From 8a4e7a0e8bc201a118cf6bf72ff3dfa4977f424e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dane Sabo Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2025 10:32:11 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] vault backup: 2025-07-30 10:32:11 --- .obsidian/plugins/colored-tags/data.json | 3 +- Templates/Literature Note.md | 20 +- ... framework for advanced reactors-notes.md} | 8 +- ...oodAutonomousControlFramework2017-notes.md | 1 + .../albertiAutomationLevelsNuclear2023.md | 239 +++++++++++++----- .../woodAutonomousControlFramework2017.md | 24 +- 6 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) rename Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/{An autonomous control framework for advanced reactors-Note.md => An autonomous control framework for advanced reactors-notes.md} (95%) create mode 100644 Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/woodAutonomousControlFramework2017-notes.md diff --git a/.obsidian/plugins/colored-tags/data.json b/.obsidian/plugins/colored-tags/data.json index c6a28b70..10ec3340 100755 --- a/.obsidian/plugins/colored-tags/data.json +++ b/.obsidian/plugins/colored-tags/data.json @@ -318,7 +318,8 @@ "machine-learning": 306, "Remote-operation": 307, "Security": 308, - "Systematic-mapping-study": 309 + "Systematic-mapping-study": 309, + "InFirstPaks": 310 }, "_version": 3 } \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/Templates/Literature Note.md b/Templates/Literature Note.md index faaaa275..3800e423 100755 --- a/Templates/Literature Note.md +++ b/Templates/Literature Note.md @@ -1,40 +1,54 @@ --- + authors: {% for type, creators in creators | groupby('creatorType') -%} {% for creator in creators %} - "{% if creator.name %}{{ creator.name }}{% else %}{{ creator.lastName }}, {{ creator.firstName }}{% endif %}" {% endfor -%} {% endfor %} + citekey: "{{ citekey }}" + alias: "{{ citekey }}" + publish_date: {{ date | format("YYYY-MM-DD") }} + {% if itemType == "journalArticle" -%} journal: "{{ publicationTitle }}" {% endif -%} + {% if volume -%} volume: {{ volume }} {% endif -%} + {% if issue -%} issue: {{ issue }} {% endif -%} + {% if itemType == "bookSection" -%} book: "{{ publicationTitle }}" {% endif -%} + {% if publisher -%} publisher: "{{ publisher }}" {% endif -%} + {% if place -%} location: "{{ place }}" {% endif -%} + {% if pages -%} pages: {{ pages }} {% endif -%} + last_import: {{ importDate | format("YYYY-MM-DD") }} + --- # {{title}} ## Indexing Information + Published: {{ date | format("YYYY-MM") }} {% if DOI -%} @@ -99,10 +113,13 @@ Published: {{ date | format("YYYY-MM") }} >{% for r in relations %}[{{ r.title }}]({{ r.citekey }}){% if not loop.last %}, {% endif %}{% endfor %} ## Annotations + ### Notes -![[Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/{{ title | replace(':', '-') | replace('&', 'and') | replace('<', '') | replace('>', '') | replace('#', '') | replace('*', '') | replace('(', '') | replace(')', '') | replace('[', '') | replace(']', '') }}-notes.md]] + +![[Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/{{citekey}}-notes.md]] ### Highlights From Zotero + {#- Process non-Purple highlights -#} {% for a in annotations -%} {% if (a.type == "highlight" or a.type == "underline") and a.colorCategory != "Purple" %} @@ -119,6 +136,7 @@ Published: {{ date | format("YYYY-MM") }} {% else -%} >[!quote] Other Highlight {% endif -%} +> > {{ a.annotatedText }} > {{ a.date | format("YYYY-MM-DD h:mm a")}} >{% if a.comment %} diff --git a/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/An autonomous control framework for advanced reactors-Note.md b/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/An autonomous control framework for advanced reactors-notes.md similarity index 95% rename from Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/An autonomous control framework for advanced reactors-Note.md rename to Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/An autonomous control framework for advanced reactors-notes.md index cfc20bc7..27cbf521 100644 --- a/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/An autonomous control framework for advanced reactors-Note.md +++ b/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/An autonomous control framework for advanced reactors-notes.md @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ -# First Pass +# An autonomous control framework for advanced reactors notes + +## First Pass **Category:** This is a vision-like paper. @@ -22,7 +24,7 @@ with respect to how the nuclear industry is unique. Well written and clear, but a bit wordy at times. Examples are used but sometimes it just feels like a mouthful. -# Second Pass +## Second Pass **What is the main thrust?