Auto sync: 2025-10-15 17:52:13 (15 files changed)
M .task/backlog.data M .task/completed.data M .task/pending.data M .task/undo.data M Writing/ERLM/main.aux M Writing/ERLM/main.bbl M Writing/ERLM/main.blg M Writing/ERLM/main.fdb_latexmk
This commit is contained in:
parent
08e01cbcb7
commit
4f1c224393
@ -108,3 +108,9 @@
|
||||
{"description":"Complete peer review with Simeona","due":"20251009T040000Z","end":"20251009T200847Z","entry":"20251008T183016Z","modified":"20251009T200847Z","project":"ERLM","status":"completed","uuid":"a2970741-1bdf-4f67-a63f-40da1f96315e"}
|
||||
{"description":"Find INL person Robert mentioned","due":"20251008T040000Z","end":"20251009T200847Z","entry":"20251008T183121Z","modified":"20251009T200847Z","project":"Internship","status":"completed","uuid":"4e709e7a-91f6-47ad-af29-11d3c2cee3d9"}
|
||||
{"description":"Read Opportunities, Challenges, and Research Needs for Remote Microreactor Operations","entry":"20250910T150523Z","modified":"20251009T200934Z","project":"thesis","start":"20251009T200934Z","status":"pending","uuid":"96c76e6b-5c33-4f54-a156-5c59e718f01a","tags":["reading"]}
|
||||
{"description":"Edit goals and outcomes to adjust capabilities. What is new capability, not research task","end":"20251015T183612Z","entry":"20250924T164236Z","modified":"20251015T183612Z","project":"ERLM","status":"completed","uuid":"ce706282-31bb-4cba-882d-86f09a76045d","tags":["writing"]}
|
||||
{"description":"Write metrics of success section","end":"20251015T183612Z","entry":"20251008T183024Z","modified":"20251015T183612Z","project":"ERLM","status":"completed","uuid":"3bf52991-f8df-4387-9a79-0b5f14f2c5d1","tags":["writing"]}
|
||||
{"description":"Find out what 10 CFR is. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.34 and 10 CFR 55.59. Emergency Operating Procedures?","entry":"20251015T212147Z","modified":"20251015T212147Z","project":"thesis","status":"pending","uuid":"b0192186-bcbc-4d5c-a156-5e83fdfeda69"}
|
||||
{"description":"edit State of the art","entry":"20251015T215116Z","modified":"20251015T215116Z","project":"ERLM","status":"pending","uuid":"fb11e8ef-4884-4e7e-b5fa-b00bb22c27d9"}
|
||||
{"description":"Write whitepaper","due":"20251020T040000Z","entry":"20251015T215139Z","modified":"20251015T215139Z","project":"ERLM","status":"pending","uuid":"52b4cc9a-33c7-472b-b3b6-3e9504649e19","depends":["fb11e8ef-4884-4e7e-b5fa-b00bb22c27d9"]}
|
||||
{"description":"Rewrite state of the art for nuclear controls engineering and hybrid systems","due":"20250929T040000Z","end":"20251015T215159Z","entry":"20250924T164019Z","modified":"20251015T215159Z","project":"ERLM","status":"completed","uuid":"e0636009-9061-47d0-9b59-1f2464a252a7","tags":["editing"]}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
|
||||
[description:"Rewrite state of the art for nuclear controls engineering and hybrid systems" due:"1759118400" end:"1760565119" entry:"1758732019" modified:"1760565119" project:"ERLM" status:"completed" tags:"editing" tags_editing:"x" uuid:"e0636009-9061-47d0-9b59-1f2464a252a7"]
|
||||
[description:"Edit goals and outcomes to adjust capabilities. What is new capability, not research task" end:"1760553372" entry:"1758732156" modified:"1760553372" project:"ERLM" status:"completed" tags:"writing" tags_writing:"x" uuid:"ce706282-31bb-4cba-882d-86f09a76045d"]
|
||||
[description:"Write metrics of success section" end:"1760553372" entry:"1759948224" modified:"1760553372" project:"ERLM" status:"completed" tags:"writing" tags_writing:"x" uuid:"3bf52991-f8df-4387-9a79-0b5f14f2c5d1"]
|
||||
[description:"Complete peer review with Simeona" due:"1759982400" end:"1760040527" entry:"1759948216" modified:"1760040527" project:"ERLM" status:"completed" uuid:"a2970741-1bdf-4f67-a63f-40da1f96315e"]
|
||||
[description:"Find INL person Robert mentioned" due:"1759896000" end:"1760040527" entry:"1759948281" modified:"1760040527" project:"Internship" status:"completed" uuid:"4e709e7a-91f6-47ad-af29-11d3c2cee3d9"]
|
||||
[description:"Edit goals and outcomes" end:"1759950170" entry:"1758731993" modified:"1759950172" project:"ERLM" status:"deleted" uuid:"bbc41e22-c647-4209-9500-382e0321b625"]
|
||||
[description:"Fix pagination that Dan was complaining about" end:"1759950177" entry:"1758732224" modified:"1759950177" project:"ERLM" status:"completed" uuid:"306c574b-c3f6-4363-914b-f1eddda04543"]
|
||||
[description:"Write zettel about lipschitz continuity" end:"1759948076" entry:"1757625029" modified:"1759948084" status:"completed" tags:"zk" tags_zk:"x" uuid:"b7f68988-8c06-4d18-bf77-91d7e39fd55f"]
|
||||
|
||||
@ -29,12 +29,10 @@
|
||||
[description:"Learning Local Control Barrier Functions for Hybrid Systems (2024)" entry:"1758125087" modified:"1758125087" project:"thesis" status:"pending" tags:"reading" tags_reading:"x" uuid:"3abf4246-566a-4ba8-b392-cbab5d7a9aa0"]
|
||||
[description:"Model Predictive Control of Stochastic Hybrid Systems with Signal Temporal Logic Constraints (2025)" entry:"1758125087" modified:"1758125087" project:"thesis" status:"pending" tags:"reading" tags_reading:"x" uuid:"320ec48e-134f-462f-ac3c-ffaf70698691"]
|
||||
[description:"Online Control Synthesis for Uncertain Systems under Signal Temporal Logic Specifications (2024)" entry:"1758125087" modified:"1758125087" project:"thesis" status:"pending" tags:"reading" tags_reading:"x" uuid:"b47de464-8a66-45d2-b487-6588a60c8112"]
|
||||
[description:"Rewrite state of the art for nuclear controls engineering and hybrid systems" due:"1759118400" entry:"1758732019" modified:"1758732076" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" tags:"editing" tags_editing:"x" uuid:"e0636009-9061-47d0-9b59-1f2464a252a7"]
|
||||
[description:"Edit goals and outcomes to adjust capabilities. What is new capability, not research task" entry:"1758732156" modified:"1758732156" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" tags:"writing" tags_writing:"x" uuid:"ce706282-31bb-4cba-882d-86f09a76045d"]
|
||||
[description:"Add research tasks to research approach section" entry:"1758732208" modified:"1758732208" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" tags:"editing,writing" tags_editing:"x" tags_writing:"x" uuid:"56028c48-5a4b-46cd-a40e-ada624cf6187"]
|
||||
[description:"Complete broader impacts peer review" due:"1759464000" entry:"1759418173" modified:"1759418173" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" uuid:"a5877ce8-f750-413d-8ec1-0e9429395cee"]
|
||||
[description:"Complete peer review with Simeona" due:"1759982400" end:"1760040527" entry:"1759948216" modified:"1760040527" project:"ERLM" status:"completed" uuid:"a2970741-1bdf-4f67-a63f-40da1f96315e"]
|
||||
[description:"Write metrics of success section" entry:"1759948224" modified:"1759948224" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" tags:"writing" tags_writing:"x" uuid:"3bf52991-f8df-4387-9a79-0b5f14f2c5d1"]
|
||||
[description:"Make list of internship spots" due:"1760068800" entry:"1759948253" modified:"1759948253" project:"Internship" status:"pending" uuid:"e978e178-5069-44a6-b9de-c835bdf1774f"]
|
||||
[description:"Find INL person Robert mentioned" due:"1759896000" end:"1760040527" entry:"1759948281" modified:"1760040527" project:"Internship" status:"completed" uuid:"4e709e7a-91f6-47ad-af29-11d3c2cee3d9"]
|
||||
[description:"Do intial play around with Emerson Ovation system" due:"1760068800" entry:"1759949018" modified:"1759949018" status:"pending" uuid:"1116b9e1-e2a9-44e3-939a-1ca7f66d3eea"]
|
||||
[description:"Find out what 10 CFR is. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.34 and 10 CFR 55.59. Emergency Operating Procedures?" entry:"1760563307" modified:"1760563307" project:"thesis" status:"pending" uuid:"b0192186-bcbc-4d5c-a156-5e83fdfeda69"]
|
||||
[description:"edit State of the art" entry:"1760565076" modified:"1760565076" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" uuid:"fb11e8ef-4884-4e7e-b5fa-b00bb22c27d9"]
|
||||
[dep_fb11e8ef-4884-4e7e-b5fa-b00bb22c27d9:"x" depends:"fb11e8ef-4884-4e7e-b5fa-b00bb22c27d9" description:"Write whitepaper" due:"1760932800" entry:"1760565099" modified:"1760565099" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" uuid:"52b4cc9a-33c7-472b-b3b6-3e9504649e19"]
|
||||
|
||||
@ -371,3 +371,24 @@ time 1760040574
|
||||
old [description:"Read Opportunities, Challenges, and Research Needs for Remote Microreactor Operations" entry:"1757516723" modified:"1758125189" project:"thesis" status:"pending" tags:"reading" tags_reading:"x" uuid:"96c76e6b-5c33-4f54-a156-5c59e718f01a"]
|
||||
new [description:"Read Opportunities, Challenges, and Research Needs for Remote Microreactor Operations" entry:"1757516723" modified:"1760040574" project:"thesis" start:"1760040574" status:"pending" tags:"reading" tags_reading:"x" uuid:"96c76e6b-5c33-4f54-a156-5c59e718f01a"]
|
||||
---
|
||||
time 1760553372
|
||||
old [description:"Edit goals and outcomes to adjust capabilities. What is new capability, not research task" entry:"1758732156" modified:"1758732156" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" tags:"writing" tags_writing:"x" uuid:"ce706282-31bb-4cba-882d-86f09a76045d"]
|
||||
new [description:"Edit goals and outcomes to adjust capabilities. What is new capability, not research task" end:"1760553372" entry:"1758732156" modified:"1760553372" project:"ERLM" status:"completed" tags:"writing" tags_writing:"x" uuid:"ce706282-31bb-4cba-882d-86f09a76045d"]
