

# Formally Verified Autonomous Hybrid Control

**Dane A. Sabo**  
dane.sabo@pitt.edu

**Dr. Daniel G. Cole**  
dgcole@pitt.edu

University of Pittsburgh


December 7, 2025



# The United States stands on the precipice of a severe energy crisis

## Electricity consumption at U.S. data centers is expected to more than double by 2030

Total electricity consumption by U.S. data centers (terawatt-hours)




Source: Pew Research Center, Data from IEA

How much baseload power increase is this?

# The United States stands on the precipice of a severe energy crisis

**Electricity consumption at U.S. data centers is expected to more than double by 2030**

*Total electricity consumption by U.S. data centers (terawatt-hours)*



Source: Pew Research Center, Data from IEA

How much baseload power increase is this?



**30 gigawatts!**

# Nuclear reactors are operated with prescriptive handbooks and legacy control technologies



# Building a fleet of new reactors with current requirements will be an incredible staffing challenge

How many reactor operators are required to staff this new fleet?



For one Small Modular Reactor (SMR)...

# Building a fleet of new reactors with current requirements will be an incredible staffing challenge

How many reactor operators are required to staff this new fleet?

24/7 operations require  $\sim 6$  shifts:



For one Small Modular Reactor (SMR)...



12 SROs



12 ROs



24 licensed operators per reactor

**To meet demand we require 2,400 new licensed operators!**

# Building a fleet of new reactors with current requirements will be an incredible staffing challenge

How many reactor operators are required to staff this new fleet?

24/7 operations require  $\sim 6$  shifts:



For one Small Modular Reactor (SMR)...



12 SROs

12 ROs


24 licensed operators per reactor

**To meet demand we require 2,400 new licensed operators!**

*We currently have only 3,600 licensed operators total...*


# Human reactor operators have key limitations that limit nuclear buildout

Humans cannot meet  
labor demand



# Human reactor operators have key limitations that limit nuclear buildout

Humans cannot meet labor demand



Procedures are not formally verified



# Human reactor operators have key limitations that limit nuclear buildout

Humans cannot meet labor demand



Procedures are not formally verified



Human factors cannot be trained away



# The goal of this research is to create verified autonomous control systems

If this research is successful, we will be able to do the following:

# The goal of this research is to create verified autonomous control systems

If this research is successful, we will be able to do the following:

- 1 Translate written procedures into discrete control logic

# The goal of this research is to create verified autonomous control systems

If this research is successful, we will be able to do the following:

- 1 Translate written procedures into discrete control logic
- 2 Verify continuous control behavior across discrete mode transitions

# The goal of this research is to create verified autonomous control systems

If this research is successful, we will be able to do the following:

- 1 Translate written procedures into discrete control logic
- 2 Verify continuous control behavior across discrete mode transitions
- 3 Demonstrate autonomous reactor startup with verifiable safety guarantees

# First, we will formalize written procedures into logical statements

## APPENDIX 19-1 Plant Startup from Cold Shutdown

### I. INITIAL CONDITIONS

#### 1. Cold Shutdown - MODE 5:

- $K_{\text{eff}} < 0.99$
- 0% power
- $T_{\text{avg}} < 200^{\circ}\text{F}$

#### 2. Reactor Coolant System: solid.

#### 3. RCS Temperature: 150 - 160°F.

**Note:**

*Temperature may be less than 150°F depending upon the decay heat load of the core.*

4. RCS Pressure: 320 - 400 psig.
5. Steam Generators: filled to wet layup (100% wide-range level indication).
6. Secondary Systems: shutdown, main turbine and feedwater pump turbines on their turning gears.
7. Pre-Startup Checklists: completed.

Westinghouse Technology Systems Manual, Section 19.0 - Plant Operations

# First, we will formalize written procedures into logical statements

## APPENDIX 19-1 Plant Startup from Cold Shutdown

### I. INITIAL CONDITIONS

#### 1. Cold Shutdown - MODE 5:

- $K_{\text{eff}} < 0.99$
- 0% power
- $T_{\text{avg}} < 200^{\circ}\text{F}$

#### 2. Reactor Coolant System: solid.

#### 3. RCS Temperature: 150 - 160°F.

**Note:**

*Temperature may be less than 150°F depending upon the decay heat load of the core.*

4. RCS Pressure: 320 - 400 psig.
5. Steam Generators: filled to wet layup (100% wide-range level indication).
6. Secondary Systems: shutdown, main turbine and feedwater pump turbines on their turning gears.
7. Pre-Startup Checklists: completed.

## FRET Specification

INITIAL\_CONDITIONS shall satisfy:

mode = MODE\_5

$k_{\text{eff}} < 0.99$

power = 0

$t_{\text{avg}} < 200$

...

# First, we will formalize written procedures into logical statements

## APPENDIX 19-1 Plant Startup from Cold Shutdown

### I. INITIAL CONDITIONS

#### 1. Cold Shutdown - MODE 5:

- $K_{\text{eff}} < 0.99$
- 0% power
- $T_{\text{avg}} < 200^{\circ}\text{F}$

#### 2. Reactor Coolant System: solid.

#### 3. RCS Temperature: 150 - 160°F.

#### Note:

*Temperature may be less than 150°F depending upon the decay heat load of the core.*

4. RCS Pressure: 320 - 400 psig.
5. Steam Generators: filled to wet layup (100% wide-range level indication).
6. Secondary Systems: shutdown, main turbine and feedwater pump turbines on their turning gears.
7. Pre-Startup Checklists: completed.

