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alias: tee-hee-hee
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# An autonomous control framework for advanced reactors notes
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## First Pass
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@ -31,114 +31,271 @@ Published: 2017-08
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**DOI**
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[10.1016/j.net.2017.07.001](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.net.2017.07.001)
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#Autonomous-Control, #Instrumentation-and-Control-System, #Small-Modular-Reactor
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#Autonomous-Control, #Instrumentation-and-Control-System,
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#Small-Modular-Reactor
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#InSecondPass
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>[!Abstract]
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>Several Generation IV nuclear reactor concepts have goals for optimizing investment recovery through phased introduction of multiple units on a common site with shared facilities and/or reconfigurable energy conversion systems. Additionally, small modular reactors are suitable for remote deployment to support highly localized microgrids in isolated, underdeveloped regions. The long-term economic viability of these advanced reactor plants depends on significant reductions in plant operations and maintenance costs. To accomplish these goals, intelligent control and diagnostic capabilities are needed to provide nearly autonomous operations with anticipatory maintenance. A nearly autonomous control system should enable automatic operation of a nuclear power plant while adapting to equipment faults and other upsets. It needs to have many intelligent capabilities, such as diagnosis, simulation, analysis, planning, reconfigurability, self-validation, and decision. These capabilities have been the subject of research for many years, but an autonomous control system for nuclear power generation remains as-yet an unrealized goal. This article describes a functional framework for intelligent, autonomous control that can facilitate the integration of control, diagnostic, and decision-making capabilities to satisfy the operational and performance goals of power plants based on multimodular advanced reactors.>[!seealso] Related Papers
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>[!Abstract] Several Generation IV nuclear reactor concepts
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>have goals for optimizing investment recovery through
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>phased introduction of multiple units on a common site with
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>shared facilities and/or reconfigurable energy conversion
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>systems. Additionally, small modular reactors are suitable
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>for remote deployment to support highly localized
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>microgrids in isolated, underdeveloped regions. The
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>long-term economic viability of these advanced reactor
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>plants depends on significant reductions in plant
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>operations and maintenance costs. To accomplish these
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>goals, intelligent control and diagnostic capabilities are
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>needed to provide nearly autonomous operations with
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>anticipatory maintenance. A nearly autonomous control
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>system should enable automatic operation of a nuclear power
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>plant while adapting to equipment faults and other upsets.
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>It needs to have many intelligent capabilities, such as
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>diagnosis, simulation, analysis, planning,
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>reconfigurability, self-validation, and decision. These
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>capabilities have been the subject of research for many
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>years, but an autonomous control system for nuclear power
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>generation remains as-yet an unrealized goal. This article
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>describes a functional framework for intelligent,
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>autonomous control that can facilitate the integration of
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>control, diagnostic, and decision-making capabilities to
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>satisfy the operational and performance goals of power
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>plants based on multimodular advanced reactors.>[!seealso]
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>Related Papers
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>
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## Annotations
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### Notes
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[[tee hee]]
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[[wood]]
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### Highlights From Zotero
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>[!tip] Brilliant
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>
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> The long-term economic viability of these advanced reactor plants depends on significant reductions in plant operations and maintenance costs. To accomplish these goals, intelligent control and diagnostic capabilities are needed to provide nearly autonomous operations with anticipatory maintenance.
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> 2025-07-06 12:44 pm
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> The long-term economic viability of these advanced reactor
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> plants depends on significant reductions in plant
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> operations and maintenance costs. To accomplish these
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> goals, intelligent control and diagnostic capabilities are
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> needed to provide nearly autonomous operations with
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> anticipatory maintenance. 2025-07-06 12:44 pm
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>
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>[!done] Important
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>
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> An SMR is generally characterized by: (1) an electrical generating capacity of less than 300 MWe (megawatt electric), (2) a primary system that is entirely or substantially fabricated within a factory, and (3) a primary system that can be transported by truck or rail to the plant site.
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> 2025-07-06 12:47 pm
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> An SMR is generally characterized by: (1) an electrical
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> generating capacity of less than 300 MWe (megawatt
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> electric), (2) a primary system that is entirely or
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> substantially fabricated within a factory, and (3) a
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> primary system that can be transported by truck or rail to
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> the plant site. 2025-07-06 12:47 pm
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>
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>[!tip] Brilliant
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>
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> he current US nuclear industry average for O&M staff is roughly one person per every 2 megawatts of generated power.