|
||||
---
|
||||
time 1760553372
|
||||
old [description:"Write metrics of success section" entry:"1759948224" modified:"1759948224" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" tags:"writing" tags_writing:"x" uuid:"3bf52991-f8df-4387-9a79-0b5f14f2c5d1"]
|
||||
new [description:"Write metrics of success section" end:"1760553372" entry:"1759948224" modified:"1760553372" project:"ERLM" status:"completed" tags:"writing" tags_writing:"x" uuid:"3bf52991-f8df-4387-9a79-0b5f14f2c5d1"]
|
||||
---
|
||||
time 1760563307
|
||||
new [description:"Find out what 10 CFR is. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.34 and 10 CFR 55.59. Emergency Operating Procedures?" entry:"1760563307" modified:"1760563307" project:"thesis" status:"pending" uuid:"b0192186-bcbc-4d5c-a156-5e83fdfeda69"]
|
||||
---
|
||||
time 1760565076
|
||||
new [description:"edit State of the art" entry:"1760565076" modified:"1760565076" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" uuid:"fb11e8ef-4884-4e7e-b5fa-b00bb22c27d9"]
|
||||
---
|
||||
time 1760565099
|
||||
new [dep_fb11e8ef-4884-4e7e-b5fa-b00bb22c27d9:"x" depends:"fb11e8ef-4884-4e7e-b5fa-b00bb22c27d9" description:"Write whitepaper" due:"1760932800" entry:"1760565099" modified:"1760565099" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" uuid:"52b4cc9a-33c7-472b-b3b6-3e9504649e19"]
|
||||
---
|
||||
time 1760565119
|
||||
old [description:"Rewrite state of the art for nuclear controls engineering and hybrid systems" due:"1759118400" entry:"1758732019" modified:"1758732076" project:"ERLM" status:"pending" tags:"editing" tags_editing:"x" uuid:"e0636009-9061-47d0-9b59-1f2464a252a7"]
|
||||
new [description:"Rewrite state of the art for nuclear controls engineering and hybrid systems" due:"1759118400" end:"1760565119" entry:"1758732019" modified:"1760565119" project:"ERLM" status:"completed" tags:"editing" tags_editing:"x" uuid:"e0636009-9061-47d0-9b59-1f2464a252a7"]
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,21 +2,80 @@
|
||||
\bibstyle{unsrt}
|
||||
\providecommand \oddpage@label [2]{}
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {1}Goals and Outcomes}{1}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\citation{DOE-HDBK-1028-2009,WNA2020,Wang2025}
|
||||
\citation{10CFR55}
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {2}State of the Art and Limits of Current Practice}{2}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {3}Research Approach}{2}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {3.1}$(Procedures \wedge FRET) \rightarrow Temporal Specifications$}{3}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {3.2}$(TemporalLogic \wedge ReactiveSynthesis) \rightarrow DiscreteAutomata$}{4}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {3.3}$(DiscreteAutomata \wedge ControlTheory \wedge Reachability) \rightarrow ContinuousModes$}{5}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {2.1}Current Reactor Control Practices}{2}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\citation{Kemeny1979}
|
||||
\citation{Kemeny1979}
|
||||
\citation{NUREG-0899}
|
||||
\citation{10CFR55}
|
||||
\citation{IAEA-TECDOC-1580}
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {2.1.1}Human Operators Retain Ultimate Decision Authority}{3}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {2.1.2}Operating Procedures Lack Formal Verification}{3}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\citation{Zerovnik2023}
|
||||
\citation{Jo2021}
|
||||
\citation{IAEA2008}
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {2.1.3}Control Mode Transitions Lack Formal Safety Verification}{4}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {2.1.4}Current Automation Reveals the Hybrid Dynamics Challenge}{4}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\citation{Lee2019}
|
||||
\citation{IEEE2019}
|
||||
\citation{DOE-HDBK-1028-2009,WNA2020}
|
||||
\citation{IAEA-severe-accidents}
|
||||
\citation{Wang2025}
|
||||
\citation{Dumas1999}
|
||||
\citation{Kemeny1979}
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {2.2}Human Factors in Nuclear Accidents}{5}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {2.2.1}Human Error Dominates Nuclear Incident Causation}{5}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {2.2.2}Three Mile Island Revealed Critical Human-Automation Interaction Failures}{5}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\citation{NUREG-CR-6883}
|
||||
\citation{NUREG-2114}
|
||||
\citation{Rasmussen1983}
|
||||
\citation{Miller1956}
|
||||
\citation{Reason1990}
|
||||
\citation{Kiniry2022}
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {2.2.3}Human Reliability Analysis Documents Fundamental Cognitive Limitations}{6}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {2.3}HARDENS: Discrete Control with Gaps in Hybrid Dynamics}{6}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {2.3.1}Rigorous Digital Engineering Demonstrated Feasibility}{6}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {2.3.2}Comprehensive Formal Methods Toolkit Provided Verification}{7}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {2.3.3}Critical Limitation: Discrete Control Logic Only}{7}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\citation{Kiniry2022}
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {2.3.4}Experimental Validation Gap Limits Technology Readiness}{8}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {2.4}Research Imperative: Formal Hybrid Control Synthesis}{8}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {3}Research Approach}{9}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {3.1}$(Procedures \wedge FRET) \rightarrow Temporal Specifications$}{10}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {3.2}$(TemporalLogic \wedge ReactiveSynthesis) \rightarrow DiscreteAutomata$}{11}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {3.3}$(DiscreteAutomata \wedge ControlTheory \wedge Reachability) \rightarrow ContinuousModes$}{12}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\citation{eia_lcoe_2022}
|
||||
\citation{eesi_datacenter_2024}
|
||||
\citation{eia_lcoe_2022}
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {3.4}Broader Impacts}{7}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {4}Metrics for Success}{8}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {paragraph}{TRL 3 \textit {Critical Function and Proof of Concept}}{9}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {paragraph}{TRL 4 \textit {Laboratory Testing of Integrated Components}}{9}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {paragraph}{TRL 5 \textit {Laboratory Testing in Relevant Environment}}{9}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {3.4}Broader Impacts}{14}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{\numberline {4}Metrics for Success}{15}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {paragraph}{TRL 3 \textit {Critical Function and Proof of Concept}}{16}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {paragraph}{TRL 4 \textit {Laboratory Testing of Integrated Components}}{16}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {paragraph}{TRL 5 \textit {Laboratory Testing in Relevant Environment}}{16}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\bibdata{references}
|
||||
\bibcite{eia_lcoe_2022}{1}
|
||||
\bibcite{eesi_datacenter_2024}{2}
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{References}{11}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\gdef \@abspage@last{12}
|
||||
\bibcite{DOE-HDBK-1028-2009}{1}
|
||||
\bibcite{WNA2020}{2}
|
||||
\bibcite{Wang2025}{3}
|
||||
\bibcite{10CFR55}{4}
|
||||
\bibcite{Kemeny1979}{5}
|
||||
\bibcite{NUREG-0899}{6}
|
||||
\bibcite{IAEA-TECDOC-1580}{7}
|
||||
\bibcite{Zerovnik2023}{8}
|
||||
\bibcite{Jo2021}{9}
|
||||
\bibcite{IAEA2008}{10}
|
||||
\bibcite{Lee2019}{11}
|
||||
\bibcite{IEEE2019}{12}
|
||||
\bibcite{IAEA-severe-accidents}{13}
|
||||
\bibcite{Dumas1999}{14}
|
||||
\bibcite{NUREG-CR-6883}{15}
|
||||
\@writefile{toc}{\contentsline {section}{References}{18}{}\protected@file@percent }
|
||||
\bibcite{NUREG-2114}{16}
|
||||
\bibcite{Rasmussen1983}{17}
|
||||
\bibcite{Miller1956}{18}
|
||||
\bibcite{Reason1990}{19}
|
||||
\bibcite{Kiniry2022}{20}
|
||||
\bibcite{eia_lcoe_2022}{21}
|
||||
\bibcite{eesi_datacenter_2024}{22}
|
||||
\gdef \@abspage@last{20}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,4 +1,113 @@
|
||||
\begin{thebibliography}{1}
|
||||
\begin{thebibliography}{10}
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{DOE-HDBK-1028-2009}
|
||||
{U.S. Department of Energy}.
|
||||
\newblock Human performance handbook.
|
||||
\newblock Handbook DOE-HDBK-1028-2009, U.S. Department of Energy, 2009.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{WNA2020}
|
||||
{World Nuclear Association}.
|
||||
\newblock Safety of nuclear power reactors.
|
||||
\newblock \url{https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/safety-of-nuclear-power-reactors.aspx}, 2020.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{Wang2025}
|
||||
Y.~Wang et~al.
|
||||
\newblock Analysis of human error in nuclear power plant operations: A systematic review of events from 2007--2020.