** Wood talks a lot about what it means for a system to be autonomous. He actually starts with a etymological argument- "*automatos* means self-acting, @@ -45,7 +47,7 @@ The biggest findings are that an autonomous control system for a nuclear power plant is possible, but by far the biggest roadblock is a high assurance decision making system. -# Third Pass +## Third Pass **Recreation Notes:** **Hidden Findings:** diff --git a/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/woodAutonomousControlFramework2017-notes.md b/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/woodAutonomousControlFramework2017-notes.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..38e64296 --- /dev/null +++ b/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/woodAutonomousControlFramework2017-notes.md @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +there is something here \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/albertiAutomationLevelsNuclear2023.md b/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/albertiAutomationLevelsNuclear2023.md index d0bbc49b..cbe749f4 100644 --- a/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/albertiAutomationLevelsNuclear2023.md +++ b/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/albertiAutomationLevelsNuclear2023.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ ---- +--- authors: - - "Alberti, Anthony L." +- "Alberti, Anthony L." - "Agarwal, Vivek" @@ -11,122 +11,227 @@ authors: - "de Oliveira, Cassiano R. E." -citekey: "albertiAutomationLevelsNuclear2023" -alias: "albertiAutomationLevelsNuclear2023" -publish_date: 2023-03-01 -journal: "Progress in Nuclear Energy" +citekey: "albertiAutomationLevelsNuclear2023" +alias: "albertiAutomationLevelsNuclear2023" +publish_date: +2023-03-01 journal: "Progress in Nuclear Energy" volume: 157 -pages: 104559 -last_import: 2025-07-30 +pages: 104559 +last_import: 2025-07-30 --- # Automation levels for nuclear reactor operations: A revised perspective -## Indexing Information -Published: 2023-03 +## Indexing Information Published: 2023-03 **DOI** [10.1016/j.pnucene.2022.104559](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pnucene.2022.104559) -#Small-modular-reactor, #Microreactor, #Advanced-sensors, #Artificial-intelligence, #Automation-levels, #Digital-twin, #Fission-battery, #Reduced-order-model +#Small-modular-reactor, #Microreactor, #Advanced-sensors, +#Artificial-intelligence, #Automation-levels, #Digital-twin, +#Fission-battery, #Reduced-order-model -#InFirstPass +#InFirstPaks ->[!Abstract] ->This work serves to propose updated levels of automation for nuclear reactor operations, as a result of considering long-term economic and commercial ambitions of the advanced reactor developer community. As in other fields such as road-going vehicles and aviation, reactor technologies can benefit from modern automation through the resulting reduction in operations and maintenance costs, while still maintaining the current industry standards regarding safety, resilience, reliability, overall performance, and the capacity for root-cause analysis. The current guidelines on automation levels, as published by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Section 9 of NUREG-0700, reflect outdated design principles that implicitly limit the potential of automation innovation for reactor operations, particularly in regard to advanced reactors intended to operate in remote locations or be used for off-grid applications. Motivated by the operational paradigms anticipated for future reactor designs, we propose a six-level approach that aligns with contemporary automation concepts as well as automation level definitions from other non-nuclear safety–critical industries. These levels build upon the current guidelines in order to enable next-generation nuclear reactor technologies to become increasingly economically competitive and commercially viable relative to competing power generation sources. Using a hypothetical heat removal reactor transient, we provide examples of how the human–machine interactions change at each level of automation, ranging from traditional operator control (Level 0) to operator-free unattended operations (Level 5)—the latter being one of the key attributes proposed at the Fission Battery Initiative led by Idaho National Laboratory. Finally, we critically examine the identified challenges, knowledge gaps, and enabling technologies to achieve advanced levels of automation.