hehe
This commit is contained in:
parent
b23db588d5
commit
8a9b8701e0
@ -1,3 +1,19 @@
|
|||||||
# Notes on [[thesis-ideas-2025-07-30]]
|
# Notes on [[thesis-ideas-2025-07-30]]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
What needs done:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- [X] 1 needs edited and reviewed
|
||||||
|
- [X] Review outcomes. I really don't like outcome
|
||||||
|
number 1.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- [X] Review and edit 2
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- [ ] Review and edit 3
|
||||||
|
- [ ] Write an impact section
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- [ ] Review and edit 4
|
||||||
|
- [ ] Needs more goal
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- [ ] Review and edit 5
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- [ ] Review and edit 6
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# 2025-08-06
|
# 2025-08-07
|
||||||
Today I have not gotten too much done, but I did get here
|
Today I have not gotten too much done, but I did get here
|
||||||
early today. Today, I'll sell the truck and work on Sam's
|
early today. Today, I'll sell the truck and work on Sam's
|
||||||
car. I saw Patrick today too, which was nice. Robert's stuff
|
car. I saw Patrick today too, which was nice. Robert's stuff
|
||||||
|
|||||||
8
Zettelkasten/Fleeting Notes/Journal/2025_08_10.md
Normal file
8
Zettelkasten/Fleeting Notes/Journal/2025_08_10.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
|||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# 2025-08-10
|
||||||
|
Today I'm finishing the thesis ideas, for real this time.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
I'm also going to get a model of a heat exchanger working.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -5,38 +5,49 @@ suggested I write down 6 ideas, and from them we shall
|
|||||||
figure out a possible topic idea that I can really start
|
figure out a possible topic idea that I can really start
|
||||||
working on.
|
working on.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
I used ChatGPT to do some of the heavy lifting based on the
|
|
||||||
papers I've been reading, and leveraged the 'deep research'
|
|
||||||
feature. Here are some of my favorite ideas, broken down
|
|
||||||
into goals, outcomes, impact, and related papers.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
___________________________________________________________
|
___________________________________________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## **Integrating Shielding into Nuclear Power Control**
|
## **Integrating Shielding into Nuclear Power Control**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Goal:
|
### Goal:
|
||||||
The goal of this research is develop machine learning
|
|
||||||
enabled control algorithims for nuclear power applications
|
The goal of this research is to use temporal logic shielding
|
||||||
that incoporate shielding: a formal guarantee of adherence
|
to do online safety assurance of a machine learning (ML)
|
||||||
to system specifications without augmenting the machine
|
based controller for a reactor control system (RCS). While
|
||||||
learning process.
|
ML-based controllers can outperform traditional rule-based
|
||||||
|
or PID control systems, their lack of provable safety
|
||||||
|
guarantees has prevented their deployment in nuclear control
|
||||||
|
applications. This work proposes to integrate shielding into
|
||||||
|
a ML-based RCS to provide a strong safety guarntee.
|
||||||
|
Shielding uses temporal logic specifications to define an
|
||||||
|
area in the state space that is safe. If the ML controller's
|
||||||
|
predicted actions leave this space or violate a
|
||||||
|
specification, the shield intervenes and engage a
|
||||||
|
safety-oriented fallback controller. This way, safety
|
||||||
|
guarantees are still provided by the fallback controller,
|
||||||
|
but the ML controller is free to operate within the verified
|
||||||
|
safe region..