|
||||
\newblock {\em Journal of Nuclear Safety}, 2025.
|
||||
\newblock Analysis of 190 events at Chinese nuclear power plants.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{10CFR55}
|
||||
{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}.
|
||||
\newblock Operators' licenses.
|
||||
\newblock 10 CFR Part 55.
|
||||
\newblock Code of Federal Regulations.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{Kemeny1979}
|
||||
John~G. Kemeny et~al.
|
||||
\newblock Report of the president's commission on the accident at three mile island.
|
||||
\newblock Technical report, President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, October 1979.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{NUREG-0899}
|
||||
{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}.
|
||||
\newblock Guidelines for the preparation of emergency operating procedures.
|
||||
\newblock Technical Report NUREG-0899, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1982.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{IAEA-TECDOC-1580}
|
||||
{International Atomic Energy Agency}.
|
||||
\newblock Good practices for cost effective maintenance of nuclear power plants.
|
||||
\newblock Technical Report TECDOC-1580, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{Zerovnik2023}
|
||||
Gašper \v{Z}erovnik et~al.
|
||||
\newblock Knowledge transfer challenges in nuclear operations.
|
||||
\newblock {\em Nuclear Engineering and Design}, 2023.
|
||||
\newblock Analysis of knowledge transfer from experienced operators.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{Jo2021}
|
||||
Y.~Jo et~al.
|
||||
\newblock Automation paradox in nuclear power plant control: Effects on operator situation awareness.
|
||||
\newblock {\em Nuclear Engineering and Technology}, 2021.
|
||||
\newblock Empirical study of automation effects on operator performance.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{IAEA2008}
|
||||
{International Atomic Energy Agency}.
|
||||
\newblock Modern instrumentation and control for nuclear power plants: A guidebook.
|
||||
\newblock Technical Report Technical Reports Series No. 387, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2008.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{Lee2019}
|
||||
D.~Lee et~al.
|
||||
\newblock Autonomous control of nuclear reactors using long short-term memory networks.
|
||||
\newblock {\em Nuclear Engineering and Technology}, 2019.
|
||||
\newblock Demonstration of LSTM-based autonomous control in LOC and SGTR scenarios.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{IEEE2019}
|
||||
{IEEE Working Group}.
|
||||
\newblock Formal verification challenges for nuclear i\&c systems.
|
||||
\newblock In {\em IEEE Conference on Nuclear Power Instrumentation, Control and Human-Machine Interface Technologies}, 2019.
|
||||
\newblock Discussion of state space explosion in formal verification.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{IAEA-severe-accidents}
|
||||
{International Atomic Energy Agency}.
|
||||
\newblock Human error as root cause in severe nuclear accidents.
|
||||
\newblock IAEA Safety Report.
|
||||
\newblock Analysis of TMI, Chernobyl, and Fukushima accidents.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{Dumas1999}
|
||||
Lloyd Dumas.
|
||||
\newblock Worker error and safety in nuclear facilities.
|
||||
\newblock {\em Journal of Nuclear Safety}, 1999.
|
||||
\newblock Study of incidents at 10 nuclear centers.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{NUREG-CR-6883}
|
||||
D.~Gertman et~al.
|
||||
\newblock The spar-h human reliability analysis method.
|
||||
\newblock Technical Report NUREG/CR-6883, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2005.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{NUREG-2114}
|
||||
{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}.
|
||||
\newblock Cognitive basis for human reliability analysis.
|
||||
\newblock Technical Report NUREG-2114, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2016.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{Rasmussen1983}
|
||||
J.~Rasmussen.
|
||||
\newblock Skills, rules, and knowledge; signals, signs, and symbols, and other distinctions in human performance models.
|
||||
\newblock {\em IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics}, SMC-13(3):257--266, 1983.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{Miller1956}
|
||||
George~A. Miller.
|
||||
\newblock The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information.
|
||||
\newblock {\em Psychological Review}, 63(2):81--97, 1956.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{Reason1990}
|
||||
James Reason.
|
||||
\newblock {\em Human Error}.
|
||||
\newblock Cambridge University Press, 1990.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{Kiniry2022}
|
||||
Joseph Kiniry, Alexander Bakst, Michal Podhradsky, Simon Hansen, and Andrew Bivin.
|
||||
\newblock High assurance rigorous digital engineering for nuclear safety (hardens) final technical report.
|
||||
\newblock Technical Report ML22326A307, Galois, Inc. / U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2022.
|
||||
\newblock NRC Contract 31310021C0014.
|
||||
|
||||
\bibitem{eia_lcoe_2022}
|
||||
{U.S. Energy Information Administration}.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3,44 +3,44 @@ Capacity: max_strings=200000, hash_size=200000, hash_prime=170003
|
||||
The top-level auxiliary file: main.aux
|
||||
The style file: unsrt.bst
|
||||
Database file #1: references.bib
|
||||
You've used 2 entries,
|
||||
You've used 22 entries,
|
||||
1791 wiz_defined-function locations,
|
||||
458 strings with 3888 characters,
|
||||
and the built_in function-call counts, 290 in all, are:
|
||||
= -- 27
|
||||
> -- 8
|
||||
< -- 0
|
||||
+ -- 4
|
||||
- -- 2
|
||||
* -- 7
|
||||
:= -- 58
|
||||
add.period$ -- 8
|
||||
call.type$ -- 2
|
||||
change.case$ -- 3
|
||||
583 strings with 7229 characters,
|
||||
and the built_in function-call counts, 3301 in all, are:
|
||||
= -- 301
|
||||
> -- 125
|
||||
< -- 7
|
||||
+ -- 54
|
||||
- -- 32
|
||||
* -- 109
|
||||
:= -- 599
|
||||
add.period$ -- 77
|
||||
call.type$ -- 22
|
||||
change.case$ -- 23
|
||||
chr.to.int$ -- 0
|
||||
cite$ -- 2
|
||||
duplicate$ -- 11
|
||||
empty$ -- 31
|
||||
format.name$ -- 2
|
||||
if$ -- 62
|
||||
cite$ -- 22
|
||||
duplicate$ -- 161
|
||||
empty$ -- 341
|
||||
format.name$ -- 32
|
||||
if$ -- 726
|
||||
int.to.chr$ -- 0
|
||||
int.to.str$ -- 2
|
||||
missing$ -- 0
|
||||
newline$ -- 15
|
||||
num.names$ -- 2
|
||||
pop$ -- 7
|
||||
int.to.str$ -- 22
|
||||
missing$ -- 10
|
||||
newline$ -- 124
|
||||
num.names$ -- 22
|
||||
pop$ -- 67
|
||||
preamble$ -- 1
|
||||
purify$ -- 0
|
||||
quote$ -- 0
|
||||
skip$ -- 3
|
||||
skip$ -- 49
|
||||
stack$ -- 0
|
||||
substring$ -- 0
|
||||
swap$ -- 1
|
||||
text.length$ -- 0
|
||||
substring$ -- 44
|
||||
swap$ -- 21
|
||||
text.length$ -- 7
|
||||
text.prefix$ -- 0
|
||||
top$ -- 0
|
||||
type$ -- 0
|
||||
warning$ -- 0
|
||||
while$ -- 2
|
||||
width$ -- 3
|
||||
write$ -- 27
|
||||
while$ -- 26
|
||||
width$ -- 24
|
||||
write$ -- 253
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
|
||||
# Fdb version 4
|
||||
["bibtex main"] 1760371279.11218 "main.aux" "main.bbl" "main" 1760371325.03652 0
|
||||
"./references.bib" 1759167577.47323 10304 77c9387d6b0ce7e1af7f15e6fb0e19c3 ""
|
||||
["bibtex main"] 1760562752.25076 "main.aux" "main.bbl" "main" 1760562753.16807 0
|
||||
"./references.bib" 1760562704.16405 17887 8c959c4bb228b5a8c44fd08ed0751b05 ""
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/bibtex/bst/base/unsrt.bst" 1292289607 18030 1376b4b231b50c66211e47e42eda2875 ""
|
||||
"main.aux" 1760371324.88752 1796 6a1daf4bdc6fce37d52aa731f75f74de "pdflatex"
|
||||
"main.aux" 1760562753.03383 5119 322e9dee8ead67f6f988fe1574ee1461 "pdflatex"
|
||||
(generated)
|
||||
"main.bbl"
|
||||
"main.blg"
|
||||
(rewritten before read)
|
||||
["pdflatex"] 1760371324.17014 "main.tex" "main.pdf" "main" 1760371325.03677 0
|
||||
["pdflatex"] 1760562752.27567 "main.tex" "main.pdf" "main" 1760562753.16828 0
|
||||
"/etc/texmf/web2c/texmf.cnf" 1722610814.59577 475 c0e671620eb5563b2130f56340a5fde8 ""
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/enc/dvips/base/8r.enc" 1165713224 4850 80dc9bab7f31fb78a000ccfed0e27cab ""
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/map/fontname/texfonts.map" 1577235249 3524 cb3e574dea2d1052e39280babc910dc8 ""
|
||||
@ -32,10 +32,12 @@
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/cm/cmr10.tfm" 1136768653 1296 45809c5a464d5f32c8f98ba97c1bb47f ""
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/cm/cmr12.tfm" 1136768653 1288 655e228510b4c2a1abe905c368440826 ""
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/cm/cmsy10.tfm" 1136768653 1124 6c73e740cf17375f03eec0ee63599741 ""
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/cm/cmtt12.tfm" 1136768653 772 9a936b7f5e2ff0557fce0f62822f0bbf ""
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/rsfs/rsfs10.tfm" 1229303445 688 37338d6ab346c2f1466b29e195316aa4 ""
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmmi10.pfb" 1248133631 36299 5f9df58c2139e7edcf37c8fca4bd384d ""
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmr10.pfb" 1248133631 35752 024fb6c41858982481f6968b5fc26508 ""
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmsy10.pfb" 1248133631 32569 5e5ddc8df908dea60932f3c484a54c0d ""
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmtt12.pfb" 1248133631 24252 1e4e051947e12dfb50fee0b7f4e26e3a ""
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/symbol/usyr.pfb" 1136849748 33709 b09d2e140b7e807d3a97058263ab6693 ""
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/times/utmb8a.pfb" 1136849748 44729 811d6c62865936705a31c797a1d5dada ""
|
||||
"/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/times/utmbi8a.pfb" 1136849748 44656 0cbca70e0534538582128f6b54593cca ""
|
||||
@ -236,12 +238,12 @@
|
||||
"broader-impacts/v1.tex" 1759167577.47123 4916 8f9b155145119717e181909e7ce40ed4 ""
|
||||
"dane_proposal_format.cls" 1760370937.93092 2555 2a01bb8bad8f4ed4e921f0e44566678c ""
|
||||
"goals-and-outcomes/v6.tex" 1759931957.10694 6070 286ca847b1aac31431e0658cd2989ea2 ""
|
||||
"main.aux" 1760371324.88752 1796 6a1daf4bdc6fce37d52aa731f75f74de "pdflatex"
|
||||
"main.bbl" 1760371279.12868 534 c978a85388337a36f349b54afe9a8b11 "bibtex main"
|
||||
"main.tex" 1760367999.00949 262 41f010b5e8ebf8fc9a0521daebd96d8e ""
|
||||
"main.aux" 1760562753.03383 5119 322e9dee8ead67f6f988fe1574ee1461 "pdflatex"
|
||||