>[!seealso] Related Papers +>[!Abstract] This work serves to propose updated levels of +>automation for nuclear reactor operations, as a result of +>considering long-term economic and commercial ambitions of +>the advanced reactor developer community. As in other +>fields such as road-going vehicles and aviation, reactor +>technologies can benefit from modern automation through the +>resulting reduction in operations and maintenance costs, +>while still maintaining the current industry standards +>regarding safety, resilience, reliability, overall +>performance, and the capacity for root-cause analysis. The +>current guidelines on automation levels, as published by +>the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Section 9 of +>NUREG-0700, reflect outdated design principles that +>implicitly limit the potential of automation innovation for +>reactor operations, particularly in regard to advanced +>reactors intended to operate in remote locations or be used +>for off-grid applications. Motivated by the operational +>paradigms anticipated for future reactor designs, we +>propose a six-level approach that aligns with contemporary +>automation concepts as well as automation level definitions +>from other non-nuclear safety–critical industries. These +>levels build upon the current guidelines in order to enable +>next-generation nuclear reactor technologies to become +>increasingly economically competitive and commercially +>viable relative to competing power generation sources. +>Using a hypothetical heat removal reactor transient, we +>provide examples of how the human–machine interactions +>change at each level of automation, ranging from +>traditional operator control (Level 0) to operator-free +>unattended operations (Level 5)—the latter being one of the +>key attributes proposed at the Fission Battery Initiative +>led by Idaho National Laboratory. Finally, we critically +>examine the identified challenges, knowledge gaps, and +>enabling technologies to achieve advanced levels of +>automation.>[!seealso] Related Papers > -## Annotations -### Notes -![[Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/Automation levels for nuclear reactor operations- A revised perspective-notes.md]] +## Annotations ### Notes ![[Zettelkasten/Literature +Notes/Notes on Papers/Automation levels for nuclear reactor +operations- A revised perspective-notes.md]] ### Highlights From Zotero ->[!highlight] Highlight -> we propose a six-level approach that aligns with contemporary automation concepts as well as automation level definitions from other nonnuclear safety-critical industries. -> 2025-07-24 9:42 am +>[!highlight] Highlight we propose a six-level approach that +>aligns with contemporary automation concepts as well as +>automation level definitions from other nonnuclear +>safety-critical industries. 2025-07-24 9:42 am > ->[!done] Important -> For typical reactors in the current fleet, 70% of their non-fuel O&M costs relate to labor [12]. -> 2025-07-24 9:44 am +>[!done] Important For typical reactors in the current +>fleet, 70% of their non-fuel O&M costs relate to labor +>[12]. 2025-07-24 9:44 am > ->[!tip] Brilliant -> The various levels of automation, as per Section 9 of NUREG-0700, ultimately rely on a human-in-the-loop to monitor plant performance and intervene when necessary. Under these guidelines, automation technology aims to provide operator support, rather than replace operator duties in regard to sustained day-to-day operational and tactical control. -> 2025-07-24 9:51 am +>[!tip] Brilliant The various levels of automation, as per +>Section 9 of NUREG-0700, ultimately rely on a +>human-in-the-loop to monitor plant performance and +>intervene when necessary. Under these guidelines, +>automation technology aims to provide operator support, +>rather than replace operator duties in regard to sustained +>day-to-day operational and tactical control. 2025-07-24 +>9:51 am > ->[!tip] Brilliant -> Recognizing that operations plans contradicting these guidelines can receive NRC approval through sufficient reasoning, we posit that this requirement implicitly limits the ambitions and desired operational paradigms of the advanced reactor developer community, and creates a potentially detrimental disconnect with the regulator. This is particularly applicable in the case of fully autonomous human-out-of-the-loop-based operations (a key facet of the “unattended” attribute adopted in the FB Initiative [21]). -> 2025-07-24 9:51 am +>[!tip] Brilliant Recognizing that operations plans +>contradicting these guidelines can receive NRC approval +>through sufficient reasoning, we posit that this +>requirement implicitly limits the ambitions and desired +>operational paradigms of the advanced reactor developer +>community, and creates a potentially detrimental disconnect +>with the regulator. This is particularly applicable in the +>case of fully autonomous human-out-of-the-loop-based +>operations (a key facet of the “unattended” attribute +>adopted in the FB Initiative [21]). 