving correctness of discrete
|
|
||||||
switching decisions. By synthesizing discrete mode transitions directly from
|
|
||||||
written operating procedures and verifying continuous behavior between
|
|
||||||
transitions, we can create hybrid control systems with end-to-end correctness
|
|
||||||
guarantees.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\subsection*{Intellectual Merit}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The intellectual merit lies in unifying discrete synthesis and continuous
|
|
||||||
verification to enable end-to-end correctness guarantees for hybrid systems.
|
|
||||||
This research will advance knowledge by developing a systematic,
|
|
||||||
tool-supported methodology for translating written procedures into temporal
|
|
||||||
logic, synthesizing provably correct discrete switching logic, and developing
|
|
||||||
verified continuous controllers. The approach addresses a fundamental gap in
|
|
||||||
hybrid system design by bridging formal methods from computer science and
|
|
||||||
control theory.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\subsection*{Broader Impacts}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This research directly addresses the multi-billion dollar operations and
|
|
||||||
maintenance cost challenge facing nuclear power deployment. By synthesizing
|
|
||||||
provably correct hybrid controllers, we can automate routine operational
|
|
||||||
sequences that currently require constant human oversight, enabling a shift
|
|
||||||
from direct operator control to supervisory monitoring. Beyond nuclear
|
|
||||||
applications, this research will establish a generalizable framework for
|
|
||||||
autonomous control of safety-critical systems including chemical process
|
|
||||||
control, aerospace systems, and autonomous transportation.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\newpage
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% RESEARCH DESCRIPTION
|
|
||||||
\section*{Research Description}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\section{Objectives}
|
|
||||||
% GOAL PARAGRAPH
|
|
||||||
The goal of this research is to develop a methodology for creating autonomous
|
|
||||||
control systems with event-driven control laws that have guarantees of safe and
|
|
||||||
correct behavior.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH Hook
|
|
||||||
Nuclear power relies on extensively trained operators who follow detailed
|
|
||||||
written procedures to manage reactor control. Based on these procedures and
|
|
||||||
operators' interpretation of plant conditions, operators make critical decisions
|
|
||||||
about when to switch between control objectives.
|
|
||||||
% Gap
|
|
||||||
While human operators have maintained the nuclear industry's exceptional safety
|
|
||||||
record, reliance on human operators has created an economic challenge for
|
|
||||||
next-generation nuclear power plants. Small modular reactors face significantly
|
|
||||||
higher per-megawatt staffing costs than conventional plants, threatening their
|
|
||||||
economic viability. Autonomous control systems are needed that can safely manage
|
|
||||||
complex operational sequences with the same assurance as human-operated systems,
|
|
||||||
but without constant supervision.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% APPROACH PARAGRAPH Solution
|
|
||||||
To address this need, we will combine formal methods from computer science with
|
|
||||||
control theory to build hybrid control systems that are correct by construction.
|
|
||||||
% Rationale
|
|
||||||
Hybrid systems use discrete logic to switch between continuous control modes,
|
|
||||||
similar to how operators change control strategies. Existing formal methods
|
|
||||||
generate provably correct switching logic but cannot handle continuous dynamics
|
|
||||||
during transitions, while traditional control theory verifies continuous
|
|
||||||
behavior but lacks tools for proving discrete switching correctness.
|
|
||||||
% Hypothesis and Technical Approach
|
|
||||||
We will bridge this gap through a three-stage methodology. First, we will
|
|
||||||
translate written operating procedures into temporal logic specifications using
|
|
||||||
NASA's Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET), which structures
|
|
||||||
requirements into scope, condition, component, timing, and response elements.
|
|
||||||
This structured approach enables realizability checking to identify conflicts
|
|
||||||
and ambiguities in procedures before implementation. Second, we will synthesize
|
|
||||||
discrete mode switching logic from these specifications using reactive synthesis
|
|
||||||
tools such as Strix, which generates deterministic automata that are provably
|
|
||||||
correct by construction. Third, we will develop and verify continuous
|
|
||||||
controllers for each discrete mode using standard control theory and
|
|
||||||
reachability analysis. We will classify continuous modes based on their
|
|
||||||
transition objectives, and then employ assume-guarantee contracts and barrier
|
|
||||||
certificates to prove that mode transitions occur safely and as defined by the
|
|
||||||
deterministic automata. This compositional approach enables local verification
|
|
||||||
of continuous modes without requiring global trajectory analysis across the
|
|
||||||
entire hybrid system. We will demonstrate this methodology by developing an
|
|
||||||
autonomous startup controller for a Small Modular Advanced High Temperature
|
|
||||||
Reactor (SmAHTR) and implementing it on an Emerson Ovation control system using
|
|
||||||
the ARCADE hardware-in-the-loop platform.