"main.bbl" 1760562752.26982 5077 d6ff10b25ca0659d0f11499aae407631 "bibtex main"
|
||||
"main.tex" 1760562742.31168 262 9f602b4fd5277ffe357ac290893d6a07 ""
|
||||
"metrics-of-success/v1.tex" 1760371276.72563 6867 9f08b3208bb158042e2fc9bbfeecae68 ""
|
||||
"research-approach/v3.tex" 1759939583.16696 17351 6ed3e4ff3c33dd86d80597dbdb0cf36f ""
|
||||
"state-of-the-art/v3.tex" 1759932892.29406 956 1c5dc5397b94b907f165191b875edbeb ""
|
||||
"state-of-the-art/v4.tex" 1760562682.16681 27511 990507df5d11f6d75319d3b7758df3ce ""
|
||||
(generated)
|
||||
"main.aux"
|
||||
"main.log"
|
||||
|
||||
@ -413,60 +413,67 @@ INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/vf/adobe/times/ptmr7t.vf
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmr8r.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/vf/adobe/times/ptmb7t.vf
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmb8r.tfm
|
||||
INPUT ./state-of-the-art/v3.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./state-of-the-art/v3.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./state-of-the-art/v3.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./state-of-the-art/v3.tex
|
||||
INPUT state-of-the-art/v3.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./state-of-the-art/v4.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./state-of-the-art/v4.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./state-of-the-art/v4.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./state-of-the-art/v4.tex
|
||||
INPUT state-of-the-art/v4.tex
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmri7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/vf/adobe/times/ptmri7t.vf
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmri8r.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7m.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7m.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7m.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7y.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7y.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7y.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7v.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7v.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7v.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmb7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmb7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmri7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmri7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/amsfonts/symbols/msam10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/amsfonts/symbols/msam10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/amsfonts/symbols/msam10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/amsfonts/symbols/msbm10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/amsfonts/symbols/msbm10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/amsfonts/symbols/msbm10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/tex/latex/psnfss/ts1ptm.fd
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/tex/latex/psnfss/ts1ptm.fd
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/tex/latex/psnfss/ts1ptm.fd
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmr8c.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/vf/adobe/times/zptmcm7t.vf
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/symbol/psyr.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/cm/cmr10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/vf/adobe/times/zptmcm7y.vf
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/cm/cmsy10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/symbol/psyr.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmr8r.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/rsfs/rsfs10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/vf/adobe/times/zptmcm7t.vf
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/cm/cmr10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/vf/adobe/times/zptmcm7y.vf
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/cm/cmsy10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/rsfs/rsfs10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/vf/adobe/times/ptmr8c.vf
|
||||
INPUT ./research-approach/v3.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./research-approach/v3.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./research-approach/v3.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./research-approach/v3.tex
|
||||
INPUT research-approach/v3.tex
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7m.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7m.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7m.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7y.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7y.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7y.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7v.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7v.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/zptmcm7v.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmb7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmb7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmri7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmri7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmri7t.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/amsfonts/symbols/msam10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/amsfonts/symbols/msam10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/amsfonts/symbols/msam10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/amsfonts/symbols/msbm10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/amsfonts/symbols/msbm10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/amsfonts/symbols/msbm10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/vf/adobe/times/zptmcm7t.vf
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/symbol/psyr.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/cm/cmr10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/vf/adobe/times/zptmcm7m.vf
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/psyro.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/cm/cmmi10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmri8r.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/vf/adobe/times/zptmcm7y.vf
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/cm/cmsy10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/rsfs/rsfs10.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/vf/adobe/times/ptmri7t.vf
|
||||
INPUT ./broader-impacts/v1.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./broader-impacts/v1.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./broader-impacts/v1.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./broader-impacts/v1.tex
|
||||
INPUT broader-impacts/v1.tex
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/tex/latex/psnfss/ts1ptm.fd
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/tex/latex/psnfss/ts1ptm.fd
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/tex/latex/psnfss/ts1ptm.fd
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmr8c.tfm
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/vf/adobe/times/ptmr8c.vf
|
||||
INPUT ./metrics-of-success/v1.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./metrics-of-success/v1.tex
|
||||
INPUT ./metrics-of-success/v1.tex
|
||||
@ -478,10 +485,12 @@ INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/adobe/times/ptmbi8r.tfm
|
||||
INPUT ./main.bbl
|
||||
INPUT ./main.bbl
|
||||
INPUT main.bbl
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/tfm/public/cm/cmtt12.tfm
|
||||
INPUT main.aux
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmmi10.pfb
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmr10.pfb
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmsy10.pfb
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmtt12.pfb
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/symbol/usyr.pfb
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/times/utmb8a.pfb
|
||||
INPUT /usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/times/utmbi8a.pfb
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
This is pdfTeX, Version 3.141592653-2.6-1.40.25 (TeX Live 2023/Debian) (preloaded format=pdflatex 2024.9.10) 13 OCT 2025 12:02
|
||||
This is pdfTeX, Version 3.141592653-2.6-1.40.25 (TeX Live 2023/Debian) (preloaded format=pdflatex 2024.9.10) 15 OCT 2025 17:12
|
||||
entering extended mode
|
||||
restricted \write18 enabled.
|
||||
file:line:error style messages enabled.
|
||||
@ -876,36 +876,50 @@ LaTeX Font Info: Font shape `OT1/ptm/bx/n' in size <8> not available
|
||||
(Font) Font shape `OT1/ptm/b/n' tried instead on input line 5.
|
||||
[1
|
||||
|
||||
{/var/lib/texmf/fonts/map/pdftex/updmap/pdftex.map}{/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/enc/dvips/base/8r.enc}] (./goals-and-outcomes/v6.tex [1]) (./state-of-the-art/v3.tex) (./research-approach/v3.tex
|
||||
{/var/lib/texmf/fonts/map/pdftex/updmap/pdftex.map}{/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/enc/dvips/base/8r.enc}] (./goals-and-outcomes/v6.tex [1]) (./state-of-the-art/v4.tex
|
||||
Overfull \hbox (1.5749pt too wide) in paragraph at lines 30--36
|
||||
\OT1/ptm/m/n/12 stru-men-ta-tion and con-trol (I&C) sys-tems. Un-der-stand-ing cur-rent practices---and their limitations---
|
||||
[]
|
||||
|
||||
[2] [3] [4]
|
||||
Overfull \hbox (3.86827pt too wide) in paragraph at lines 215--223
|
||||
\OT1/ptm/m/n/12 organizational and sys-temic weak-nesses that cre-ate con-di-tions for fail-ure. Lloyd Du-mas's study [14]
|
||||
[]
|
||||
|
||||
[5]
|
||||
LaTeX Font Info: Font shape `OT1/ptm/bx/n' in size <12> not available
|
||||
(Font) Font shape `OT1/ptm/b/n' tried instead on input line 8.
|
||||
(Font) Font shape `OT1/ptm/b/n' tried instead on input line 275.
|
||||
LaTeX Font Info: Font shape `OT1/ptm/bx/n' in size <9> not available
|
||||
(Font) Font shape `OT1/ptm/b/n' tried instead on input line 8.
|
||||
(Font) Font shape `OT1/ptm/b/n' tried instead on input line 275.
|
||||
LaTeX Font Info: Font shape `OT1/ptm/bx/n' in size <7> not available
|
||||
(Font) Font shape `OT1/ptm/b/n' tried instead on input line 8.
|
||||
[2] [3] [4] [5] [6]) (./broader-impacts/v1.tex
|
||||
LaTeX Font Info: Trying to load font information for TS1+ptm on input line 14.
|
||||
(Font) Font shape `OT1/ptm/b/n' tried instead on input line 275.
|
||||
LaTeX Font Info: Trying to load font information for TS1+ptm on input line 307.
|
||||
(/usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/tex/latex/psnfss/ts1ptm.fd
|
||||
File: ts1ptm.fd 2001/06/04 font definitions for TS1/ptm.