2025-07-24 9:51 am > ->[!done] Important -> In terms of classifying tasks for automation in nuclear power plant operations, O’Hara and Higgins break down the tasks for which reactor operators are responsible into two general types: primary and secondary [23]. Primary tasks, which are the main focus of this work, directly impact the overall functionality and safety of the plant. Secondary tasks encompass all other intermediate tasks, such as navigating, arranging, and interrogating information at workstations and control panels [24, 23]. -> 2025-07-24 11:22 am +>[!done] Important In terms of classifying tasks for +>automation in nuclear power plant operations, O’Hara and +>Higgins break down the tasks for which reactor operators +>are responsible into two general types: primary and +>secondary [23]. Primary tasks, which are the main focus of +>this work, directly impact the overall functionality and +>safety of the plant. Secondary tasks encompass all other +>intermediate tasks, such as navigating, arranging, and +>interrogating information at workstations and control +>panels [24, 23]. 2025-07-24 11:22 am > ->[!tip] Brilliant -> Monitoring and detection covers activities related to obtaining information about a system or subsystem. This can simply mean tracking parameters on a control panel or sending personnel to visually verify that a component is functioning properly. Situation assessment refers to evaluating obtained data and determining the state of a system or subsystem. This typically involves understanding whether the given plant or system is operating properly. If any anomaly is found, the underlying causes are investigated. Response planning refers to determining proper courses of action, based on the situation assessment. Response implementation encompasses performing the actions identified in the response plan. -> 2025-07-24 11:29 am +>[!tip] Brilliant Monitoring and detection covers activities +>related to obtaining information about a system or +>subsystem. This can simply mean tracking parameters on a +>control panel or sending personnel to visually verify that +>a component is functioning properly. Situation assessment +>refers to evaluating obtained data and determining the +>state of a system or subsystem. This typically involves +>understanding whether the given plant or system is +>operating properly. If any anomaly is found, the underlying +>causes are investigated. Response planning refers to +>determining proper courses of action, based on the +>situation assessment. Response implementation encompasses +>performing the actions identified in the response plan. +>2025-07-24 11:29 am > -> *This is all really important, and outlines the chain of actions that a nuclear plant operator would take.* +> *This is all really important, and outlines the chain of +> actions that a nuclear plant operator would take.* ->[!highlight] Highlight -> Strategic operations consider the questions of whether, when, and where. -> 2025-07-28 11:38 am +>[!highlight] Highlight Strategic operations consider the +>questions of whether, when, and where. 2025-07-28 11:38 am > ->[!highlight] Highlight -> Operational and tactical operations pertain to the context of vehicle motion. These impact longitudinal (acceleration/deceleration) and lateral (steering) actions, object detection, maneuver planning, and response execution. The number/combination of automated driving tasks—as well as which operational design domain they fall underlargely determine the automation level of a particular driving task. -> 2025-07-28 11:38 am +>[!highlight] Highlight Operational and tactical operations +>pertain to the context of vehicle motion. These impact +>longitudinal (acceleration/deceleration) and lateral +>(steering) actions, object detection, maneuver planning, +>and response execution. The number/combination of automated +>driving tasks—as well as which operational design domain +>they fall underlargely determine the automation level of a +>particular driving task. 2025-07-28 11:38 am > ->[!highlight] Highlight -> The minimal risk condition is a predetermined state in which either a user or automated system recognizes a potentially hazardous situation and subsequently circumnavigates it to minimize risk. Fallback is the response to encountering a potentially hazardous situation -> 2025-07-28 11:43 am +>[!highlight] Highlight The minimal risk condition is a +>predetermined state in which either a user or automated +>system recognizes a potentially hazardous situation and +>subsequently circumnavigates it to minimize risk. Fallback +>is the response to encountering a potentially hazardous +>situation 2025-07-28 11:43 am > ->[!tip] Brilliant -> Level 3: The system recognizes a crash scene and requests that the driver resume control and provide fallback (e.g., engage hazard lights and enter the unobstructed shoulder lane). Level 4/5: Even if the driver is unresponsive to the fallback request, the automated system is able to achieve the minimal risk condition or circumnavigate the hazard. -> 2025-07-28 11:44 am +>[!tip] Brilliant Level 3: The system recognizes a crash +>scene and requests that the driver resume control and +>provide fallback (e.g., engage hazard lights and enter the +>unobstructed shoulder lane). Level 4/5: Even if the driver +>is unresponsive to the fallback request, the automated +>system is able to achieve the minimal risk condition or +>circumnavigate the hazard. 