|
|
||||||
% Pay-off
|
|
||||||
This approach will demonstrate autonomous control can be used for complex
|
|
||||||
nuclear power operations while maintaining safety guarantees.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\vspace{11pt}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% OUTCOMES PARAGRAPHS
|
|
||||||
If this research is successful, we will be able to do the following:
|
|
||||||
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
||||||
% OUTCOME 1 Title
|
|
||||||
\item \textit{Synthesize written procedures into verified control logic.}
|
|
||||||
% Strategy
|
|
||||||
We will develop a methodology for converting written operating procedures
|
|
||||||
into formal specifications. These specifications will be synthesized into
|
|
||||||
discrete control logic using reactive synthesis tools. This process uses
|
|
||||||
structured intermediate representations to bridge natural language and
|
|
||||||
mathematical logic.
|
|
||||||
% Outcome
|
|
||||||
Control engineers will be able to generate mode-switching controllers from
|
|
||||||
regulatory procedures with little formal methods expertise, reducing
|
|
||||||
barriers to high-assurance control systems.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% OUTCOME 2 Title
|
|
||||||
\item \textit{Verify continuous control behavior across mode transitions. }
|
|
||||||
% Strategy
|
|
||||||
We will develop methods using reachability analysis to ensure continuous control modes
|
|
||||||
satisfy discrete transition requirements.
|
|
||||||
% Outcome
|
|
||||||
Engineers will be able to design continuous controllers using standard
|
|
||||||
practices while ensuring system correctness and proving mode transitions
|
|
||||||
occur safely at the right times.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% OUTCOME 3 Title
|
|
||||||
\item \textit{Demonstrate autonomous reactor startup control with safety
|
|
||||||
guarantees. }
|
|
||||||
% Strategy
|
|
||||||
We will implement this methodology on a small modular reactor simulation
|
|
||||||
using industry-standard control hardware. This trial will include multiple
|
|
||||||
coordinated control modes from cold shutdown through criticality to power
|
|
||||||
operation on a SmAHTR reactor simulation in a hardware-in-the-loop
|
|
||||||
experiment.
|
|
||||||
% Outcome
|
|
||||||
Control engineers will be able to implement high-assurance autonomous
|
|
||||||
controls on industrial platforms they already use, enabling users to
|
|
||||||
achieve autonomy without retraining costs or developing new equipment.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\end{enumerate}
|
|
||||||
\section{State of the Art and Limits of Current Practice}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Automation of some nuclear power operations is already performed today. Highly
|
|
||||||
automated systems handle reactor protection and emergency core cooling, while
|
|
||||||
human operators retain strategic decision-making. Autonomous systems are trusted
|
|
||||||
to handle emergency situations that are considered terminal operations, but
|
|
||||||
otherwise introduce too much risk to reactor operations. Contrary to this notion
|
|
||||||
is the fact that 70--80\% of all nuclear power plant events are attributed to
|
|
||||||
human error rather than equipment failures. The persistence of this ratio despite
|
|
||||||
four decades of improvements to procedures and control rooms suggests
|
|
||||||
fundamental cognitive limitations rather than remediable deficiencies.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recognized that introducing automation
|
|
||||||
into the control room is the only way forward. Recent efforts to apply formal
|
|
||||||
methods to nuclear control have shown both promise and remaining gaps. The High
|
|
||||||
Assurance Rigorous Digital Engineering for Nuclear Safety (HARDENS) project
|
|
||||||
represents the most advanced application to date. HARDENS produced a complete
|
|
||||||
Reactor Trip System with full traceability from NRC requirements through formal
|
|
||||||
specifications to verified binaries of a controller implementation. The project
|
|
||||||
employed formal methods along the control design stack. This comprehensive
|
|
||||||
approach demonstrated that formal methods may be technically feasible and
|
|
||||||
economically viable for nuclear protection systems.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
But despite these accomplishments, HARDENS has a fundamental limitation directly
|
|
||||||
relevant to our work. The project addressed only discrete digital control logic
|
|
||||||
without modeling or verifying continuous reactor dynamics. Real reactor safety
|
|
||||||
depends on interaction between continuous processes and discrete control
|
|
||||||
decisions. HARDENS verified the discrete controller in isolation but not the
|
|
||||||
closed-loop hybrid system behavior.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\section{Research Approach}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This research will overcome the identified limitations by combining formal
|
|
||||||
methods from computer science with control theory to build hybrid control
|
|
||||||
systems that are correct by construction. We accomplish this through three
|
|
||||||
main thrusts:
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\item We will translate natural language procedures and
|
|
||||||
requirements into temporal logic specifications using the Formal Requirements
|
|
||||||
Elicitation Tool (FRET).