|
||||
) [7]) (./metrics-of-success/v1.tex [8] [9]) [10] (./main.bbl) [11] (./main.aux)
|
||||
) [6] [7] [8]) (./research-approach/v3.tex [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]) (./broader-impacts/v1.tex [14]) (./metrics-of-success/v1.tex [15]) [16] [17] (./main.bbl
|
||||
Underfull \hbox (badness 10000) in paragraph at lines 9--12
|
||||
\OT1/cmtt/m/n/12 nuclear . org / information -[] library / safety -[] and -[] security / safety -[] of -[]
|
||||
[]
|
||||
|
||||
[18]) [19] (./main.aux)
|
||||
***********
|
||||
LaTeX2e <2023-11-01> patch level 1
|
||||
L3 programming layer <2024-01-22>
|
||||
***********
|
||||
)
|
||||
Here is how much of TeX's memory you used:
|
||||
25411 strings out of 476182
|
||||
527976 string characters out of 5795595
|
||||
1935975 words of memory out of 5000000
|
||||
46851 multiletter control sequences out of 15000+600000
|
||||
590488 words of font info for 105 fonts, out of 8000000 for 9000
|
||||
25443 strings out of 476182
|
||||
528350 string characters out of 5795595
|
||||
1934975 words of memory out of 5000000
|
||||
46876 multiletter control sequences out of 15000+600000
|
||||
592787 words of font info for 111 fonts, out of 8000000 for 9000
|
||||
14 hyphenation exceptions out of 8191
|
||||
110i,6n,107p,1008b,285s stack positions out of 10000i,1000n,20000p,200000b,200000s
|
||||
</usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmmi10.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmr10.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmsy10.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/symbol/usyr.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/times/utmb8a.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/times/utmbi8a.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/times/utmr8a.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/times/utmri8a.pfb>
|
||||
Output written on main.pdf (12 pages, 122324 bytes).
|
||||
110i,6n,107p,1008b,327s stack positions out of 10000i,1000n,20000p,200000b,200000s
|
||||
</usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmmi10.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmr10.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmsy10.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/public/amsfonts/cm/cmtt12.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/symbol/usyr.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/times/utmb8a.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/times/utmbi8a.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/times/utmr8a.pfb></usr/share/texlive/texmf-dist/fonts/type1/urw/times/utmri8a.pfb>
|
||||
Output written on main.pdf (20 pages, 159455 bytes).
|
||||
PDF statistics:
|
||||
111 PDF objects out of 1000 (max. 8388607)
|
||||
64 compressed objects within 1 object stream
|
||||
142 PDF objects out of 1000 (max. 8388607)
|
||||
85 compressed objects within 1 object stream
|
||||
0 named destinations out of 1000 (max. 500000)
|
||||
109 words of extra memory for PDF output out of 10000 (max. 10000000)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Binary file not shown.
Binary file not shown.
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
\maketitle
|
||||
\input{goals-and-outcomes/v6}
|
||||
\input{state-of-the-art/v3}
|
||||
\input{state-of-the-art/v4}
|
||||
\input{research-approach/v3}
|
||||
\input{broader-impacts/v1}
|
||||
\input{metrics-of-success/v1}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -329,3 +329,219 @@
|
||||
url = {https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/data-center-energy-needs-are-upending-power-grids-and-threatening-the-climate},
|
||||
note = {Accessed: 2025-09-29}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@techreport{DOE-HDBK-1028-2009,
|
||||
title = {Human Performance Handbook},
|
||||
author = {{U.S. Department of Energy}},
|
||||
institution = {U.S. Department of Energy},
|
||||
year = {2009},
|
||||
number = {DOE-HDBK-1028-2009},
|
||||
type = {Handbook}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@misc{WNA2020,
|
||||
title = {Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors},
|
||||
author = {{World Nuclear Association}},
|
||||
year = {2020},
|
||||
howpublished = {\url{https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/safety-of-nuclear-power-reactors.aspx}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{Wang2025,
|
||||
title = {Analysis of Human Error in Nuclear Power Plant Operations: A Systematic Review of Events from 2007--2020},
|
||||
author = {Wang, Y. and others},
|
||||
journal = {Journal of Nuclear Safety},
|
||||
year = {2025},
|
||||
note = {Analysis of 190 events at Chinese nuclear power plants}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@misc{10CFR55,
|
||||
title = {Operators' Licenses},
|
||||
author = {{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}},
|
||||
howpublished = {10 CFR Part 55},
|
||||
note = {Code of Federal Regulations}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@techreport{Kemeny1979,
|
||||
title = {Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island},
|
||||
author = {Kemeny, John G. and others},
|
||||
institution = {President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island},
|
||||
year = {1979},
|
||||
month = {October}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@misc{10CFR50,
|
||||
title = {Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities},
|
||||
author = {{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}},
|
||||
howpublished = {10 CFR Part 50},
|
||||
note = {Code of Federal Regulations}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@techreport{NUREG-0899,
|
||||
title = {Guidelines for the Preparation of Emergency Operating Procedures},
|
||||
author = {{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}},
|
||||
institution = {U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission},
|
||||
year = {1982},
|
||||
number = {NUREG-0899}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@techreport{IAEA-TECDOC-1580,
|
||||
title = {Good Practices for Cost Effective Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants},
|
||||
author = {{International Atomic Energy Agency}},
|
||||
institution = {International Atomic Energy Agency},
|
||||
year = {2007},
|
||||
number = {TECDOC-1580}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@techreport{NUREG-2114,
|
||||
title = {Cognitive Basis for Human Reliability Analysis},
|
||||
author = {{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}},
|
||||
institution = {U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission},
|
||||
year = {2016},
|
||||
number = {NUREG-2114}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{Zerovnik2023,
|
||||
title = {Knowledge Transfer Challenges in Nuclear Operations},
|
||||
author = {\v{Z}erovnik, Gašper and others},
|
||||
journal = {Nuclear Engineering and Design},
|
||||
year = {2023},
|
||||
note = {Analysis of knowledge transfer from experienced operators}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{Jo2021,
|
||||
title = {Automation Paradox in Nuclear Power Plant Control: Effects on Operator Situation Awareness},
|
||||
author = {Jo, Y. and others},
|
||||
journal = {Nuclear Engineering and Technology},
|
||||
year = {2021},
|
||||
note = {Empirical study of automation effects on operator performance}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@techreport{IAEA2008,
|
||||
title = {Modern Instrumentation and Control for Nuclear Power Plants: A Guidebook},
|
||||
author = {{International Atomic Energy Agency}},
|
||||
institution = {International Atomic Energy Agency},
|
||||
year = {2008},
|
||||
number = {Technical Reports Series No. 387}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{Lee2019,
|
||||
title = {Autonomous Control of Nuclear Reactors Using Long Short-Term Memory Networks},
|
||||
author = {Lee, D. and others},
|
||||
journal = {Nuclear Engineering and Technology},
|
||||
year = {2019},
|
||||
note = {Demonstration of LSTM-based autonomous control in LOC and SGTR scenarios}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@inproceedings{IEEE2019,
|
||||
title = {Formal Verification Challenges for Nuclear I\&C Systems},
|
||||
author = {{IEEE Working Group}},
|
||||
booktitle = {IEEE Conference on Nuclear Power Instrumentation, Control and Human-Machine Interface Technologies},
|
||||
year = {2019},
|
||||
note = {Discussion of state space explosion in formal verification}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@misc{IAEA-severe-accidents,
|
||||
title = {Human Error as Root Cause in Severe Nuclear Accidents},
|
||||
author = {{International Atomic Energy Agency}},
|
||||
howpublished = {IAEA Safety Report},
|
||||
note = {Analysis of TMI, Chernobyl, and Fukushima accidents}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{Dumas1999,
|
||||
title = {Worker Error and Safety in Nuclear Facilities},
|
||||
author = {Dumas, Lloyd},
|
||||
journal = {Journal of Nuclear Safety},
|
||||
year = {1999},
|
||||
note = {Study of incidents at 10 nuclear centers}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@techreport{IAEA-INSAG-1,
|
||||
title = {Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident},
|
||||
author = {{International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group}},
|
||||
institution = {International Atomic Energy Agency},
|
||||
year = {1986},
|
||||
number = {INSAG-1}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@techreport{IAEA-INSAG-7,
|
||||
title = {The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1},
|
||||
author = {{International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group}},
|
||||
institution = {International Atomic Energy Agency},
|
||||
year = {1992},
|
||||
number = {INSAG-7}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@techreport{NUREG-CR-1278,
|
||||
title = {Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications (THERP)},
|
||||
author = {Swain, A. D. and Guttmann, H. E.},
|
||||
institution = {U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission},
|
||||
year = {1983},
|
||||
number = {NUREG/CR-1278}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@techreport{NUREG-CR-6883,
|
||||
title = {The SPAR-H Human Reliability Analysis Method},
|
||||
author = {Gertman, D. and others},
|
||||
institution = {U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission},
|
||||
year = {2005},
|
||||
number = {NUREG/CR-6883}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@techreport{NUREG-2127,
|
||||
title = {International HRA Empirical Study: Phase 1 Report},
|
||||
author = {{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}},
|
||||
institution = {U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission},
|
||||
year = {2013},
|
||||
number = {NUREG-2127}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{Rasmussen1983,
|
||||
title = {Skills, Rules, and Knowledge; Signals, Signs, and Symbols, and Other Distinctions in Human Performance Models},
|
||||
author = {Rasmussen, J.},
|
||||
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics},
|
||||
year = {1983},
|
||||
volume = {SMC-13},
|
||||
number = {3},
|
||||
pages = {257--266}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{Miller1956,
|
||||
title = {The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information},
|
||||
author = {Miller, George A.},
|
||||
journal = {Psychological Review},
|
||||
year = {1956},
|
||||
volume = {63},
|
||||
number = {2},
|
||||
pages = {81--97}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@techreport{NUREG-2256,
|
||||
title = {Integrated Human Event Analysis System for Emergency Crew Actions (IDHEAS-ECA)},
|
||||
author = {{U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission}},
|
||||
institution = {U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission},
|
||||
year = {2022},
|
||||
number = {NUREG-2256}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@book{Reason1990,
|
||||
title = {Human Error},
|
||||
author = {Reason, James},
|
||||
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
|
||||
year = {1990}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{Lee2018,
|
||||
title = {Deep Reinforcement Learning for Autonomous Nuclear Reactor Control},
|
||||
author = {Lee, D. and others},
|
||||
journal = {Nuclear Engineering and Design},
|
||||
year = {2018},
|
||||
note = {Demonstration of autonomous control superior to human-plus-automation}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@techreport{Kiniry2022,
|
||||
title = {High Assurance Rigorous Digital Engineering for Nuclear Safety (HARDENS) Final Technical Report},
|
||||
author = {Kiniry, Joseph and Bakst, Alexander and Podhradsky, Michal and Hansen, Simon and Bivin, Andrew},
|
||||
institution = {Galois, Inc. / U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission},
|
||||
year = {2022},
|
||||
number = {ML22326A307},
|
||||
note = {NRC Contract 31310021C0014}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
487
Writing/ERLM/state-of-the-art/v4.tex
Normal file
487
Writing/ERLM/state-of-the-art/v4.tex
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,487 @@
|
||||
\section{State of the Art and Limits of Current Practice}
|
||||
|
||||
Nuclear reactor control represents a quintessential hybrid cyber-physical
|
||||
system. Continuous physical plant dynamics---neutron kinetics,
|
||||
thermal-hydraulics, heat transfer---interact with discrete control
|
||||
logic---mode transitions, trip decisions, valve states. Yet
|
||||
\textbf{formal hybrid control synthesis methods remain largely unapplied}
|
||||
to this safety-critical domain. This gap persists despite compelling
|
||||
evidence: human error contributes to \textbf{70--80\% of all nuclear
|
||||
incidents}~\cite{DOE-HDBK-1028-2009,WNA2020,Wang2025} even after four
|
||||
decades of improvements in training, procedures, and automation.