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Outcomes:
|
### Outcomes:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
|
For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
|
||||||
following:
|
following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
1. Identify key controllers in a nuclear power context with
|
1. Translate regulatory and system level requirements into a
|
||||||
the most benefit from using an ML-based controller
|
temporal logic specification to synthesize a controller
|
||||||
|
'shield'. This shield monitors the ML controller and
|
||||||
|
intervenes whenever a requirement is predicted to be
|
||||||
|
violated.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
2. Translate regulatory and system level requirements into a
|
2. Design a verified fallback controller against the same
|
||||||
formal specification to synthesize a controller 'shield'.
|
verification requirements that can either return the
|
||||||
This shield monitors the ML controller and intervenes
|
reactor to the safe state space or safely shut down the
|
||||||
whenever a requirement is predicted to be violated.
|
reactor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
3. Evaluate performance of the ML controller with attached
|
3. Evaluate performance of the ML controller with attached
|
||||||
shield, while assessing the amount of shield useage for
|
shield, while assessing shield intervention frequency for
|
||||||
different operating scenarios (power up, shut down, regular
|
different operating scenarios (power up, shut down, regular
|
||||||
load following)
|
load following).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Impact:
|
### Impact:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -45,17 +56,16 @@ rule-based controllers by adapting to nonlinear dynamics,
|
|||||||
optimizing over multi-objective cost functions, and changing
|
optimizing over multi-objective cost functions, and changing
|
||||||
plant conditions. But, these ML controllers are often
|
plant conditions. But, these ML controllers are often
|
||||||
*unexplainable*, meaning that their global behavior is not
|
*unexplainable*, meaning that their global behavior is not
|
||||||
easily understood.This unexplainability prevents ML based
|
easily understood. This prevents ML based controllers from
|
||||||
controllers from being used in high-assurance usecases such
|
being used in high-assurance usecases such as nuclear power.
|
||||||
as nuclear power. Shielding can address this issue, by
|
Shielding can address this issue, by providing a formal
|
||||||
providing a formal runtime assurance, allieviating the
|
runtime assurance, alleviating the burden of explainability
|
||||||
burden of explainability away from the machine learning
|
away from the machine learning algorithm. This work would
|
||||||
algorithm. This work would further bring regulatory
|
further bring regulatory requiremnts into the formal design
|
||||||
requiremnts into the formal design of control systems and
|
of control systems and high
|
||||||
help bridge the gap between high assurance systems and the
|
|
||||||
start of the art in control.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Relevant Papers
|
### Relevant Papers
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[[safe-reinforcement-learning-via-shielding]]
|
[[safe-reinforcement-learning-via-shielding]]
|
||||||
[[evaluating-robustness-of-neural-networks-with-mixed-integer-programming]]
|
[[evaluating-robustness-of-neural-networks-with-mixed-integer-programming]]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -64,50 +74,71 @@ ___________________________________________________________
|
|||||||
## **Formally Verified Neural Network Control of Control Rod System**
|
## **Formally Verified Neural Network Control of Control Rod System**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Goals:
|
### Goals:
|
||||||
The goal of this research is to use formal methods to ensure that
|
|
||||||
a neural network based control rod controller will never violate
|
The goal of this resarch is to use formal methods to verify
|
||||||
safety guarantees of a reactor trip system. To do this, a
|
safety properties of neural network controller for a reactor
|
||||||
satisfiability modulo theory method will be applied to
|
control system. Neural network based controllers are able to
|
||||||
exhaustively search the network for potential failure modes.
|
efficiently control nonlinear systems with complex
|
||||||
|
objectives, but by their nature are are opaque systems whose
|
||||||
|
behavior is not easily analyzed. That being said, once a
|
||||||
|
neural network is trained, it is an entirely deterministic
|
||||||
|
system. Recent techniques using satisfiability modulo theory
|
||||||
|
(SMT) or mixed integer linear programming (MILP) encodings
|
||||||
|
of neural networks have been used to verify neural network
|
||||||
|
controller behavior adheres to constraints for fixed input
|
||||||
|
spaces. This work will adapt these methods to be used with
|
||||||
|
nuclear-specific safety constraints and enable provably safe
|
||||||
|
neural network control for the nuclear industry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Outcomes:
|
### Outcomes:
|
||||||
If this research is successful, I will have accomplished the
|
|
||||||
|
For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
|
||||||
following:
|
following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- Build a neural network controller for real time control of a
|
1. Build a neural network controller for real time control
|
||||||
control rod system.