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\item We will synthesize these temporal logic
|
|
||||||
specifications into the discrete component of the hybrid controller using
|
|
||||||
reactive synthesis.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\item We will build continuous control modes that satisfy discrete controller
|
|
||||||
transition requirements.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\end{enumerate}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Commercial nuclear power operations remain manually controlled despite
|
|
||||||
significant advances in control systems. The key insight is that procedures
|
|
||||||
performed by human operators are highly prescriptive and well-documented. To
|
|
||||||
formalize these procedures, we will use temporal logic, which captures system
|
|
||||||
behaviors through temporal relations. Linear Temporal Logic provides four
|
|
||||||
fundamental operators: next ($X$), eventually ($F$), globally ($G$), and until
|
|
||||||
($U$). These operators enable precise specification of time-dependent
|
|
||||||
requirements. The most efficient path to accomplish this translation is through
|
|
||||||
NASA's Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET). FRET employs FRETish, a
|
|
||||||
specialized requirements language that restricts requirements to easily
|
|
||||||
understood components while eliminating ambiguity. FRET enforces structure by
|
|
||||||
requiring all requirements to contain six components: Scope, Condition,
|
|
||||||
Component, Shall, Timing, and Response.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
FRET provides functionality to check realizability of a system. Realizability
|
|
||||||
analysis determines whether written requirements are complete by examining the
|
|
||||||
six structural components. Complete requirements neither conflict with one
|
|
||||||
another nor leave any behavior undefined. Systems that are not realizable
|
|
||||||
contain behavioral inconsistencies that represent the physical equivalent of
|
|
||||||
software bugs. Using FRET during autonomous controller development allows us
|
|
||||||
to identify and resolve these errors systematically. FRET exports requirements
|
|
||||||
in temporal logic format compatible with reactive synthesis tools, enabling
|
|
||||||
the second thrust of our approach.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Reactive synthesis is an active research field focused on generating discrete
|
|
||||||
controllers from temporal logic specifications. The term reactive indicates
|
|
||||||
that the system responds to environmental inputs to produce control outputs.
|
|
||||||
These synthesized systems are finite in size, where each node represents a
|
|
||||||
unique discrete state. The connections between nodes, called state
|
|
||||||
transitions, specify the conditions under which the discrete controller moves
|
|
||||||
from state to state. This complete mapping constitutes a discrete automaton.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
We will employ reactive synthesis tools which translate linear temporal logic
|
|
||||||
specifications into deterministic automata automatically while maximizing
|
|
||||||
generated automata quality. Once constructed, the automaton can be
|
|
||||||
straightforwardly implemented using standard programming control flow
|
|
||||||
constructs. The discrete automata representation yields an important theoretical
|
|
||||||
guarantee. Because the discrete automaton is synthesized entirely through
|
|
||||||
automated tools from design requirements and operating procedures, we can
|
|
||||||
prove that the automaton---and therefore our hybrid switching behavior---is
|
|
||||||
correct by construction.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This correctness guarantee is paramount. Mode switching represents the primary
|
|
||||||
responsibility of human operators in control rooms today. Human operators
|
|
||||||
possess the advantage of real-time judgment. When mistakes occur, they can
|
|
||||||
correct them dynamically. Autonomous control lacks this adaptive advantage. By
|
|
||||||
synthesizing controllers from logical specifications with guaranteed
|
|
||||||
correctness, we eliminate the possibility of switching errors.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
While discrete system components will be synthesized with correctness
|
|
||||||
guarantees, they represent only half of the complete system. The continuous
|
|
||||||
modes will be developed after discrete automaton construction, leveraging the
|
|
||||||
automaton structure and transitions to design multiple smaller, specialized
|
|
||||||
continuous controllers.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The discrete automaton transitions mark decision points for switching between
|
|
||||||
continuous control modes and define their strategic objectives. We will
|
|
||||||
classify three types of high-level continuous controller objectives:
|
|
||||||
Stabilizing modes maintain the hybrid system within its current discrete mode,
|
|
||||||
corresponding to steady-state normal operating modes like full-power
|
|
||||||
load-following control. Transitory modes have the primary goal of
|
|
||||||
transitioning the hybrid system from one discrete state to another, such as
|
|
||||||
controlled warm-up procedures. Expulsory modes are specialized transitory
|
|
||||||
modes with additional safety constraints that ensure the system is directed to
|
|
||||||
a safe stabilizing mode during failure conditions, such as reactor SCRAM.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Building continuous modes after constructing discrete automata enables local
|
|
||||||
controller design focused on satisfying discrete transitions. The primary