|
||||
|
||||
Current reactor control practices lack the mathematical guarantees that
|
||||
formal verification could provide. Recent efforts to apply formal
|
||||
methods---such as the HARDENS project---have addressed only discrete
|
||||
control logic without considering continuous reactor dynamics or
|
||||
experimental validation. This section examines three critical areas:
|
||||
existing reactor control practices and their fundamental limitations,
|
||||
the persistent impact of human factors in nuclear safety incidents, and
|
||||
pioneering formal methods efforts that demonstrate both the promise and
|
||||
current limitations of rigorous digital engineering for nuclear systems.
|
||||
Together, these areas reveal a clear research imperative: to develop
|
||||
mathematically verified hybrid controllers that provide safety
|
||||
guarantees across both continuous plant dynamics and discrete control
|
||||
logic while addressing the reliability limitations inherent in
|
||||
human-in-the-loop control.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Current Reactor Control Practices}
|
||||
|
||||
Nuclear reactor control in the United States and globally relies on a
|
||||
carefully orchestrated combination of human operators, written
|
||||
procedures, automated safety systems, and increasingly digital
|
||||
instrumentation and control (I\&C) systems. Understanding current
|
||||
practices---and their limitations---provides essential context for
|
||||
motivating formal hybrid control synthesis.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Human Operators Retain Ultimate Decision Authority}
|
||||
|
||||
Current generation nuclear power plants employ \textbf{3,600+ active
|
||||
NRC-licensed reactor operators} in the United States, divided into
|
||||
Reactor Operators (ROs) who manipulate reactor controls and Senior
|
||||
Reactor Operators (SROs) who direct plant operations and serve as shift
|
||||
supervisors~\cite{10CFR55}. These operators work in control rooms
|
||||
featuring mixed analog and digital displays, enhanced by Safety
|
||||
Parameter Display Systems (SPDS) mandated after the Three Mile Island
|
||||
accident. Staffing typically requires \textbf{2--4 operators per shift}
|
||||
for current generation plants, though advanced designs like NuScale have
|
||||
demonstrated that operations can be conducted with as few as three
|
||||
operators.
|
||||
|
||||
The role of human operators is paradoxically both critical and
|
||||
problematic. Operators hold legal authority under 10 CFR Part 55 to make
|
||||
critical decisions including departing from normal regulations during
|
||||
emergencies---a necessity for handling unforeseen scenarios but also a
|
||||
source of risk. The Three Mile Island accident demonstrated how
|
||||
``combination of personnel error, design deficiencies, and component
|
||||
failures'' led to partial meltdown when operators ``misread confusing
|
||||
and contradictory readings and shut off the emergency water
|
||||
system''~\cite{Kemeny1979}. The President's Commission on TMI identified
|
||||
a fundamental ambiguity: placing ``responsibility and accountability for
|
||||
safe power plant operations...on the licensee in all circumstances''
|
||||
without formal verification that operators can fulfill this
|
||||
responsibility under all conditions~\cite{Kemeny1979}. This tension
|
||||
between operational flexibility and safety assurance remains unresolved
|
||||
in current practice.
|
||||
|
||||
Advanced designs attempt to reduce operator burden through passive
|
||||
safety features and increased automation. NuScale's Small Modular
|
||||
Reactor design requires \textbf{no operator actions for 72 hours}
|
||||
following design-basis accidents and only two operator actions for
|
||||
beyond-design-basis events. However, even these advanced designs retain
|
||||
human operators for strategic decisions, procedure implementation, and
|
||||
override authority---preserving the human reliability challenges
|
||||
documented over four decades.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Operating Procedures Lack Formal Verification}
|
||||
|
||||
Nuclear plant procedures exist in a hierarchy: normal operating
|
||||
procedures for routine evolutions, abnormal operating procedures for
|
||||
off-normal conditions, Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) for
|
||||
design-basis accidents, Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs)
|
||||
for beyond-design-basis events, and Extensive Damage Mitigation
|
||||
Guidelines (EDMGs) for catastrophic damage scenarios. These procedures
|
||||
must comply with 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6)(ii) and are developed using guidance
|
||||
from NUREG-0899~\cite{NUREG-0899}, but their development process relies
|
||||
fundamentally on expert judgment and simulator validation rather than
|
||||
formal verification.
|
||||
|
||||
EOPs adopted a symptom-based approach following TMI, allowing operators
|
||||
to respond to plant conditions without first diagnosing root causes---a
|
||||
significant improvement over earlier event-based procedures. The BWR
|
||||
Owners' Group completed Revision 3 of integrated Emergency Procedure
|
||||
Guidelines/Severe Accident Guidelines in 2013, representing the current
|
||||
state of the art in procedure development. Procedures undergo technical
|
||||
evaluation, simulator validation testing, and biennial review as part of
|
||||
operator requalification under 10 CFR 55.59~\cite{10CFR55}.
|
||||
|
||||
Despite these rigorous development processes, \textbf{procedures
|
||||
fundamentally lack formal verification of key safety properties}. There
|
||||
is no mathematical proof that procedures cover all possible plant
|
||||
states, that required actions can be completed within available
|
||||
timeframes under all scenarios, or that transitions between procedure
|
||||
sets maintain safety invariants. As the IAEA notes in
|
||||
TECDOC-1580~\cite{IAEA-TECDOC-1580}, ``Most subsequent investigations
|
||||
identify internal and external industry operating experience that, if
|
||||
applied effectively, would have prevented the event''---a pattern
|
||||
suggesting that current procedure development methods cannot guarantee
|
||||
completeness.
|
||||
|
||||
\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{Procedures lack formal verification of
|
||||
correctness and completeness.} Current procedure development relies on
|
||||
expert judgment and simulator validation. No mathematical proof exists
|
||||
that procedures cover all possible plant states, that required actions
|
||||
can be completed within available timeframes, or that transitions
|
||||
between procedure sets maintain safety invariants. Paper-based
|
||||
procedures cannot adapt to novel combinations of failures, and even
|
||||
computer-based procedure systems lack the formal guarantees that
|
||||
automated reasoning could provide.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Control Mode Transitions Lack Formal Safety Verification}
|
||||
|
||||
Nuclear plants operate with multiple control modes: automatic control
|
||||
where the reactor control system maintains target parameters through
|
||||
continuous rod adjustment, manual control where operators directly
|
||||
manipulate control rods, and various intermediate modes. In typical PWR
|
||||
operation, the reactor control system automatically maintains floating
|
||||
average temperature, compensating for xenon effects and fuel burnup at
|
||||
rates limited to approximately 5\% power per minute. Safety systems
|
||||
operate with high automation---Reactor Protection Systems trip
|
||||
automatically on safety signals with millisecond response times, and
|
||||
Engineered Safety Features actuate automatically on accident signals
|
||||
without operator action required.
|
||||
|
||||
\textbf{The decision to transition between control modes relies on
|
||||
operator judgment} informed by plant stability, equipment availability,
|
||||
procedural requirements, and safety margins. However, current practice
|
||||
lacks formal verification that mode transitions maintain safety
|
||||
properties across all possible plant states. As \v{Z}erovnik et al.
|
||||
observe~\cite{Zerovnik2023}, ``Manual control may be demanded in nuclear
|
||||
power plants due to safety protocols. However, it may not be convenient
|
||||
in load-following regimes with frequent load changes''---highlighting
|
||||
the tension between operational flexibility and formal safety assurance.