|
of a control rod system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- Formalize safety guarantees of shutdown margin in a
|
2. Encode shutdown margin safety requirements into a SMT or
|
||||||
satisfiability modulo theory embedding
|
MILP framework.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- Formally verify that the neural network based controller will
|
3. Formally verify that the neural network based controller
|
||||||
not violate any shutdown margin restrictions
|
will not violate any shutdown margin restrictions while
|
||||||
|
still meeting operational goals.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Impact:
|
### Impact:
|
||||||
SMT solvers and MILP formulations have been applied to neural
|
|
||||||
networks to ensure that the network is resilient to input
|
SMT and MILP methods of verifying neural networks have been
|
||||||
perturbations. I think we can expand this to more general
|
previously applied to classification problems, but have not
|
||||||
considerations of the state space, especially when there are a
|
been utilized to check neural network controllers for
|
||||||
relatively small number of states such as in power contexts. The
|
adherence to cyber-physical system requirements. Critical
|
||||||
benefit of this system is that we would get closer to saying
|
infrastructure control such as nuclear power is an ideal
|
||||||
neural network based systems can be high assurance for physical
|
candidate for these methods to be utilized, however, because
|
||||||
systems.
|
the systems being controlled have a bounded and
|
||||||
|
well-characterized state space compared to other neural
|
||||||
|
network controller usecases (autonomous flight, autonomous
|
||||||
|
driving, image classification, etc.). This work, if
|
||||||
|
successful, will help ease tensions about neural network
|
||||||
|
controllers' safety for critical infrastructure, and allow a
|
||||||
|
new class of provably safe control architectures to be used
|
||||||
|
in high assurance systems.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Related Papers:
|
### Related Papers:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[[reluplex-an-efficient-smt-solver-for-verifying-deep-neural-networks]]
|
[[reluplex-an-efficient-smt-solver-for-verifying-deep-neural-networks]]
|
||||||
[[evaluating-robustness-of-neural-networks-with-mixed-integer-programming]]
|
[[evaluating-robustness-of-neural-networks-with-mixed-integer-programming]]
|
||||||
[[formal-verification-of-neural-network-controlled-autonomous-systems]]
|
[[formal-verification-of-neural-network-controlled-autonomous-systems]]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
___________________________________________________________
|
___________________________________________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## **Temporal Logic Specifications for Autonomous Controller Synthesis**
|
## **Temporal Logic Specifications for Autonomous Controller Synthesis**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Goals:
|
### Goals:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The goal of this program is to use temporal logic
|
The goal of this program is to use temporal logic
|
||||||
specifications to procedurally generate autonomous
|
specifications to procedurally generate autonomous
|
||||||
supervisory controllers for a reactor system.
|
supervisory controllers for a reactor system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Outcomes:
|
### Outcomes:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
If this research is successful, I will have accomplished the
|
If this research is successful, I will have accomplished the
|
||||||
following:
|
following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -129,11 +160,13 @@ ___________________________________________________________
|
|||||||
## **Formally Verified Runtime Monitoring and Fallback**
|
## **Formally Verified Runtime Monitoring and Fallback**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Goals:
|
### Goals:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
If this research is successful, we will be able to generate
|
If this research is successful, we will be able to generate
|
||||||
autonomous controller shields that provably adhere to specifications
|
autonomous controller shields that provably adhere to specifications
|
||||||
written with temporal logic.
|
written with temporal logic.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Outcomes:
|
### Outcomes:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- Create an intermediary shield that mediates signals between an
|
- Create an intermediary shield that mediates signals between an
|
||||||
optimal control system and the physical plant (MODBUS)?
|
optimal control system and the physical plant (MODBUS)?