|
|
||||||
challenge in hybrid system verification is ensuring global stability across
|
|
||||||
transitions. Current techniques struggle with this problem because dynamic
|
|
||||||
discontinuities complicate verification. This work alleviates these problems
|
|
||||||
by designing continuous controllers specifically with transitions in mind. By
|
|
||||||
decomposing continuous modes according to their required behavior at
|
|
||||||
transition points, we avoid solving trajectories through the entire hybrid
|
|
||||||
system.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
To ensure continuous modes satisfy their requirements, we will employ three
|
|
||||||
complementary techniques. Reachability analysis computes the reachable set of
|
|
||||||
states for a given input set. We will use reachability when continuous
|
|
||||||
state ranges at discrete transition boundaries are defined and verify that
|
|
||||||
continuous modes only can reach such defined ranges. Otherwise, assume-guarantee contracts will be
|
|
||||||
employed when continuous state boundaries are not explicitly defined. For any
|
|
||||||
given mode, the input range for reachability analysis is defined by the output
|
|
||||||
ranges of discrete modes that transition to it. This compositional approach
|
|
||||||
ensures each continuous controller is prepared for its possible input range.
|
|
||||||
Finally, barrier certificates will prove that mode transitions are satisfied. Control
|
|
||||||
barrier functions provide a method to certify safety by establishing
|
|
||||||
differential inequality conditions that guarantee forward invariance of safe
|
|
||||||
sets.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Combining these three techniques will enable us to prove that continuous
|
|
||||||
components satisfy discrete requirements and thus complete system behavior. To
|
|
||||||
demonstrate this methodology, we will develop an autonomous startup controller
|
|
||||||
for a Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR). SmAHTR
|
|
||||||
represents an ideal test case with well-documented startup procedures that
|
|
||||||
must transition through multiple distinct operational modes: initial cold
|
|
||||||
conditions, controlled heating to operating temperature, approach to
|
|
||||||
criticality, low-power physics testing, and power ascension to full operating
|
|
||||||
capacity. We have access to an already developed high-fidelity SmAHTR model in Simulink that
|
|
||||||
captures the thermal-hydraulic and neutron kinetics behavior.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The synthesized hybrid controller will be implemented on an Emerson Ovation
|
|
||||||
control system platform, which is representative of industry-standard control
|
|
||||||
hardware. This control system will be used in a hardware-in-the-loop simulation,
|
|
||||||
where the Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment
|
|
||||||
(ARCADE) suite will serve as the integration layer. This
|
|
||||||
hardware-in-the-loop configuration enables validation of the controller
|
|
||||||
implementation on actual industrial control equipment.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\section{Metrics of Success}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This research will be measured by advancement through Technology Readiness
|
|
||||||
Levels, progressing from fundamental concepts to validated prototype
|
|
||||||
demonstration. The work begins at TRL 2--3 and aims to reach TRL 5, where system
|
|
||||||
components operate successfully in a relevant laboratory environment. TRLs
|
|
||||||
provide the ideal success metric because they explicitly measure the gap between
|
|
||||||
academic proof-of-concept and practical deployment. This gap is precisely what
|
|
||||||
our work aims to bridge. TRLs capture both theoretical rigor and practical
|
|
||||||
feasibility simultaneously. The nuclear industry already uses TRLs for
|
|
||||||
technology assessment, making this metric directly relevant to potential
|
|
||||||
adopters.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Moving from current state (TRL 2--3) to target (TRL 5) requires progressing
|
|
||||||
through component isolation, system integration, and hardware validation. By
|
|
||||||
reaching TRL 5, we will have demonstrated a complete autonomous hybrid
|
|
||||||
controller operating on industrial control hardware through hardware-in-the-loop
|
|
||||||
testing. Achieving TRL 5 establishes both theoretical validity and practical
|
|
||||||
feasibility, proving that the methodology produces verified controllers
|
|
||||||
implementable with current technology and providing a clear pathway for nuclear
|
|
||||||
industry adoption and broader application to safety-critical autonomous systems.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\section{Broader Impacts}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Nuclear power presents both a compelling application domain and an urgent
|
|
||||||
economic challenge. Recent interest in powering artificial intelligence
|
|
||||||
infrastructure has renewed focus on small modular reactors for hyperscale
|
|
||||||
datacenters. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, advanced
|
|
||||||
nuclear power entering service in 2027 is projected to cost \$88.24 per
|
|
||||||
megawatt-hour. With datacenter electricity demand projected to reach 1,050
|
|
||||||
terawatt-hours annually by 2030, operations and maintenance costs represent
|
|
||||||
approximately 23--30\% of total levelized cost, translating to \$21--28
|
|
||||||
billion annually for projected datacenter demand.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This research directly addresses the multi-billion dollar O\&M cost challenge.