## FRET Specification

INITIAL\_CONDITIONS shall satisfy:


```
mode = MODE_5
k_eff < 0.99
power = 0
t_avg < 200
...
```

## LTL Formula



```
□ (initial → (
    mode_5_active ∧
    k_eff_subcritical ∧
    zero_power ∧
    temp_safe ∧
    ...))
```

Westinghouse Technology Systems Manual, Section 19.0 - Plant Operations


Second, we will use reactive synthesis to convert the logical formulae to generate discrete automata




Second, we will use reactive synthesis to convert the logical formulae to generate discrete automata



# Finally, we will build continuous controllers to move between discrete states




# Finally, we will build continuous controllers to move between discrete states



## Key Challenge

Verify continuous control behavior across discrete mode transitions

# Finally, we will build continuous controllers to move between discrete states




## Key Challenge

Verify continuous control behavior across discrete mode transitions

## Reachable Set

$$\mathcal{R}(t) = \{x(t) \mid x(0) \in X_0, \dot{x} = f(x)\}$$

# Finally, we will build continuous controllers to move between discrete states



## Key Challenge

Verify continuous control behavior across discrete mode transitions

## Reachable Set

$$\mathcal{R}(t) = \{x(t) \mid x(0) \in X_0, \dot{x} = f(x)\}$$

## Barrier Certificate

$$B(x) > 0 \wedge \nabla B \cdot f(x) \leq 0 \implies x \in \text{Safe}$$


# Success will be measured through Technology Readiness Level advancement

## Why TRLs?

Bridge gap between proof-of-concept and deployment

Measure both rigor and feasibility

**TRL 3**  
Components



**Current:** TRL 2-3

**Target:** TRL 5

# Success will be measured through Technology Readiness Level advancement

## Why TRLs?


Bridge gap between proof-of-concept and deployment

Measure both rigor and feasibility


**Current:** TRL 2-3

**Target:** TRL 5

**TRL 3**  
Components



**TRL 4**  
Integration



# Success will be measured through Technology Readiness Level advancement

## Why TRLs?


Bridge gap between proof-of-concept and deployment

Measure both rigor and feasibility


**Current:** TRL 2-3

**Target:** TRL 5


**TRL 3**  
Components



**TRL 4**  
Integration



**TRL 5**  
Hardware



# Four primary risks are identified with clear mitigation and contingency plans

## 1 Computational Tractability of Synthesis

# Four primary risks are identified with clear mitigation and contingency plans

- 1 Computational Tractability of Synthesis
- 2 Discrete-Continuous Interface Complexity

# Four primary risks are identified with clear mitigation and contingency plans

- 1 Computational Tractability of Synthesis
- 2 Discrete-Continuous Interface Complexity
- 3 Procedure Formalization Completeness

# Four primary risks are identified with clear mitigation and contingency plans

- 1 Computational Tractability of Synthesis
- 2 Discrete-Continuous Interface Complexity
- 3 Procedure Formalization Completeness
- 4 Hardware-in-the-Loop Integration

# Broader Impact: Multi-billion dollar O&M cost reduction

## The Economic Opportunity

Datacenter electricity demand projected to reach **1,050 TWh/year** by 2030

**If supplied by nuclear power:**

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Total annual cost} &= 1,050 \text{ TWh/yr} \times \$88.24/\text{MWh} \\ &= \mathbf{\$92.7 \text{ billion/year}}\end{aligned}$$

# Broader Impact: Multi-billion dollar O&M cost reduction

## The Economic Opportunity

Datacenter electricity demand projected to reach **1,050 TWh/year** by 2030

**If supplied by nuclear power:**

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Total annual cost} &= 1,050 \text{ TWh/yr} \times \$88.24/\text{MWh} \\ &= \mathbf{\$92.7 \text{ billion/year}}\end{aligned}$$

**O&M represents 23-30% of LCOE:**

$$\begin{aligned}\text{O\&M costs} &= \$92.7\text{B} \times 0.23\text{-}0.30 \\ &= \mathbf{\$21\text{-}28 \text{ billion/year}}\end{aligned}$$

# Broader Impact: Multi-billion dollar O&M cost reduction

## The Economic Opportunity

Datacenter electricity demand projected to reach **1,050 TWh/year** by 2030

**If supplied by nuclear power:**

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Total annual cost} &= 1,050 \text{ TWh/yr} \times \$88.24/\text{MWh} \\ &= \mathbf{\$92.7 \text{ billion/year}}\end{aligned}$$

**O&M represents 23-30% of LCOE:**

$$\begin{aligned}\text{O\&M costs} &= \$92.7\text{B} \times 0.23\text{-}0.30 \\ &= \mathbf{\$21\text{-}28 \text{ billion/year}}\end{aligned}$$

# Beyond nuclear: A generalizable framework for safety-critical autonomy

## Why Nuclear First?

- Highest regulatory requirements
- Most safety-critical domain
- Procedures already documented
- Establishes regulatory pathway

## Future Applications

- Chemical process control
- Aerospace systems
- Autonomous transportation
- Critical infrastructure

**Translate procedures → Synthesize logic → Verify behavior**  
Applicable to any hybrid system with documented operational requirements

# Formally Verified Autonomous Hybrid Control

Enabling Economic Viability  
of Next-Generation Nuclear  
Power

**Dane A. Sabo**

dane.sabo@pitt.edu

**Advisor:**

Dr. Daniel G. Cole

dgcole@pitt.edu

University of Pittsburgh  
Department of Mechanical  
Engineering and Materials Science