|
||||
|
||||
Research by Jo et al.~\cite{Jo2021} reveals a concerning trade-off:
|
||||
``using procedures at high level of automation enables favorable
|
||||
operational performance with decreased mental workload; however,
|
||||
operator's situation awareness is decreased.'' This automation
|
||||
paradox---where increasing automation reduces errors from workload but
|
||||
increases errors from reduced vigilance---has been empirically
|
||||
demonstrated but not formally optimized. Operators may experience mode
|
||||
confusion, losing track of which control mode is active during complex
|
||||
scenarios.
|
||||
|
||||
\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{Mode transitions lack formal safety
|
||||
verification.} No formal proof exists that all mode transitions preserve
|
||||
safety invariants across the hybrid state space of continuous plant
|
||||
dynamics and discrete control logic. The automation paradox trade-off
|
||||
between reduced workload and reduced situation awareness has never been
|
||||
formally optimized with mathematical guarantees about the resulting
|
||||
reliability.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Current Automation Reveals the Hybrid Dynamics Challenge}
|
||||
|
||||
Approximately \textbf{40\% of the world's operating
|
||||
reactors}~\cite{IAEA2008} have undergone some digital I\&C upgrades,
|
||||
with 90\% of digital implementations representing modernization of
|
||||
existing analog systems. All reactors beginning construction after 1990
|
||||
incorporate digital I\&C components, with Asia leading adoption.
|
||||
|
||||
The current division between automated and human-controlled functions
|
||||
reveals the fundamental challenge of hybrid control. \textbf{Highly
|
||||
automated systems} handle reactor protection (automatic trip on safety
|
||||
parameters), emergency core cooling actuation, containment isolation,
|
||||
and basic process control. \textbf{Human operators retain control} of
|
||||
strategic decision-making (power level changes, startup/shutdown
|
||||
sequences, mode transitions), procedure implementation (emergency
|
||||
response strategy selection), override authority, and assessment and
|
||||
diagnosis of beyond-design-basis events.
|
||||
|
||||
Emerging technologies include deep reinforcement learning for autonomous
|
||||
control and Long Short-Term Memory networks for safety system control.
|
||||
Lee et al. demonstrated~\cite{Lee2019} that autonomous LSTM-based
|
||||
control achieved \textbf{performance superior to
|
||||
automation-plus-human-control} in simulated loss-of-coolant and steam
|
||||
generator tube rupture scenarios. Yet even these advanced autonomous
|
||||
control approaches lack formal verification, and as IEEE research
|
||||
documented~\cite{IEEE2019}, ``Introducing I\&C hardware failure modes to
|
||||
formal models comes at significant computational cost...state space
|
||||
explosion and prohibitively long processing times.''
|
||||
|
||||
\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{Current practice treats continuous plant
|
||||
dynamics and discrete control logic separately.} No application of
|
||||
hybrid control theory exists that could provide mathematical guarantees
|
||||
across mode transitions, verify timing properties formally, or optimize
|
||||
the automation-human interaction trade-off with provable safety bounds.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Human Factors in Nuclear Accidents}
|
||||
|
||||
The persistent role of human error in nuclear safety incidents, despite
|
||||
decades of improvements in training and procedures, provides perhaps the
|
||||
most compelling motivation for formal automated control with
|
||||
mathematical safety guarantees.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Human Error Dominates Nuclear Incident Causation}
|
||||
|
||||
Multiple independent analyses converge on a striking statistic:
|
||||
\textbf{70--80\% of all nuclear power plant events are attributed to
|
||||
human error} versus approximately 20\% to equipment
|
||||
failures~\cite{DOE-HDBK-1028-2009,WNA2020}. More significantly, the
|
||||
International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that ``human error was the
|
||||
root cause of all severe accidents at nuclear power plants''---a
|
||||
categorical statement spanning Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and
|
||||
Fukushima Daiichi~\cite{IAEA-severe-accidents}.
|
||||
|
||||
A detailed analysis of 190 events at Chinese nuclear power plants from
|
||||
2007--2020 by Wang et al.~\cite{Wang2025} found that 53\% involved
|
||||
active errors while 92\% were associated with latent errors---organiza%
|
||||
tional and systemic weaknesses that create conditions for failure. Lloyd
|
||||
Dumas's study~\cite{Dumas1999} found approximately 80\% of incidents at
|
||||
10 nuclear centers stemmed from worker error or poor procedures, with
|
||||
roughly 70\% from latent organizational weaknesses and 30\% from
|
||||
individual worker actions.
|
||||
|
||||
The persistence of this 70--80\% human error contribution despite
|
||||
\textbf{four decades of continuous improvements} in operator training,
|
||||
control room design, procedures, and human factors engineering suggests
|
||||
fundamental cognitive limitations rather than remediable deficiencies.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Three Mile Island Revealed Critical Human-Automation
|
||||
Interaction Failures}
|
||||
|
||||
The Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident on March 28, 1979 remains the
|
||||
definitive case study in human factors failures in nuclear operations.
|
||||
The accident began at 4:00 AM with a routine feedwater pump trip,
|
||||
escalating when a pressure-operated relief valve (PORV) stuck
|
||||
open---draining reactor coolant---but control room instrumentation
|
||||
showed only whether the valve had been commanded to close, not whether
|
||||
it actually closed. When Emergency Core Cooling System pumps
|
||||
automatically activated as designed, \textbf{operators made the fateful
|
||||
decision to shut them down} based on their incorrect assessment of plant
|
||||
conditions.
|
||||
|
||||
President's Commission chairman John Kemeny documented~\cite{Kemeny1979}
|
||||
how operators faced more than 100 simultaneous alarms, overwhelming
|
||||
their cognitive capacity. The core suffered partial meltdown with
|
||||
\textbf{44\% of the fuel melting} before the situation was stabilized.
|
||||
|
||||
Quantitative risk analysis revealed the magnitude of failure in existing
|
||||
safety assessment methods: the actual core damage probability was
|
||||
approximately \textbf{5\% per year} while Probabilistic Risk Assessment
|
||||
had predicted 0.01\% per year---a \textbf{500-fold underestimation}.
|
||||
This dramatic failure demonstrated that human reliability could not be
|
||||
adequately assessed through expert judgment and historical data alone.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Human Reliability Analysis Documents Fundamental Cognitive
|
||||
Limitations}
|
||||
|
||||
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods developed over four decades
|
||||
quantify human error probabilities and performance shaping factors. The
|
||||
SPAR-H method~\cite{NUREG-CR-6883} represents current best practice,
|
||||
providing nominal Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) of \textbf{0.01 (1\%)
|
||||
for diagnosis tasks} and \textbf{0.001 (0.1\%) for action tasks} under
|
||||
optimal conditions.
|
||||
|
||||
However, these nominal error rates degrade dramatically under realistic
|
||||
accident conditions: inadequate available time increases HEP by
|
||||
\textbf{10-fold}, extreme stress by \textbf{5-fold}, high complexity by
|
||||
\textbf{5-fold}, missing procedures by \textbf{50-fold}, and poor
|
||||
ergonomics by \textbf{50-fold}. Under combined adverse conditions
|
||||
typical of severe accidents, human error probabilities can approach
|
||||
\textbf{0.1 to 1.0 (10\% to 100\%)}---essentially guaranteed failure for
|
||||
complex diagnosis tasks~\cite{NUREG-2114}.
|
||||
|
||||
Rasmussen's influential 1983 taxonomy~\cite{Rasmussen1983} divides human
|
||||
errors into skill-based (highly practiced responses, HEP $10^{-3}$ to
|
||||
$10^{-4}$), rule-based (following procedures, HEP $10^{-2}$ to
|
||||
$10^{-1}$), and knowledge-based (novel problem solving, HEP $10^{-1}$ to
|
||||
1). Severe accidents inherently require knowledge-based responses where
|
||||
human reliability is lowest. Miller's classic 1956
|
||||
finding~\cite{Miller1956} that working memory capacity is limited to
|
||||
\textbf{7$\pm$2 chunks} explains why Three Mile Island's 100+
|
||||
simultaneous alarms exceeded operators' processing capacity.
|
||||
|
||||
\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{Human factors impose fundamental reliability
|
||||
limits that cannot be overcome through training alone.} Response time
|
||||
limitations constrain human effectiveness---reactor protection systems
|
||||
must respond in milliseconds, \textbf{100--1000 times faster than human
|
||||
operators}. Cognitive biases systematically distort judgment:
|
||||
confirmation bias, overconfidence, and anchoring bias are inherent
|
||||
features of human cognition, not individual failings~\cite{Reason1990}.
|
||||
The persistent 70--80\% human error contribution despite four decades of
|
||||
improvements demonstrates that these limitations are \textbf{fundamental
|
||||
rather than remediable}.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{HARDENS: Discrete Control with Gaps in Hybrid Dynamics}
|
||||
|
||||
The High Assurance Rigorous Digital Engineering for Nuclear Safety
|
||||
(HARDENS) project, completed by Galois, Inc. for the U.S. Nuclear
|
||||
Regulatory Commission in 2022, represents the most advanced application
|
||||
of formal methods to nuclear reactor control systems to
|
||||
date---and simultaneously reveals the critical gaps that remain.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Rigorous Digital Engineering Demonstrated Feasibility}
|
||||
|
||||
HARDENS aimed to address the nuclear industry's fundamental dilemma:
|
||||
existing U.S. nuclear control rooms rely on analog technologies from the
|
||||
1950s--60s, making construction costs exceed \$500 million and timelines
|
||||
stretch to decades. The NRC contracted Galois to demonstrate that
|
||||
Model-Based Systems Engineering and formal methods could design, verify,
|
||||
and implement a complex protection system meeting regulatory criteria at
|
||||
a fraction of typical cost.