2025-07-28 11:44 am > ->[!done] Important -> The automation tipping point occurs at Level 4, with the automated flight system becoming able to sufficiently control operational and tactical tasks, such that a human pilot is no longer required. Rather, the ECA suggests the implementation of a mission commander, who is in command but not in control. -> 2025-07-28 11:48 am +>[!done] Important The automation tipping point occurs at +>Level 4, with the automated flight system becoming able to +>sufficiently control operational and tactical tasks, such +>that a human pilot is no longer required. Rather, the ECA +>suggests the implementation of a mission commander, who is +>in command but not in control. 2025-07-28 11:48 am > -> *Higher levels of optimization actually reduce the training demand of operators. We see this all over the place with things like ChatGPT. They remove the grunt work so the human can think **strategically**.* +> *Higher levels of optimization actually reduce the +> training demand of operators. We see this all over the +> place with things like ChatGPT. They remove the grunt work +> so the human can think **strategically**.* ->[!tip] Brilliant -> At Level 5, the commander simply provides strategic commands to the system—without controlling the aircraft at any point. -> 2025-07-28 11:48 am +>[!tip] Brilliant At Level 5, the commander simply provides +>strategic commands to the system—without controlling the +>aircraft at any point. 2025-07-28 11:48 am > ->[!done] Important -> Additionally, we assume strategic operations to not be automated at any level. These are reserved for human command, either onsite via an operator or reactor supervisor, or offsite via a reactor supervisor. Only operational and tactical tasks are considered for automation. -> 2025-07-28 11:53 am +>[!done] Important Additionally, we assume strategic +>operations to not be automated at any level. These are +>reserved for human command, either onsite via an operator +>or reactor supervisor, or offsite via a reactor supervisor. +>Only operational and tactical tasks are considered for +>automation. 2025-07-28 11:53 am > ->[!highlight] Highlight -> Following the definition presented by the SAE, automatic active safety systems (e.g., the ADS in the ESBWR) are not classified as automated. Rather, these systems provide safety measures to ensure the ultimate safety of the plant, and thus should be included at every automation level. -> 2025-07-28 12:59 pm +>[!highlight] Highlight Following the definition presented +>by the SAE, automatic active safety systems (e.g., the ADS +>in the ESBWR) are not classified as automated. Rather, +>these systems provide safety measures to ensure the +>ultimate safety of the plant, and thus should be included +>at every automation level. 2025-07-28 12:59 pm > ### Follow-Ups ->[!example] - >In the present paradigm, much of this automation comes in the form of operator support. Examples include computerized operator support systems that assess various alarms and provide fault diagnoses to operators [26, 27, 28, 29], computer-based procedure systems that provide necessary data and procedures to assist operators by identifying tasks in real-time to foster safety goal achievement [30, 31, 32], and the automatic activation of primary safety systems (e.g., emergency core cooling systems) during severe accidents. - >- [ ] #Follow-Up +>[!example] In the present paradigm, much of this automation +>comes in the form of operator support. Examples include +>computerized operator support systems that assess various +>alarms and provide fault diagnoses to operators [26, 27, +>28, 29], computer-based procedure systems that provide +>necessary data and procedures to assist operators by +>identifying tasks in real-time to foster safety goal +>achievement [30, 31, 32], and the automatic activation of +>primary safety systems (e.g., emergency core cooling +>systems) during severe accidents. +>- [ ] #Follow-Up ->[!example] - >[23] J.M. OHara and J.C. Higgins. Human-system Interfaces to Automatic Systems: Review Guidance and Technical Basis. Technical Report BNL–91017-2010, 1013461, 2010. URL https://doi.org/10.2172/1013461. [24] John M. O’Hara, William S. Brown, Paul M. Lewis, and J.J. Persensky. The Effects of Interface Management Tasks on Crew Performance and Safety in Complex, Computer-Based Systems: Overview and Main