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> 2025-07-06 12:48 pm
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> he current US nuclear industry average for O&M staff is
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> roughly one person per every 2 megawatts of generated
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> power. 2025-07-06 12:48 pm
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>
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>[!done] Important
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>
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> Current automated control technologies for nuclear power plants are reasonably mature, and highly automated control for an SMR is clearly feasible under optimum circumstances. Autonomous control is primarily intended to account for the nonoptimum circumstances when degradation, failure, and other off-normal events challenge the performance of the reactor, and the capability for immediate human intervention is constrained. There are clear gaps in the development and demonstration of autonomous control capabilities for the specific domain of nuclear power operations.
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> 2025-07-06 1:04 pm
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> Current automated control technologies for nuclear power
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> plants are reasonably mature, and highly automated
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> control for an SMR is clearly feasible under optimum
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> circumstances. Autonomous control is primarily intended to
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> account for the nonoptimum circumstances when degradation,
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> failure, and other off-normal events challenge the
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> performance of the reactor, and the capability for
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> immediate human intervention is constrained. There are
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> clear gaps in the development and demonstration of
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> autonomous control capabilities for the specific domain of
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> nuclear power operations. 2025-07-06 1:04 pm
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>
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>[!done] Important
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>
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> Autonomy extends the scope of primary control functions. Such capabilities can consist of automated control during all operating modes, process performance optimization (e.g., self-tuning), continuous monitoring, and diagnosis of performance indicators as well as trends for operational and safety-related parameters, diagnosis of component health, flexible control to address both anticipated and unanticipated events and to provide protection of life-limited components (such as batteries and actuators), adaptation to changing or degrading conditions, and validation and maintenance of control system performance. Key characteristics of autonomy include intelligence, robustness, optimization, flexibility, and adaptability. Intelligence facilitates minimal or no reliance on human intervention and can accommodate an integrated, whole system approach to control. It implies embedded decision-making and management/planning authority. Intelligence in control provides for anticipatory action based on system knowledge and event prediction.
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> 2025-07-06 6:03 pm
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> Autonomy extends the scope of primary control functions.
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> Such capabilities can consist of automated control during
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> all operating modes, process performance optimization
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> (e.g., self-tuning), continuous monitoring, and diagnosis
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> of performance indicators as well as trends for
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> operational and safety-related parameters, diagnosis of
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> component health, flexible control to address both
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> anticipated and unanticipated events and to provide
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> protection of life-limited components (such as batteries
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> and actuators), adaptation to changing or degrading
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> conditions, and validation and maintenance of control
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> system performance. Key characteristics of autonomy
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> include intelligence, robustness, optimization,
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> flexibility, and adaptability. Intelligence facilitates
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> minimal or no reliance on human intervention and can
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> accommodate an integrated, whole system approach to
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> control. It implies embedded decision-making and
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> management/planning authority. Intelligence in control
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> provides for anticipatory action based on system knowledge
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> and event prediction. 2025-07-06 6:03 pm
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>
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>[!highlight] Highlight
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>
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> As a minimum requirement of autonomy, the SMR plant control system must be able to switch between normal operational modes automatically (i.e., automatic control). Additionally, reactor protective action must be available if the desired operational conditions cannot be achieved.
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> As a minimum requirement of autonomy, the SMR plant
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> control system must be able to switch between normal
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> operational modes automatically (i.e., automatic control).
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> Additionally, reactor protective action must be available
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> if the desired operational conditions cannot be achieved.
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> 2025-07-06 6:07 pm
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>
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>[!done] Important
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>
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> Unlike conventional reactor operational concepts, in which the primary defense against potentially adverse conditions resulting from off-normal events is to scram the reactor, the objective of autonomous control is to limit the progression of off-normal events and minimize the need for shutdown. This is especially true in situations where the nuclear power plant is the stabilizing generation source on a small electric grid.
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> 2025-07-06 6:10 pm
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> Unlike conventional reactor operational concepts, in which
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> the primary defense against potentially adverse conditions
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> resulting from off-normal events is to scram the reactor,
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> the objective of autonomous control is to limit the
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> progression of off-normal events and minimize the need for
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> shutdown. This is especially true in situations where the
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> nuclear power plant is the stabilizing generation source
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> on a small electric grid. 2025-07-06 6:10 pm
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>
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>[!tip] Brilliant
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>
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> To illustrate the autonomous functionality that can be provided for the SMR plant control system, two fault management scenarios are considered in which detection and response are described. The first scenario relates to fault adaptation in the case of sensor failure. The indicators from surveillance and diagnostic functions that the plant control system can employ include divergence of redundant measurements, conflict between predicted (based on analytical or relational estimation) and measured values, and detection and isolation of a confirmed fault. The prospective response can include substitution of a redundant measurement or utilization of a diverse measurement. An example of the latter would be using neutron flux instead of temperature (i.e., core thermal power) as a power measurement. Switching to an alternate control algorithm may prove necessary for faulted or suspect measurements. The second scenario relates to fault avoidance in the case of a degrading actuator. The indicators of an incipient failure can be prediction of actuator failure based on prognostic modeling (e.g., fault forecasting) or detection of sluggish response to commands. The prospective response can be to switch to an alternate control strategy to avoid incipient failure by reducing stress on the suspect component. An example would be utilizing manipulation of core heat removal (e.g., coolant density change) instead of direct reactivity insertion (e.g., control element movement) to control reactor power.
