From 2d97e5032bd44fc7c294f38f038c1916984f8031 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dane Sabo <dane.sabo@pitt.edu>
Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2025 16:55:19 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] thesis ideas

---
 .../Editing/thesis_ideas_notes.md             | 125 +++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 119 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Zettelkasten/Fleeting Notes/Editing/thesis_ideas_notes.md b/Zettelkasten/Fleeting Notes/Editing/thesis_ideas_notes.md
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@@ -8,12 +8,125 @@ What needs done:
 
 - [X] Review and edit 2
 
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-    - [ ] Write an impact section
+- [X] Review and edit 3
+    - [X] Write an impact section
 
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-    - [ ] Needs more goal 
+- [X] Review and edit 4
+    - [X] Needs more goal 
 
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+- [X] Review and edit 5
 
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+- [X] Review and edit 6
+
+## Discussion Cheat Sheet
+
+Chat helped with this
+
+### Temporal Logic Specifications for Autonomous Controller
+Synthesis
+- **Feasibility:** ★★★★★  
+- **Impact:** ★★★★☆  
+- **Merit:** ★★★★★  
+
+**Scope Boundaries:**  Focus on one subsystem (e.g., rod
+supervisory control), one specification language, and
+existing synthesis tools (TLA+, FRET, Strix).  
+
+**Key Risk:**  State space explosion during synthesis could
+make controller generation intractable.  
+
+**Mitigation Strategy:**  Use bounded abstractions,
+compositional synthesis, and validate the synthesized
+controller on a high-fidelity simulation before scaling up.
+
+---
+
+### Formally Verified Runtime Monitoring and Fallback
+- **Feasibility:** ★★★★★  
+- **Impact:** ★★★★☆  
+- **Merit:** ★★★★☆  
+
+**Scope Boundaries:**  Single primary controller with one
+fallback controller, one LTL specification set, and
+integration with ARCADE.  
+
+**Key Risk:**  Limited novelty if scoped too narrowly or
+perceived as a straightforward engineering integration.  
+
+**Mitigation Strategy:**  Emphasize automation of
+specification-to-monitor translation, nuclear-specific
+verification, and proof artifact generation to show novelty.
+
+---
+
+### Verified Adaptive Control
+- **Feasibility:** ★★★★☆  
+- **Impact:** ★★★★☆  
+- **Merit:** ★★★★☆  
+
+**Scope Boundaries:**  One subsystem (rod control), one
+adaptation method, runtime contract monitoring only.  
+
+**Key Risk:**  Over-scoping to multiple adaptation targets
+or attempting plant-wide adaptive control.  
+
+**Mitigation Strategy:**  Pick representative degradation
+types (e.g., HX fouling, pump efficiency drop); limit
+adaptation to parameter tuning inside pre-verified safe
+envelopes.
+
+---
+
+### Integrating Shielding into Nuclear Power Control
+- **Feasibility:** ★★★★☆  
+- **Impact:** ★★★★☆  
+- **Merit:** ★★★★☆  
+
+**Scope Boundaries:**  One ML control task (e.g., startup or
+load-following), one shield synthesis approach from temporal
+logic.  
+
+**Key Risk:**  Regulatory and industry reluctance toward ML
+in safety-critical nuclear applications.  
+
+**Mitigation Strategy:**  Demonstrate shielding benefits for
+both ML and conventional controllers to broaden acceptance.
+
+---
+
+### Improved: Data-Driven Fault Detection Using
+High-Assurance Digital Twins
+- **Feasibility:** ★★★★☆  
+- **Impact:** ★★★★☆  
+- **Merit:** ★★★★☆  
+
+**Scope Boundaries:**  Limit to 3–4 high-impact fault types
+(e.g., secondary coolant loss, HX fouling, sensor drift),
+residual-based detection with physics-informed models.  
+
+**Key Risk:**  Scope creep into too many fault scenarios or
+overly complex ML methods.  
+
+**Mitigation Strategy:**  Focus on explainable,
+physics-informed detection; tie mitigation responses
+directly to NRC-aligned safety procedures.
+
+---
+
+### Formally Verified Neural Network Control of Control Rod
+System
+- **Feasibility:** ★★★☆☆  
+- **Impact:** ★★★★☆  
+- **Merit:** ★★★☆☆  
+
+**Scope Boundaries:**  Small, well-structured NN
+architecture; bounded state space; one primary safety
+property (shutdown margin).  
+
+**Key Risk:**  Scalability issues in SMT/MILP verification
+for larger or more complex networks.  
+
+**Mitigation Strategy:**  Constrain network size and
+complexity; limit verification domain to tractable operating
+regions; focus on proof-of-concept that shows
+nuclear-specific applicability.