|
||||
|
||||
The project delivered far beyond its scope, creating what Galois
|
||||
describes as ``the world's most advanced, high-assurance protection
|
||||
system demonstrator.'' Completed in \textbf{nine months at a tiny
|
||||
fraction of typical control system costs}~\cite{Kiniry2022}, the project
|
||||
produced a complete Reactor Trip System (RTS) implementation with full
|
||||
traceability from NRC Request for Proposals and IEEE standards through
|
||||
formal architecture specifications to formally verified binaries and
|
||||
hardware running on FPGA demonstrator boards.
|
||||
|
||||
Principal Investigator Joseph Kiniry led the team in applying Galois's
|
||||
Rigorous Digital Engineering methodology combining model-based
|
||||
engineering, digital twins with measurable fidelity, and applied formal
|
||||
methods. The approach integrates multiple abstraction levels---from
|
||||
semi-formal natural language requirements through formal specifications
|
||||
to verified implementations---all maintained as integrated artifacts
|
||||
rather than separate documentation prone to divergence.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Comprehensive Formal Methods Toolkit Provided Verification}
|
||||
|
||||
HARDENS employed an impressive array of formal methods tools and
|
||||
techniques across the verification hierarchy. High-level specifications
|
||||
used Lando, SysMLv2, and FRET (NASA JPL's Formal Requirements
|
||||
Elicitation Tool) to capture stakeholder requirements, domain
|
||||
engineering, certification requirements, and safety requirements.
|
||||
Requirements were formally analyzed for \textbf{consistency,
|
||||
completeness, and realizability} using SAT and SMT solvers---verification
|
||||
that current procedure development methods lack.
|
||||
|
||||
Executable formal models employed Cryptol to create an executable
|
||||
behavioral model of the entire RTS including all subsystems, components,
|
||||
and formal digital twin models of sensors, actuators, and compute
|
||||
infrastructure. Automatic code synthesis generated formally verifiable C
|
||||
implementations and System Verilog hardware implementations directly
|
||||
from Cryptol models---eliminating the traditional gap between
|
||||
specification and implementation where errors commonly arise.
|
||||
|
||||
Formal verification tools included SAW (Software Analysis Workbench) for
|
||||
proving equivalence between models and implementations, Frama-C for C
|
||||
code verification, and Yosys for hardware verification. HARDENS verified
|
||||
both automatically synthesized and hand-written implementations against
|
||||
their models and against each other, providing redundant assurance
|
||||
paths.
|
||||
|
||||
This multi-layered verification approach represents a quantum leap
|
||||
beyond current nuclear I\&C verification practices, which rely primarily
|
||||
on testing and simulation. HARDENS demonstrated that \textbf{complete
|
||||
formal verification from requirements to implementation is technically
|
||||
feasible} for safety-critical nuclear control systems.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Critical Limitation: Discrete Control Logic Only}
|
||||
|
||||
Despite its impressive accomplishments, HARDENS has a fundamental
|
||||
limitation directly relevant to hybrid control synthesis: \textbf{the
|
||||
project addressed only discrete digital control logic without modeling
|
||||
or verifying continuous reactor dynamics}. The Reactor Trip System
|
||||
specification and formal verification covered discrete state transitions
|
||||
(trip/no-trip decisions), digital sensor input processing through
|
||||
discrete logic, and discrete actuation outputs (reactor trip commands).
|
||||
The system correctly implements the digital control logic for reactor
|
||||
protection with mathematical guarantees.
|
||||
|
||||
However, the project did not address continuous dynamics of nuclear
|
||||
reactor physics including neutron kinetics, thermal-hydraulics, xenon
|
||||
oscillations, fuel temperature feedback, coolant flow dynamics, and heat
|
||||
transfer---all governed by continuous differential equations. Real
|
||||
reactor safety depends on the interaction between continuous processes
|
||||
(temperature, pressure, neutron flux evolving according to differential
|
||||
equations) and discrete control decisions (trip/no-trip, valve
|
||||
open/close, pump on/off). HARDENS verified the discrete controller in
|
||||
isolation but not the closed-loop hybrid system behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{HARDENS addressed discrete control logic
|
||||
without continuous dynamics or hybrid system verification.} Hybrid
|
||||
automata, differential dynamic logic, or similar hybrid systems
|
||||
formalisms would be required to specify and verify properties like ``the
|
||||
controller maintains core temperature below safety limits under all
|
||||
possible disturbances''---a property that inherently spans continuous and
|
||||
discrete dynamics. Verifying discrete control logic alone provides no
|
||||
guarantee that the closed-loop system exhibits desired continuous
|
||||
behavior such as stability, convergence to setpoints, or maintained
|
||||
safety margins.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Experimental Validation Gap Limits Technology Readiness}
|
||||
|
||||
The second critical limitation is \textbf{absence of experimental
|
||||
validation} in actual nuclear facilities or realistic operational
|
||||
environments. HARDENS produced a demonstrator system at Technology
|
||||
Readiness Level 3--4 (analytical proof of concept with laboratory
|
||||
breadboard validation) rather than a deployment-ready system validated
|
||||
through extended operational testing. The NRC Final Report explicitly
|
||||
notes~\cite{Kiniry2022}: ``All material is considered in development and
|
||||
not a finalized product'' and ``The demonstration of its technical
|
||||
soundness was to be at a level consistent with satisfaction of the
|
||||
current regulatory criteria, although with no explicit demonstration of
|
||||
how regulatory requirements are met.''
|
||||
|
||||
The project did not include deployment in actual nuclear facilities,
|
||||
testing with real reactor systems under operational conditions,
|
||||
side-by-side validation with operational analog RTS systems, systematic
|
||||
failure mode testing (radiation effects, electromagnetic interference,
|
||||
temperature extremes), actual NRC licensing review, or human factors
|
||||
validation with licensed nuclear operators in realistic control room
|
||||
scenarios.
|
||||
|
||||
\textbf{LIMITATION:} \textit{HARDENS achieved TRL 3--4 without experimental
|
||||
validation.} While formal verification provides mathematical correctness
|
||||
guarantees for the implemented discrete logic, the gap between formal
|
||||
verification and actual system deployment involves myriad practical
|
||||
considerations: integration with legacy systems, long-term reliability
|
||||
under harsh environments, human-system interaction in realistic
|
||||
operational contexts, and regulatory acceptance of formal methods as
|
||||
primary assurance evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Research Imperative: Formal Hybrid Control Synthesis}
|
||||
|
||||
Three converging lines of evidence establish an urgent research
|
||||
imperative for formal hybrid control synthesis applied to nuclear
|
||||
reactor systems.
|
||||
|
||||
\textbf{Current reactor control practices} reveal fundamental gaps in
|
||||
verification. Procedures lack mathematical proofs of completeness or
|
||||
timing adequacy. Mode transitions preserve safety properties only
|
||||
informally. Operator decision-making relies on training rather than
|
||||
verified algorithms. The divide between continuous plant dynamics and
|
||||
discrete control logic has never been bridged with formal methods.
|
||||
Despite extensive regulatory frameworks developed over six decades,
|
||||
\textbf{no mathematical guarantees exist} that current control approaches
|
||||
maintain safety under all possible scenarios.
|
||||
|
||||
\textbf{Human factors in nuclear accidents} demonstrate that human error
|
||||
contributes to 70--80\% of nuclear incidents despite four decades of
|
||||
systematic improvements. The IAEA's categorical statement that ``human
|
||||
error was the root cause of all severe accidents'' reveals fundamental
|
||||
cognitive limitations: working memory capacity of 7$\pm$2 chunks,
|
||||
response times of seconds to minutes versus milliseconds required,
|
||||
cognitive biases immune to training, stress-induced performance
|
||||
degradation. Human Reliability Analysis methods document error
|
||||
probabilities of 0.001--0.01 under optimal conditions degrading to
|
||||
0.1--1.0 under realistic accident conditions. These limitations
|
||||
\textbf{cannot be overcome through human factors improvements alone}.
|
||||
|
||||
\textbf{The HARDENS project} proved that formal verification is
|
||||
technically feasible and economically viable for nuclear control
|
||||
systems, achieving complete verification from requirements to
|
||||
implementation in nine months at a fraction of typical costs. However,
|
||||
HARDENS addressed only discrete control logic without considering
|
||||
continuous reactor dynamics or hybrid system verification, and the
|
||||
demonstrator achieved only TRL 3--4 without experimental validation in
|
||||
realistic nuclear environments. These limitations directly define the
|
||||
research frontier: \textbf{formal synthesis of hybrid controllers that
|
||||
provide mathematical safety guarantees across both continuous plant
|
||||
dynamics and discrete control logic}.
|
||||
|
||||
The research opportunity is clear. Nuclear reactors are quintessential
|
||||
hybrid cyber-physical systems where continuous neutron kinetics,
|
||||
thermal-hydraulics, and heat transfer interact with discrete control
|
||||
mode decisions, trip logic, and valve states. Current practice treats
|
||||
these domains separately---reactor physics analyzed with simulation,
|
||||
control logic verified through testing, human operators expected to
|
||||
integrate everything through procedures. \textbf{Hybrid control
|
||||
synthesis offers the possibility of unified formal treatment} where
|
||||
controllers are automatically generated from high-level safety
|
||||
specifications with mathematical proofs that guarantee safe operation
|
||||
across all modes, all plant states, and all credible disturbances.
|
||||
|
||||
Recent advances in hybrid systems theory---including reachability
|
||||
analysis, barrier certificates, counterexample-guided inductive
|
||||
synthesis, and satisfiability modulo theories for hybrid systems---provide
|
||||
the theoretical foundation. Computational advances enable verification of
|
||||
systems with continuous state spaces that were intractable a decade ago.
|
||||
The confluence of mature formal methods, powerful verification tools
|
||||
demonstrated by HARDENS, urgent safety imperatives documented by
|
||||
persistent human error statistics, and fundamental gaps in current
|
||||
hybrid dynamics treatment creates a compelling and timely research
|
||||
opportunity.
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user