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> 2025-07-06 6:15 pm
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> To illustrate the autonomous functionality that can be
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> provided for the SMR plant control system, two fault
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> management scenarios are considered in which detection and
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> response are described. The first scenario relates to
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> fault adaptation in the case of sensor failure. The
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> indicators from surveillance and diagnostic functions that
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> the plant control system can employ include divergence of
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> redundant measurements, conflict between predicted (based
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> on analytical or relational estimation) and measured
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> values, and detection and isolation of a confirmed fault.
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> The prospective response can include substitution of a
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> redundant measurement or utilization of a diverse
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> measurement. An example of the latter would be using
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> neutron flux instead of temperature (i.e., core thermal
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> power) as a power measurement. Switching to an alternate
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> control algorithm may prove necessary for faulted or
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> suspect measurements. The second scenario relates to fault
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> avoidance in the case of a degrading actuator. The
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> indicators of an incipient failure can be prediction of
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> actuator failure based on prognostic modeling (e.g., fault
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> forecasting) or detection of sluggish response to
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> commands. The prospective response can be to switch to an
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> alternate control strategy to avoid incipient failure by
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> reducing stress on the suspect component. An example would
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> be utilizing manipulation of core heat removal (e.g.,
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> coolant density change) instead of direct reactivity
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> insertion (e.g., control element movement) to control
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> reactor power. 2025-07-06 6:15 pm
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>
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>[!done] Important
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>
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> Although having a highly reliable plant control system is important, that fact is of limited value if the control system cannot accommodate plant degradation without immediate human intervention or scram. In such a case, the result is a highly reliable control system that becomes ineffective because the plant has changed.
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> 2025-07-06 6:16 pm
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> Although having a highly reliable plant control system is
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> important, that fact is of limited value if the control
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> system cannot accommodate plant degradation without
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> immediate human intervention or scram. In such a case, the
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> result is a highly reliable control system that becomes
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> ineffective because the plant has changed. 2025-07-06 6:16
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> pm
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>
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>[!highlight] Highlight
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>
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> A three-level hierarchy is typical for robotic applications [8,30,31]. The three layers in top-to-bottom hierarchical order are the planner layer, the executive layer, and the functional layer. The general concept of the hierarchy is that commands are issued by higher levels to lower levels, and response data flows from lower levels to higher levels in the multi-tiered framework. Intelligence increases with increasing level within the hierarchy. Each of the three interacting tiers has a principal role. Basically, the functional layer provides direct control, the executive layer provides sequencing of action, and the planner layer provides deliberative planning.
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> 2025-07-06 6:19 pm
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> A three-level hierarchy is typical for robotic
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> applications [8,30,31]. The three layers in top-to-bottom
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> hierarchical order are the planner layer, the executive
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> layer, and the functional layer. The general concept of
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> the hierarchy is that commands are issued by higher levels
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> to lower levels, and response data flows from lower levels
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> to higher levels in the multi-tiered framework.
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> Intelligence increases with increasing level within the
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> hierarchy. Each of the three interacting tiers has a
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> principal role. Basically, the functional layer provides
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> direct control, the executive layer provides sequencing of
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> action, and the planner layer provides deliberative
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> planning. 2025-07-06 6:19 pm
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>
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> *Kinda mimmics the Purdue model? Application layer, scada layer, then what would be enterprise layer?*
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> *Kinda mimmics the Purdue model? Application layer, scada
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> layer, then what would be enterprise layer?*
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>[!tip] Brilliant
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>
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> Key characteristics that are feasible through autonomous control include Intelligence to confirm system performance and detect degraded or failed conditions Optimization to minimize stress on SMR components and efficiently react to operational events without compromising system integrity Robustness to accommodate uncertainties and changing conditions Flexibility and adaptability to accommodate failures through reconfiguration among available control system elements or adjustment of control system strategies, algorithms, or parameters
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> 2025-07-06 12:51 pm
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> Key characteristics that are feasible through autonomous
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> control include Intelligence to confirm system
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> performance and detect degraded or failed conditions
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> Optimization to minimize stress on SMR components and
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> efficiently react to operational events without
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> compromising system integrity Robustness to accommodate
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> uncertainties and changing conditions Flexibility and
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> adaptability to accommodate failures through
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> reconfiguration among available control system elements or
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> adjustment of control system strategies, algorithms, or
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> parameters 2025-07-06 12:51 pm
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>
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>[!done] Important
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>
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> Given anticipated operational imperatives to utilize technology with demonstrated (or at least high probability) readiness, it is not practical to strive for the high-end extreme of autonomy in first-generation SMRs. Instead, modest advancement beyond fully automatic control to allow extended fault tolerance for anticipated events or degraded conditions and some predefined reconfigurability is the most realistic goal for an initial application of SMR plant autonomous control.