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -145,6 +178,7 @@ shield components will not allow an arbitrary controller to
|
|||||||
reach an unsafe state.
|
reach an unsafe state.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Impact:
|
### Impact:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Shielding is one of the preeminent ways to do safe machine
|
Shielding is one of the preeminent ways to do safe machine
|
||||||
learning controllers. Instead of putting the proof burden on
|
learning controllers. Instead of putting the proof burden on
|
||||||
the machine learning component, shielding creates a safe
|
the machine learning component, shielding creates a safe
|
||||||
@ -162,6 +196,7 @@ engineers of these systems to quickly and clearly implement
|
|||||||
a shield, without all of the cumbersome derivation.
|
a shield, without all of the cumbersome derivation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Related Papers:
|
### Related Papers:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[[on-using-real-time-reachability-for-the-safety-assurance-of-machine-learning-controllers]]
|
[[on-using-real-time-reachability-for-the-safety-assurance-of-machine-learning-controllers]]
|
||||||
[[enhancing-cyber-physical-system-dependability-via-synthesis-challenges-and-future-directions]]
|
[[enhancing-cyber-physical-system-dependability-via-synthesis-challenges-and-future-directions]]
|
||||||
[[safe-reinforcement-learning-via-shielding]]
|
[[safe-reinforcement-learning-via-shielding]]
|
||||||
@ -172,6 +207,7 @@ ___________________________________________________________
|
|||||||
(8)
|
(8)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Goals:
|
### Goals:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The goal of this research is to use machine learning to
|
The goal of this research is to use machine learning to
|
||||||
identify system faults of a reactor control system during
|
identify system faults of a reactor control system during
|
||||||
runtime. A digital twin will be compared to measurements
|
runtime. A digital twin will be compared to measurements
|
||||||
@ -181,6 +217,7 @@ that safety strategic decisions about the plant can be made
|
|||||||
autonomously.
|
autonomously.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Outcomes:
|
### Outcomes:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
|
For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
|
||||||
following:
|
following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -199,6 +236,7 @@ control modes rather than only responding with reactor
|
|||||||
shutdown.
|
shutdown.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Impact:
|
### Impact:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The nuclear energy industry's largest expense is operations
|
The nuclear energy industry's largest expense is operations
|
||||||
and maintenance (O&M). These costs include typical reactor repair
|
and maintenance (O&M). These costs include typical reactor repair
|
||||||
and refueling, the labor involved to complete such
|
and refueling, the labor involved to complete such
|
||||||
@ -229,17 +267,19 @@ Finally reactor safety can be improved by greater autonomy
|
|||||||
yada yada find some reasons to back this up.
|
yada yada find some reasons to back this up.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Related Papers:
|
### Related Papers:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
___________________________________________________________
|
___________________________________________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## **Verified Adaptive Control**
|
## **Verified Adaptive Control**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Goals:
|
### Goals:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The goal of this research is to create an adaptive controller
|
The goal of this research is to create an adaptive controller
|
||||||
that can adjust to system dynamics changes over time to maintain
|
that can adjust to system dynamics changes over time to maintain
|
||||||
an optimal control, while using formal methods to provide strong
|
an optimal control, while using formal methods to provide strong
|
||||||
safety guarantees about the malleable control law.
|
safety guarantees about the malleable control law.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Outcomes:
|
### Outcomes:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
|
For this research to be successful, I will accomplish the
|
||||||
following:
|
following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -259,6 +299,7 @@ suspended in the salt I'd assume chemistry is pretty strictly
|
|||||||
controlled. I'm sure I can find other examples.
|
controlled. I'm sure I can find other examples.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Impact:
|
### Impact:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Certain reactor control systems are already automatic systems,
|
Certain reactor control systems are already automatic systems,
|
||||||
such as constant temperature or pressure controls for operating
|
such as constant temperature or pressure controls for operating
|
||||||
at steady state. These simple controllers are able to follow load
|
at steady state. These simple controllers are able to follow load
|
||||||
@ -274,5 +315,3 @@ of safety in order to be attractive to the nuclear industry.
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
### Related Papers:
|
### Related Papers:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user