Findings (NUREG/CR-6690), 2002. URL https://www.nrc.gov/ reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr6690/vol1/index.html. - >- [ ] #Follow-Up +>[!example] [23] J.M. OHara and J.C. Higgins. Human-system +>Interfaces to Automatic Systems: Review Guidance and +>Technical Basis. Technical Report BNL–91017-2010, 1013461, +>2010. URL https://doi.org/10.2172/1013461. [24] John M. +>O’Hara, William S. Brown, Paul M. Lewis, and J.J. +>Persensky. The Effects of Interface Management Tasks on +>Crew Performance and Safety in Complex, Computer-Based +>Systems: Overview and Main Findings (NUREG/CR-6690), 2002. +>URL https://www.nrc.gov/ +>reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr6690/vol1/index.html. +>- [ ] #Follow-Up diff --git a/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/woodAutonomousControlFramework2017.md b/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/woodAutonomousControlFramework2017.md index 66c0caa3..abd46389 100644 --- a/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/woodAutonomousControlFramework2017.md +++ b/Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/woodAutonomousControlFramework2017.md @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ --- + authors: - "Wood, Richard T." @@ -7,19 +8,25 @@ authors: - "Floyd, Dan C." + citekey: "woodAutonomousControlFramework2017" + alias: "woodAutonomousControlFramework2017" + publish_date: 2017-08-01 + journal: "Nuclear Engineering and Technology" volume: 49 issue: 5 pages: 896-904 last_import: 2025-07-30 + --- # An autonomous control framework for advanced reactors ## Indexing Information + Published: 2017-08 **DOI** @@ -36,57 +43,69 @@ Published: 2017-08 > ## Annotations + ### Notes -![[Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/An autonomous control framework for advanced reactors-notes.md]] + +![[Zettelkasten/Literature Notes/Notes on Papers/woodAutonomousControlFramework2017-notes.md]] ### Highlights From Zotero >[!tip] Brilliant +> > The long-term economic viability of these advanced reactor plants depends on significant reductions in plant operations and maintenance costs. To accomplish these goals, intelligent control and diagnostic capabilities are needed to provide nearly autonomous operations with anticipatory maintenance. > 2025-07-06 12:44 pm > >[!done] Important +> > An SMR is generally characterized by: (1) an electrical generating capacity of less than 300 MWe (megawatt electric), (2) a primary system that is entirely or substantially fabricated within a factory, and (3) a primary system that can be transported by truck or rail to the plant site. > 2025-07-06 12:47 pm > >[!tip] Brilliant +> > he current US nuclear industry average for O&M staff is roughly one person per every 2 megawatts of generated power. > 2025-07-06 12:48 pm > >[!done] Important +> > Current automated control technologies for nuclear power plants are reasonably mature, and highly automated control for an SMR is clearly feasible under optimum circumstances. Autonomous control is primarily intended to account for the nonoptimum circumstances when degradation, failure, and other off-normal events challenge the performance of the reactor, and the capability for immediate human intervention is constrained. There are clear gaps in the development and demonstration of autonomous control capabilities for the specific domain of nuclear power operations. > 2025-07-06 1:04 pm > >[!done] Important +> > Autonomy extends the scope of primary control functions. Such capabilities can consist of automated control during all operating modes, process performance optimization (e.g., self-tuning), continuous monitoring, and diagnosis of performance indicators as well as trends for operational and safety-related parameters, diagnosis of component health, flexible control to address both anticipated and unanticipated events and to provide protection of life-limited components (such as batteries and actuators), adaptation to changing or degrading conditions, and validation and maintenance of control system performance. Key characteristics of autonomy include intelligence, robustness, optimization, flexibility, and adaptability. Intelligence facilitates minimal or no reliance on human intervention and can accommodate an integrated, whole system approach to control. It implies embedded decision-making and management/planning authority. Intelligence in control provides for anticipatory action based on system knowledge and event prediction. > 2025-07-06 6:03 pm > >[!highlight] Highlight +> > As a minimum requirement of autonomy, the SMR plant control system must be able to switch between normal operational modes automatically (i.e., automatic control). Additionally, reactor protective action must be available if the desired operational conditions cannot be