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> Given anticipated operational imperatives to utilize
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> technology with demonstrated (or at least high
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> probability) readiness, it is not practical to strive for
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> the high-end extreme of autonomy in first-generation SMRs.
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> Instead, modest advancement beyond fully automatic control
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> to allow extended fault tolerance for anticipated events
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> or degraded conditions and some predefined
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> reconfigurability is the most realistic goal for an
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> initial application of SMR plant autonomous control.
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> 2025-07-06 1:00 pm
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>
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>[!tip] Brilliant
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>
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> The primary technical gap relates to decision capabilities (e.g., strategic, interpretive, adaptive, predictive). Technology development and demonstration activities are needed to provide the desired technical readiness for implementation of an SMR autonomous control system. In particular, the capabilities to monitor, trend, detect, diagnose, decide, and self-adjust must be established within an integrated functional architecture to enable control system autonomy.
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> 2025-07-06 1:00 pm
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> The primary technical gap relates to decision capabilities
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> (e.g., strategic, interpretive, adaptive, predictive).
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> Technology development and demonstration activities are
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> needed to provide the desired technical readiness for
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> implementation of an SMR autonomous control system. In
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> particular, the capabilities to monitor, trend, detect,
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> diagnose, decide, and self-adjust must be established
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> within an integrated functional architecture to enable
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> control system autonomy. 2025-07-06 1:00 pm
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>
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### Follow-Ups
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>[!example]
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>One of the most fully digital plants currently in operation in the United States is the Oconee Nuclear Station [14]. The three units at Oconee have digital reactor protection systems and a digital integrated control system (ICS). The digital ICS coordinates the main control actions of multiple control loops through an integrated master controller that establishes feedforward control demands based on desired overall core thermal power. The ICS also has provisions for supplementary support actions among control loops to facilitate optimized performance.
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>- [ ] #Follow-Up
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>[!example] One of the most fully digital plants currently
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>in operation in the United States is the Oconee Nuclear
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>Station [14]. The three units at Oconee have digital
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>reactor protection systems and a digital integrated control
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>system (ICS). The digital ICS coordinates the main control
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>actions of multiple control loops through an integrated
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>master controller that establishes feedforward control
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>demands based on desired overall core thermal power. The
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>ICS also has provisions for supplementary support actions
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>among control loops to facilitate optimized performance.
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>- [ ] #Follow-Up
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>[!example]
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>There is an architectural approach for nearly autonomous control systems that has been developed through simulated nuclear power applications (see Fig. 2). As part of research into advanced multimodular nuclear reactor concepts, such as the ALMR, the International Reactor Innovative and Secure (IRIS), and representative advanced SMR concepts, a supervisory control system architecture was devised [24e26]. This approach provides a framework for autonomous control while supporting a high-level interface with operations staff, who can act as plant supervisors. The final authority for decisions and goal setting remains with the human, but the control system assumes expanded responsibilities for normal control action, abnormal event response, and system fault tolerance.
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>- [ ] #Follow-Up
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>[!example] There is an architectural approach for nearly
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>autonomous control systems that has been developed through
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>simulated nuclear power applications (see Fig. 2). As part
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>of research into advanced multimodular nuclear reactor
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>concepts, such as the ALMR, the International Reactor
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>Innovative and Secure (IRIS), and representative advanced
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>SMR concepts, a supervisory control system architecture was
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>devised [24e26]. This approach provides a framework for
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>autonomous control while supporting a high-level interface
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>with operations staff, who can act as plant supervisors.
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>The final authority for decisions and goal setting remains
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>with the human, but the control system assumes expanded
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>responsibilities for normal control action, abnormal event
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>response, and system fault tolerance.
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>- [ ] #Follow-Up
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