|
|
||||||
Current nuclear operations require full control room staffing for each reactor.
|
|
||||||
These staffing requirements drive high O\&M costs, particularly for smaller
|
|
||||||
reactor designs where the same overhead must be spread across lower power
|
|
||||||
output. The economic burden threatens the viability of next-generation nuclear
|
|
||||||
technologies. But, by synthesizing provably correct hybrid controllers, we can
|
|
||||||
automate routine operational sequences that currently require constant human
|
|
||||||
oversight. This enables a change from direct operator control to
|
|
||||||
supervisory monitoring where operators oversee multiple autonomous reactors
|
|
||||||
rather than manually controlling individual units. The transition fundamentally
|
|
||||||
changes the economics of nuclear operations.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The correct-by-construction methodology is critical for this transition.
|
|
||||||
Traditional automation approaches cannot provide sufficient safety guarantees
|
|
||||||
for nuclear applications where regulatory requirements and public safety
|
|
||||||
concerns demand the highest levels of assurance. By formally verifying both
|
|
||||||
discrete mode-switching logic and continuous control behavior, this research
|
|
||||||
will produce controllers with mathematical proofs of correctness. These
|
|
||||||
guarantees enable automation to safely handle routine operations that
|
|
||||||
currently require human operators to follow written procedures.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Beyond nuclear applications, this research will establish a generalizable
|
|
||||||
framework for autonomous control of safety-critical systems. The methodology of
|
|
||||||
translating operational procedures into formal specifications, synthesizing
|
|
||||||
discrete switching logic, and verifying continuous mode behavior applies to any
|
|
||||||
hybrid system with documented operational requirements. Potential applications
|
|
||||||
include chemical process control, aerospace systems, and autonomous
|
|
||||||
transportation. These domains share similar economic and safety considerations
|
|
||||||
that favor increased autonomy with provable correctness guarantees. By
|
|
||||||
demonstrating this approach in nuclear power this research will establish both
|
|
||||||
technical feasibility and regulatory pathways for broader adoption across
|
|
||||||
critical infrastructure.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\newpage
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
% REFERENCES CITED
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\begin{thebibliography}{99}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\bibitem{10CFR55}
|
|
||||||
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ``10 CFR Part 55 - Operators' Licenses.''
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|
||||||
\textit{Code of Federal Regulations}, 2024.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\bibitem{Kemeny1979}
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|
||||||
J. G. Kemeny et al. ``Report of the President's Commission on the Accident
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|
||||||
at Three Mile Island.'' U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1979.
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|
||||||
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|
||||||
\bibitem{NUREG-0899}
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|
||||||
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|
||||||
Emergency Operating Procedures.'' NUREG-0899, August 1982.
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|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\bibitem{DOE-HDBK-1028-2009}
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|
||||||
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|
||||||
DOE-HDBK-1028-2009, June 2009.
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|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\bibitem{WNA2020}
|
|
||||||
World Nuclear Association. ``Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors.''
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|
||||||
\textit{World Nuclear Association Information Library}, 2020.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\bibitem{Kiniry2022}
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|
||||||
J. Kiniry et al. ``High Assurance Rigorous Digital Engineering for Nuclear
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|
||||||
Safety (HARDENS).'' NRC Final Technical Report ML22326A307, October 2022.
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|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\bibitem{eia_lcoe_2022}
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|
||||||
U.S. Energy Information Administration. ``Levelized Costs of New Generation
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|
||||||
Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2022.'' Report, March 2022.
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|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\bibitem{eesi_datacenter_2024}
|
|
||||||
Environmental and Energy Study Institute. ``Data Center Energy Needs are
|
|
||||||
Upending Power Grids and Threatening the Climate.'' Web article, 2024.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
\end{thebibliography}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user