achieved. > 2025-07-06 6:07 pm > >[!done] Important +> > Unlike conventional reactor operational concepts, in which the primary defense against potentially adverse conditions resulting from off-normal events is to scram the reactor, the objective of autonomous control is to limit the progression of off-normal events and minimize the need for shutdown. This is especially true in situations where the nuclear power plant is the stabilizing generation source on a small electric grid. > 2025-07-06 6:10 pm > >[!tip] Brilliant +> > To illustrate the autonomous functionality that can be provided for the SMR plant control system, two fault management scenarios are considered in which detection and response are described. The first scenario relates to fault adaptation in the case of sensor failure. The indicators from surveillance and diagnostic functions that the plant control system can employ include divergence of redundant measurements, conflict between predicted (based on analytical or relational estimation) and measured values, and detection and isolation of a confirmed fault. The prospective response can include substitution of a redundant measurement or utilization of a diverse measurement. An example of the latter would be using neutron flux instead of temperature (i.e., core thermal power) as a power measurement. Switching to an alternate control algorithm may prove necessary for faulted or suspect measurements. The second scenario relates to fault avoidance in the case of a degrading actuator. The indicators of an incipient failure can be prediction of actuator failure based on prognostic modeling (e.g., fault forecasting) or detection of sluggish response to commands. The prospective response can be to switch to an alternate control strategy to avoid incipient failure by reducing stress on the suspect component. An example would be utilizing manipulation of core heat removal (e.g., coolant density change) instead of direct reactivity insertion (e.g., control element movement) to control reactor power. > 2025-07-06 6:15 pm > >[!done] Important +> > Although having a highly reliable plant control system is important, that fact is of limited value if the control system cannot accommodate plant degradation without immediate human intervention or scram. In such a case, the result is a highly reliable control system that becomes ineffective because the plant has changed. > 2025-07-06 6:16 pm > >[!highlight] Highlight +> > A three-level hierarchy is typical for robotic applications [8,30,31]. The three layers in top-to-bottom hierarchical order are the planner layer, the executive layer, and the functional layer. The general concept of the hierarchy is that commands are issued by higher levels to lower levels, and response data flows from lower levels to higher levels in the multi-tiered framework. Intelligence increases with increasing level within the hierarchy. Each of the three interacting tiers has a principal role. Basically, the functional layer provides direct control, the executive layer provides sequencing of action, and the planner layer provides deliberative planning. > 2025-07-06 6:19 pm > @@ -95,16 +114,19 @@ Published: 2017-08 >[!tip] Brilliant +> > Key characteristics that are feasible through autonomous control include Intelligence to confirm system performance and detect degraded or failed conditions Optimization to minimize stress on SMR components and efficiently react to operational events without compromising system integrity Robustness to accommodate uncertainties and changing conditions Flexibility and adaptability to accommodate failures through reconfiguration among available control system elements or adjustment of control system strategies, algorithms, or parameters > 2025-07-06 12:51 pm > >[!done] Important +> > Given anticipated operational imperatives to utilize technology with demonstrated (or at least high probability) readiness, it is not practical to strive for the high-end extreme of autonomy in first-generation SMRs. Instead, modest advancement beyond fully automatic control to allow extended fault tolerance for anticipated events or degraded conditions and some predefined reconfigurability is the most realistic goal for an initial application of SMR plant autonomous control. > 2025-07-06 1:00 pm > >[!tip] Brilliant +> > The primary technical gap relates to decision capabilities (e.g., strategic, interpretive, adaptive, predictive). Technology development and demonstration activities are needed to provide the desired technical readiness for implementation of an SMR autonomous control system. In particular, the capabilities to monitor, trend, detect, diagnose, decide, and self-adjust must be established within an integrated functional architecture to enable control system autonomy. > 2025-07-06 1:00 pm >